Financial Statement Disclosure of Carbon Footprint Costs in the Airline Industry by Tuck-Riggs, Carol Anne
Walden University
ScholarWorks
Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Walden Dissertations and Doctoral StudiesCollection
2015
Financial Statement Disclosure of Carbon
Footprint Costs in the Airline Industry
Carol Anne Tuck-Riggs
Walden University
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.waldenu.edu/dissertations
Part of the Accounting Commons, Economics Commons, Natural Resource Economics
Commons, and the Sustainability Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies Collection at ScholarWorks. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks. For more information, please
contact ScholarWorks@waldenu.edu.
  
 
 
 
 
 
Walden University 
 
 
 
College of Management and Technology 
 
 
 
 
This is to certify that the doctoral dissertation by 
 
 
Carol Riggs 
 
 
has been found to be complete and satisfactory in all respects, 
and that any and all revisions required by 
the review committee have been made. 
 
 
Review Committee 
Dr. Mohammad Sharifzadeh, Committee Chairperson, Management Faculty 
Dr. David Gould, Committee Member, Management Faculty 
Dr. Jeffrey Prinster, University Reviewer, Management Faculty 
 
 
 
 
Chief Academic Officer 
Eric Riedel, Ph.D. 
 
 
 
Walden University 
2015 
  
Abstract 
Financial Statement Disclosure of Carbon Footprint Costs in the Airline Industry 
by 
Carol A. Tuck-Riggs 
 
CPA, Institute of Chartered Professional Accountants, 2012 
MBA, York University, 1998 
BAS, York University, 1993 
CMA, Society of Management Accountants, 1989 
 
 
Dissertation Submitted in Partial Fulfillment 
of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Doctor of Philosophy 
Management 
 
 
Walden University 
February 2015
  
Abstract 
Unaccountable corporate polluters profit short term at the expense of global economic 
sustainability. The purpose of this study was to determine if carbon dioxide (CO2) 
penalties on the airline emissions would result in financial statement disclosure and 
emission mitigation. Contributing to environmental accounting, the study was based in 
corporate social responsibility with a conceptual framework based on economically-
centered CO2 studies. A random sample of 69 global airlines, taken from the International 
Air Transport Association (IATA), and the International Civil Aviation Organization 
(ICAO) memberships, was stratified between EU bound and non-EU bound airlines. The 
research questions explored (a) the frequency mean differences in disclosed CO2 costs 
between the strata based upon the European Union’s environmental trading scheme (EU-
ETS) and (b) whether international financial reporting standards (IFRS) influenced the 
financial statement reporting of CO2 emissions costs. Financial statement data was 
analyzed in a 3-year longitudinal, ex-post, quasi-experimental, repeated measures 
factorial ANOVA and ANCOVA, pretest-posttest control group design. The results 
showed significant CO2 disclosure differences between the experimental (EU bound) 
airlines and control group (non-EU) airlines and for those airlines with IFRS prepared 
statements, indicating that government regulation was needed for the disclosure of 
pollution costs. These results should convince accounting practitioners that the 
quantification and reporting of greenhouse gas pollutions can become the catalyst for 
improved operations and commercial sustainability. Positive social change to mitigate 
anthropogenic pollution should result and should promote normative accounting practice 
to hold those responsible to a higher global accountability.
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Chapter 1: Introduction to the Study 
Anthropogenic pollution is destroying the earth’s life sustaining systems and the 
species that currently live on the earth (Gaglemann & Hansjurgens, 2002; Hopwood, 
2009; Janmaat & Braun, 2009; Kolk, Levy, & Pinkse, 2008; MacKenzie, 2009; Smale, 
Hartley, Hepbur, Ward, & Grubb, 2006). The European Union (EU) has taken the 
initiative to quantify the anthropogenic destruction caused by the greenhouse gas (GHG) 
carbon dioxide (CO2) and to penalize the polluters. This EU action was pursued within 
the EU obligations under the Kyoto Accord’s specific pollution reduction targets and to 
promote a social paradigm shift to pollution responsibility. The EU has penalized airline 
corporations that used any EU airspace for their CO2 emissions. I analyzed an empirical 
research problem regarding corporate disclosure of the costs of carbon pollution on the 
financial statements (FS) of responsible airline corporations under this EU regulatory 
intervention. The background to the study provided in Chapter 1 includes the underlying 
problem examined and the purpose of this study. The theoretical foundations and design 
frameworks that I referenced, as well as the rationale for the design chosen, are discussed 
along with any assumptions and limitations that might have occurred within this 
investigation. 
Background to the Study 
During the 250 years since the Industrial Revolution began, the anthropogenic 
destruction of the earth’s natural resources and the corresponding pollution into earth’s 
atmosphere has been increasing, with approximately 50% of that pollution produced in 
just the last 40 years (Ajani et al., 2013; Denman et al., 2007; Gaglemann & Hansjurgens, 
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2002; Janmaat & Braun, 2009; Kolk et al., 2008; Venmans, 2012). This anthropogenic 
destruction is anticipated to double again before 2025, during which time some scientists 
have determined that the weather patterns and therefore land masses, vegetation, and 
earth’s species will change dramatically due to climate warming from atmospheric 
pollution (Ajani et al., 2013; Perrow, 2011; Power, 2011; Suzuki & Hanington, 2012). 
The airline industry currently contributes approximately 2% of the GHGs that promote 
anthropogenic atmospheric pollution (International Panel on Climate Change [IPCC], 
1999). Across the globe many companies and their home countries are more interested in 
profit, short-term gain, and raising or maintaining standards of living, and they  are in the 
process of destroying the earth’s ability to sustain life (Perrow, 2011; Preston, Lee, & 
Hooper, 2012; Pritchard & MacPherson, 2004). Financial statements are the global 
vehicle upon which all economic decisions and activity depend (Graham, Harvey, & 
Rajgopal, 2005). For sustainable global economics, financial statement information is the 
engine of change. 
There was little researched evidence in the literature of disclosed CO2 costs on 
corporate income statements or balance sheets, whether voluntary or compulsory, in 
environmental accounting, or in the realm of corporate social responsibility (CSR) 
research. Several authors discussed environmental accounting from a management 
accounting perspective (Bagliani & Martini, 2012; Burritt, 2004; Christ & Burritt, 2013; 
Gray & Bebbington, 2000; Tsai et al., 2012; Vasile & Man, 2012) and others have 
created software packages for modeling the cost components of anthropogenic pollution 
(Protogeros, Vontas, Chatzikostas, & Koumpis, 2011) that may be reported on either 
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management accounting or financial accounting statements. Several frameworks have 
been put forward by accounting practitioners and researchers for what should be included 
in a full costing system. This costing system would include the anthropogenic pollution 
cost of the earth’s biomass, geosphere, and oceanic water (Ajani et al., 2013; Matisoff et 
al., 2012; Tsai et al., 2012). Still others, such as Malina et al. (2012) and Venmans 
(2012), have created theoretical arguments on the validity of the EU’s environmental CO2 
penalty trading scheme. However, there is a gap in the quantitative research literature on 
evidence of pollution footprint inclusion on financial statements even in the footnotes and 
notations (Andrew & Cortese, 2011). 
While International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) are struggling to set out 
what will be acceptable to the global accounting community for pollution cost reporting, 
there has been little evidential research to prove compliance or the framework used in the 
calculations. This lack of evidence remained even when some form of regulation was put 
in place such as in Australia and Europe (Choi, Lee, & Psaros, 2013; Pedersen, 
Neergaard, Pedersen, & Gwozdz, 2013; Stubbs, Higgins, & Milne, 2012). Allowable 
additional costs on income statements should result in less corporate tax; however, the 
political stigma of disclosing pollution might have been a barrier. The EU presented an 
opportunity to discover if regulation and legislation can make a positive difference in a 
paradigm shift to disclosure of pollution costs. 
Problem Statement 
A problem exists while unaccountable corporate polluters, such as those in the 
airline industry, profit short term at the expense of global economic sustainability, that is 
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threatened by escalating ecosystem destruction costs and human health costs (Brown, 
Dillard, & Marshall, 2009; Dillard, 2010; Henriques & Richardson, 2012; Hopwood, 
2009). Although some accounting frameworks and legislations currently exist, such as 
the EU-ETS and IFRS, no quantitative evidence existed to show whether the members of 
the airline industry had incorporated those pollution costs into their formal income 
statements and therefore had accepted the transparent economic consequences for this 
pollution, such as profit or loss (O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011; Pedersen et al., 
2013; Perrow, 2011; Stechemesser & Guenther, 2012; Uddin & Holtedahl, 2013). 
Despite the Kyoto and Copenhagen Accords (2005, 2009), within which many countries 
agreed to specific polluting GHG target reductions, researchers have shown that 
environmental accounting will happen only with a consistent framework and individual 
country legislation (Archel, Husillos, & Spence, 2011; Alrazi, de Villiers, & van Staden, 
2010; Ball & Craig, 2010; Power, 2011). Authors have provided limited studies on 
environmental cost reporting (Apergis, Eleftheriou, & Payne, 2013; Turner, Munday, 
McGregor, & Swales, 2012; Vasile & Man, 2012); however, I found no current published 
studies on the financial statement disclosure of carbon pollution costs in the airline 
industry. In this study, I provided quantitative data on the incidence of carbon pollution 
costs in the financial statements of airline corporations to show whether the EU 
intervention (EU-ETS) and/or the IFRS guidelines would support corporate compliance 
and normative accounting practice to create pollution conscious social change. 
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Purpose of the Study 
The purpose of this quantitative quasi-experimental study was to analyze the 
intervention effectiveness of the EU-ETS carbon pollution scheme for the airline 
industry. This analysis was done in order to provide evidence of carbon cost disclosure 
and corporate accountability for anthropogenic pollution. Two strata within the airline 
industry were considered and compared: those airline corporations that were subject to 
the EU-ETS intervention legislation (EU-bound airlines), and those airline corporations 
who were not subject to the EU-ETS intervention legislation (non-EU bound airlines). I 
examined whether there was a causal relationship on the formal financial statements of 
the mandated airline corporations due to the EU-ETS intervention (the independent 
variable) by comparing EU-destined airlines’ carbon pollution cost reporting (the 
dependent variable) on their financial statements with the non-EU destined airlines that 
were not under any similar mandate. IFRS, a further independent variable, might also 
have been a factor in the reporting treatment of carbon costs and, therefore, financial 
statements were also analyzed for IFRS cost reporting (a dependent variable). 
The financial statements were analyzed for the various accounting treatments and 
the method of costing being reported by the airline industry. In the analysis, I recorded 
the frequency of reporting of these costs, and any inference that was apparent for changes 
to accounting database systems to collect and report these costs from the management 
discussion and analysis (MD&A) section or footnotes. Detailed information on all 
variables in this study is discussed in the Research Design section of Chapter 3. 
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Research Questions and Hypotheses 
The research questions of interest in this study were as follows. 
Research Question 1: To what extent is there a difference in the frequency means 
for reporting carbon footprint costs between the EU bound airlines and the non-EU bound 
airlines?  
Research Question 2: Do international financial reporting standards influence the 
reporting of carbon emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations? 
The research questions were translated into the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: µ1 = µ2. On average there is no difference between EU bound and non-EU bound 
airline corporations in tracking the carbon costs of carbon emissions and reporting on 
financial statements. 
H1:  µ 1 ≠  µ 2. On average there is a difference between EU bound and non-EU bound 
airline corporations in tracking the carbon costs of carbon emissions and reporting on 
financial statements. 
Where µ1 is the average number of carbon credit or debit or penalty accounting 
disclosures on the financial statements of the Group 1, EU mandated airlines, and µ2 is 
the average number of accounting disclosures on the financial statements of the Group 2, 
non-EU mandated airlines. 
The statistical methodology to test Hypothesis 1 was an ANCOVA that compared 
three independent population means, that is, a comparison of average carbon cost 
disclosures between EU resident airlines, EU bound airlines, and non-EU mandated 
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airlines. In this comparison the differences in the reporting of carbon costs on the 
financial statements of global corporate airlines was measured, classified by carbon credit 
or EU-ETS terminology. 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: µ1 = µ2. International financial reporting standards do not influence the reporting of 
carbon emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations. 
H1: µ1 ≠ µ2. International financial reporting standards influence the reporting of carbon 
emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations. 
Where µ1 is the average number of IFRS allowable carbon emissions accounting 
references disclosed on the financial statements of IFRS country airlines and µ2 is the 
average number of IFRS allowable carbon emissions accounting references disclosed on 
the financial statements of non-IFRS country airline corporations. 
The statistical methodology to test Hypothesis 2 was an ANOVA that compared 
two independent population means, that is, a comparison of average carbon cost 
disclosures between IFRS country airline corporations and non-IFRS country airline 
corporations, as classified by the allowable, but not environment specific, IFRS treatment 
sections for financial statements. 
Theoretical Foundation 
Underlying the disclosure of carbon pollutants on financial statements were 
regulatory constraints, political priorities, and corporate behavioral actions, all of which 
reflect social value systems. This report included several theories that informed this 
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study; agency theory, the systems theories that include; complexity, political economic 
theory, stakeholder, and legitimacy, as well as operant behavior theory. 
Agency Theory 
Eisenhardt (1989) explained agency theory’s contractual foundation as discussing 
two problems, the divergent goals of the principal and agent and the failure of the 
principal to be able to validate what the agent was doing. This goal divergence may 
unfortunately lead to goal congruence with some stakeholders and not others. Agents, 
their employer principals, stakeholders, and regulatory authorities as well as the earth’s 
natural systems of resources are altogether part of a larger system of economics and 
commerce as reflected in FS and as such the general systems theory, complexity theory, 
and its subordinate theories are also discussed. 
Systems Theories 
According to Chan and Nunamaker (1991), a system is a set of interconnected 
activities that forms a whole. Accounting is a system of interrelated statements that are 
created out of a set of interconnected double entry transactions representing economic 
activity. Von Bertalanffy (1968) was credited with the general theory that any system 
cannot be studied as isolated component parts; inquiry must consider the influencers and 
environments holistically. Anderson (1999) used the term complexity theory to describe 
the complex interactions of organizational adaptation to its ever changing environment. 
This section presents a cascade of related system theories, focusing on one subset, 
political economy theory (PET), and its subordinates, legitimacy theory and stakeholder 
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theory. Operant behavior theory #2 from Reynolds (2007) and Skinner (1978) completes 
this section. 
Similar to the interdependencies within the earth’s biological environments are 
the economic operations activities, actions, and reactions of companies and their 
management as they strive to satisfy regulators, their shareholders, and their own 
personal agendas (Deegan & Unerman, 2011; Hahn, 2007). The politics within an 
industry as a whole may use collective strength to force beneficial economic sanctions. 
Adding more complexity are the politics involved in disclosing pollution costs and 
perhaps the technologies or strategies to meet pollution targets as these may pose a risk to 
proprietary information that companies decide not to take (Matisoff, Noonan, & O’Brien, 
2012).  
Weaver (1948) and other authors including Anderson (1999) discussed 
complexity theory as the need to manage multiple, diverse, and possibly interrelated 
forces simultaneously. In order to be flexible and adaptable to meet these changing needs 
and demands, a corporation should integrate algorithmic risk probability models within 
its strategic planning along with continuous landscape monitoring by employees or 
agents (Anderson, 1999). To facilitate this needed knowledge, the organization’s logistic 
systems for product transference as well as its business information systems for data 
gathering and reporting must be efficient and effective. The airline industry faces 
complex continuing challenges in cost structure and pricing in response to fierce 
competition, as well as rigid safety expectations and increasing pressure from 
environmental concerns (Pritchard & MacPherson, 2004).  
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Political economy theory as a subsidiary of complexity systems theory, according 
to Gray et al. (1996), provides a framework for human life that is simultaneously 
economic, social, and political. Jevons (1871) wrote that as humans we remain politically 
aware and must balance the economic impacts of our actions to be perceived as 
acceptable to that society and its politics. Bebbington, Larrinaga, and Moneva (2008) 
described this perception in corporate actions as reputation risk management. The 
disclosures that entities choose to make on their FS may be legislated; however, other 
voluntary disclosures according to Gray et al., are part of their public relations strategy—
their politics. I continued this complexity discussion with two subset theories, those of 
legitimacy theory and stakeholder theory. These theories are concerned with CSR and the 
public perception of behavior in adherence to an organization’s economic, social, and 
political environment. 
Following Hurst (1970) and legitimacy theory, according to Gray et al. (1996), 
social and ethical adherence, or that perception, of an entity to its society’s expectations 
and value system is a social contract and creates legitimacy for that entity. According to 
Bebbington et al. (2008), Ebrahim and Weisband (2007), and Gray et al., accounting 
reporting, disclosure, and audit practice have become legitimizing tools, part of a 
corporate strategy to manage relationships and perceptions. Lindblom (1994) described 
four organizational strategies to win this perception: (a) make actual changes, (b) put 
forward an education or awareness information for the public, (c) associate with some 
recognized symbol of legitimization, or (d) adjust the public perception through public 
relations (PR) campaigns. Although these PR expenses, for example in the oil and gas 
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industry, are recorded on the FS, the costs of the underlying social and environmental 
damage may not be (Levy & Kolk, 2002; Ungerer, Tavitian, & Boutin, 2005; 
Wagenhofer, 2011; Winer, 2003). 
The perception of legitimacy is a powerful organizational motivation and 
investors and all stakeholders have a vested interest and can be a power in a corporation’s 
actions. In 1984, Freeman’s stakeholder theory presented the many and varied details of 
parties who would be interested in the health of a corporation. In 1970, Hurst (as cited in 
Deegan & Unerman, 2011) described the power of the investing and regulatory 
stakeholders as a more imminent power over the organization than societal expectations. 
A corporation’s financial reporting, their extent of disclosure, along with the audit firm 
which verified the corporate reporting, resulted as much from the corporate managers’ 
personal agendas as the necessity to maintain the entity’s perceived investment reputation 
within the larger society (Darnall, Seol, & Sarkis, 2009; Freeman, 1984; Healy & Palepu, 
2001). 
The stakeholders in the airline industry included many who depended upon the 
profitability of the airlines and also many who desired the reduction of GHG emissions. 
These included the UN in its global mandate to reduce anthropogenic pollution, 
responsive local governments, environmental groups, and individual citizens. The profit 
seekers were not only the shareholders who expected dividends from profit taking, but 
also the employees who earned salaries, the country governments who wanted tax 
revenues, and auditors who verified the financial reports.
12 
 
Operant Behavior Law #2 
The cost disclosure actions of corporate management to maintain government and 
stakeholder relations, was also the subject of operant behavior law. Operant behavior law 
#2 (Reynolds, 2007; Skinner, 1978) was foundational to this study as it states that 
companies will comply (i.e., respond positively and report carbon costs) if previous 
changes in regulatory demands in accounting or other disclosures actually came to be 
enforced by authorities consistently on a continual basis. If previous enforcement was 
intermittent or inconsistent, operant law #2 states that compliance will not happen or will 
happen haphazardly. Further information on these theories as they supported this study is 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 5. 
Nature of the Study 
This study was a longitudinal, quasi-experimental causal process form (Reynolds, 
2007) with the classic experimental design of compared groups, pretest-posttest control 
group design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). Through this analysis, the frequency of 
reported carbon costs, across EU and non-EU bound airlines, was counted and supported 
the comparison of the results between these groups. A factorial mixed model repeated 
measures ANOVA, two tailed analysis was used as well as an ANCOVA to include for 
the EU-ETS and IFRS interventions. The public financial statements of airline 
corporations were analyzed through a modified Guttman frame to determine the number 
and accounting type of disclosures of this carbon emission cost data. 
The contrasted groups design type model was used as I observed intact groups 
over two independent variables in a longitudinal study over the 3-year period beginning 
13 
 
September 2011 (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008) and assessed whether the 
average cost disclosure scores had differed meaningfully over the time frame. Campbell 
and Stanley (1963) outlined the pretest-posttest control group design comparison model 
that would be appropriate for this type of study as it was expected that the EU bound and 
EU resident airlines would be a compliant experimental group with the EU-ETS mandate, 
while the non-EU bound airlines was the control group and under no requirement from 
the EU authority. 
Definitions 
Presented are the explanations of the source of the independent variables as well 
as further accounting definitions of the dependent variables and their possible 
corresponding or referenced EU, IFRS, IAS, ISO, UN, or SEC regulatory sections and 
other important acronyms. Please note that IAS, the parent of IFRS standards, continues 
to update its IAS sections in conjunction with IFRS changes. 
European Union Environmental Trading Scheme (EU-ETS): A threshold of 
carbon emissions was established in 2003 and amended to include for airlines by 
directive 2008/101/EC (European Commission, 2011). Directive 2009/450/EC detailed 
the interpretation of aviation activities to be included. These activities included the tonne-
kilometer (TKm) reporting of any flight in or out of an EU airport with pollution 
penalties for any airline exceeding its carbon benchmark 2008-2010 averages. Allowance 
credits were to be issued to each airline to cover its benchmark and additional credits 
could be earned by companies who put in place specific pollution reducing green 
projects. Airlines who exceeded their initial credit allowance could acquire carbon credits 
14 
 
from other companies or industries (EU, 2013). Should this ETS not be activated due to 
IATA or non-EU country political pressure, the EU was expected to impose carbon 
emissions penalty costs on airline corporations using EU airspace (EU, 2013). 
As context to the EU-ETS, the international community had agreed at United 
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) meetings that global 
warming must be kept below 2 degrees C compared to the preindustrial times that meant 
no more than 1.2 degrees C above current temperatures. The EU stated the growth in 
GHG must completely stop by 2020 at the latest, and that polluters must reduce the 
atmospheric GHG by 50% of 1990 levels by 2050, and must continue to cut GHG 
thereafter (http://ec.europa.eu/clima/policies/brief/eu/index_en.htm). EU members in 
2004 (15 members) agreed to reduce collective emissions to 8% below 1990 from 2008-
2012. By 2020 the EU has committed to cutting emissions to 20% below 1990 levels 
(EU, 2013). The EU has stated that if other countries will do their fair share, the EU may 
be able to commit to 30% below 1990 levels by 2020 (EU, 2013). 
Although the EU-ETS trading scheme was not set to commence until January 1, 
2012, under the EU-ETS, aircraft operators who flew into the EU were required to 
monitor and report their CO2 emissions from January 1, 2010. This requirement applied 
to all aircraft operators with connections to Europe, who were required to report their 
carbon emissions to the relevant authority of the EU country assigned to them. By March 
31 every year, these carbon emissions must be independently verified and reported. 
International Accounting Standard (IAS) 8: Accounting policies, changes in 
accounting estimates and errors (and pertains to any IFRS after 1 January 2012). IAS 8 
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prescribes the criteria for changing accounting policies as well as the accounting and 
disclosure treatment of changes in accounting estimates and the correction of previous 
accounting errors (IFRS, 2012). 
IAS 36: Impairment of assets. In keeping with IFRS 9, IAS 36 prescribes the 
disclosure and treatment for recording the loss or gain in value of an asset such that its 
balance sheet carrying value is its recoverable value through use or sale of the asset 
(IFRS, 2012).  
IAS 37: Provisions, contingent liabilities, and contingent assets. BDO (2013) 
describes IAS 37 as prescribing the measurement and treatment for: 
• Provisions: recording of a liability of uncertain timing or amount, 
• Contingent liability: recording of a possible obligation in the future, 
• Contingent asset: recording of a possible asset that may be held in the 
future. 
International Financial Reporting Interpretations Committee (IFRIC), (2004), Part 
of IFRS which stated that an allowance was an intangible asset and governed by IAS 38, 
while emission cap and trade schemes gave rise to liabilities and were provisions that 
should follow IAS 37 (IFRIC, 2004, p. 7). 
Possible carbon pollution penalties may be recorded as a contingent liability or 
the expectation of being allowed carbon credits due to some change in operations may be 
recorded as a contingent asset. 
IAS 38: Intangible assets—contingent pricing of property, plant, and equipment 
and other intangible assets. Defined as “an identifiable nonmonetary asset without 
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physical substance” (IASB, 2005, p. 2227). As previously noted in IAS37, IFRIC (2004) 
stated that allowances were intangible assets (IAS38) while emission cap and trade 
schemes may be liabilities and were provisions of IAS 37 (IFRIC, 2004). In keeping with 
IAS 39 for the recording of financial instruments (such as carbon credits) and IAS 16, for 
property, plant, and equipment (PP&E), IAS 38 recognized that any estimated timing or 
financial outflow changes to the value of an intangible asset such as might happen from 
the decommissioning, restoration, or other changes should be recorded as deducted from 
or added to the asset value in the current period. The adjustment would not however, 
exceed the carrying cost of the asset and the new value must be a fully recoverable reality 
amount in accordance with IAS 36 (IFRS, 2012). Referenced in Apergis et al. (2013). 
IAS 39: Financial instruments: recognition and measurement. The standard 
defines a “contract that gives rise to both a financial asset of one entity and a financial 
liability or equity instrument of another entity” (IASB, 2005, p. 2219). In keeping with 
IFRS 9 for FMV asset recording, IAS32 for financial instrument presentation, IAS 38 and 
IAS 16 for PP&E, standards were amended July 2013 to ensure that any change in asset 
value was reflected in the asset valuation on the balance sheet (IFRS, 2012).  
IAS Interpretation Article 3 (IFRIC 3): Emission rights set policies for carbon-
related transactions which dictated how carbon credits would be accounted for. An 
allowance received without cost by an industry company or investment bank are 
intangible assets. IFRIC (2004) stated that an allowance was an intangible asset and 
governed by IAS 38, while emission cap and trade schemes gave rise to liabilities and 
were provisions that should follow IAS 37 (IFRIC, 2004, p. 7). This interpretation was 
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widely challenged as contradictory and amended in July, 2013. See IAS 20, 37, 38, and 
39. 
IAS 41: Fair market value reporting. This provides guidance for agricultural 
activity accounting including the measurement of biological assets at FMV minus the 
costs to sell. IAS 41 gives direction for both bearer biological assets (the parent from 
which a crop is taken such as, a cow, a grape vine etc.) as well as consumable biological 
assets (the milk, the grapes etc.). Further discussions on making bearer assets part of IAS 
16 (PP&E) are ongoing. See also IFRS 9. See Bolivar and Galera (2007) which reflected 
IAS 41 for the FMV of biological assets. 
International Financial Reporting Standard (IFRS) 5: Noncurrent assets held for 
sale and discontinued operations. Noncurrent assets that are held for sale and not being 
used up by the business in daily operations should be classified separately in the current 
asset section of the balance sheet and should not be depreciated. To be included in current 
assets, the noncurrent asset held for sale must be available for immediate sale and there 
must be a high probability of its being sold within the current fiscal year of this 
classification. EU carbon credits may fall into this category. 
IFRS 6: Exploration for and evaluation of mineral rights. This standard provides 
guidance for the expense recognition on the income statement of mining and mineral 
exploration and evaluation activities. It also includes for the balance sheet recognition of 
exploration and evaluation assets which may be termed current or capital assets 
dependent upon the life expectancy. 
18 
 
IFRS 9: Assets are required to be recorded/updated at fair market value (FMV) 
and previously offsetting assets and liabilities are to be disclosed separately. See also 
IFRS 7, IAS 32, 39, and 41.  
International Standards Organization (ISO) 14001: As part of the ISO 14000 
standards for management of the processes to affect positive environmental change, the 
14001 is a set of standards by which an organization can design and implement a rigorous 
environmental management system. ISO14001 sets up and is used more specifically by 
the EU Eco-Management and Audit Scheme (EMAS). In this, the processes detailing 
administrative, material and performance improvement, as well as regulatory and legal 
reporting compliance standards are very strict. 
ISO 14044: As part of the ISO14000 standards for the management of the 
processes to affect positive environmental change, 14044 encompasses techniques to 
assess the UNFCCC Scope 2 and 3 environmental impacts for the life cycle of products 
(LCA), (i.e., from raw material extraction, transportation, manufacture, distribution, 
usage, maintenance, through to disposal). 
ISO 14064: As part of the ISO14000 standards for the management of the 
processes to affect positive environmental change, 14064 includes GHG emission 
monitoring tools that organizations may use to quantify, report, and allow verification of 
the GHG emissions by stakeholders such as governments, geographic regions, or other 
organizations. 
Land use, land use change, and forestry (LULUCF): Under the UN framework 
convention on climate change, the LULUCF covers anthropogenic activity regarding 
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GHG emission sinks of soil, trees, plants, biomass, and timber. This includes both the 
removal of GHGs into the sinks and the destruction of the sink that generates emissions 
release. Referenced in Ajani et al. (2013). Although the Kyoto Protocol (Article 3.3) had 
recognized the GHG effects of afforestation and deforestation in 1990, on July 8, 2013 
the UNFCCC formally recognized these sinks as part of the GHG equation (EU/Climate 
action, 2013). Fresh and salt water sinks and their destruction have yet to be recognized. 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC): The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and 
the 2004 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report; Environmental disclosure: 
GOA recommended the SEC provide greater scrutiny of environmental disclosures. The 
SOX (15 U.S.C & 7266(a)) requires the SEC to conduct regular reviews of disclosures by 
certain classes of corporations (Lidstone, Miller, & Joseph, 2013). Because undisclosed 
environmental risks impair investor’s decision making, the SEC requires public filings to 
include for disclosure of environmental liabilities. According to Lidstone et al. (2013) the 
extent of disclosure compliance is unknown. 
Third assessment report (TAR): climate change 2001): Third in a series of IPCC 
environment assessment reports (i.e., SAR: second assessment report, 1995 and FAR: 
fifth assessment report, 2013). All assessment reports may be viewed at 
http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/publications_and_data_reports.shtml#1. 
UN Intergovernmental panel on climate change (UN—IPCC): A committee of the 
UN, the IPCC includes over 600 authors from 32 countries who frequently publish 
assessment reports on climate change imperatives. They provide criteria and calculation 
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methods for GHG inventories (IPCC, 2012). Referenced in Stechemesser and Guenther 
(2012). 
 IPCC carbon stock and flow definitions and GHG annual report. Referenced in 
Ajani et al. (2013) 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC): Scope 1, 
2, and 3 emissions classifications. Referenced in Ajani et al. (2013) and Stechemesser 
and Guenther (2012). 
Other Important GHG and Accounting Frameworks 
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM): CDM are project based green schemes 
meant to generate carbon credits (not cap and trade schemes) from projects that will 
reduce emissions below the level they would have emitted without the project. Countries 
like China that were evolving economies could create projects in their industries that 
generate CDM credits, certified emission credits (CERs) and sell those to other countries 
or companies (Mackenzie, 2009). 
Global Warming Potential (GWP): A calculated metric by formula designed by 
the UN intergovernmental panel on climate change (IPCC) and a department of Harvard 
University. It is a calculation that includes the life of various gases, its molecular weight, 
and its infrared absorption rate (MacKenzie, 2009). 
International financial reporting interpretations committee (IFRIC): A subsidiary 
body of the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB). Mackenzie (2009) stated 
that IFRIC (2004, p. 19) determined that emission rights “were an instrument that must 
be delivered in order to settle the obligation that arises from emission” and they were not 
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an allowance that conferred the right to emit polluting gases. Emission rights are viewed 
by IFRIC as an asset. 
The definitions and acronyms in this study represented many political and global 
organizations concerned with the growing threat from GHG and loss of ecosystems and 
resources. With these important definitions presented, outlined in the next section was the 
potential for any weaknesses in the study and the mediation of those weaknesses. 
Assumptions 
In this section, the details of the assumptions of truth and completeness in 
secondary data sources are detailed. In the study, it was assumed that the intervention of 
the EU in its demand for carbon emissions reporting from affected airline corporations 
would be continued henceforth and provided the population frame and the representative 
sample. The affected airlines have been reporting their emissions in order to set a 
benchmark since 2010, and the EU resident airlines have been reporting under the EU-
ETS cap and trade scheme since January 2012. IFRS compliance was assumed for those 
airlines resident in IFRS adopted countries and for which formal FS were audited 
annually by competent professional auditors. The financial statements, which provided 
the raw data, were assumed to be truthful and compliant with the GAAP regimes in 
which they were involved. 
Additionally, the membership listings of IATA in conjunction with the ICAO and 
EU-ETS listings were assumed to comprise a complete airline corporation frame as 
members of the airline industry would want to be involved and part of the powerful lobby 
group that speaks for the airline corporations globally. The EU listing of affected airlines 
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and the reported carbon emission data to the EU was assumed to be an error free listing. 
It would be of critical importance to the EU that they have their numbers reporting 
correctly both for the trading scheme metrics themselves and more importantly, to 
support the reputation of the EU and their reporting requirements as being complete and 
truthful. 
Scope and Delimitations 
Scope of the Study 
A random sampling of airline corporations was considered from the airline 
industry population and their anticipated reporting of carbon emission costs on their 
corporate financial statements. In order to provide evidence of regulatory compliance and 
its commercial profit effect, the study was designed to continue and expand upon the 
research of both corporate social responsibility scholars and of the environmental 
accounting scholars. These research areas have been increasingly concerned with climate 
warming and the disclosure of GHG emission activities by polluting organizations. 
Delimitations 
My environmental accounting literature review revealed no studies into the airline 
corporation’s disclosure of carbon emissions costs. As GHG and climate warming are 
becoming critical issues, this study was conceived for this industry as an objective within 
the environmental accounting discipline. As the scope of this carbon emissions cost 
reporting study was limited to airline corporations, the complete population frame 
comprised the ICAO listing in conjunction with the IATA and EU-ETS airline 
corporation listings of all airline companies which had an operating code and that flew 
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anywhere in the world. The random sample within the population frame allowed 
generalizability of the results. 
Using the EU-ETS airline reporting data base, this frame was initially divided 
between those who are required to report (Group 1) and those who are not (Group 2). 
From within each of these two population groups, a random sample of 64 corporations 
was chosen as per the G power calculation, Figure 1 in Chapter 3. Their corporate status 
was confirmed and the availability of formal, audited, financial statements was assured. 
Until a full statistical sample of corporations within the groups had been met, further 
randomly chosen airlines from the groups continued until a full sample complement was 
reached for the study which was expanded to 69 to include for possible mortality over the 
study time frame. The independent variables in the study had been chosen in order to 
investigate the effect of an ETS or emissions penalty cost and the IFRS intervention upon 
the actions of these groups of airline participants. 
The cost reporting of these two independent variables fell under a number of sub-
categories particular to the ETS or penalty scheme, the IFRS and IAS financial reporting 
guidelines, the SEC regulations, and the ISO environmental recording processes. The 
dependent variables were the frequency of the participant’s reported costs under one or 
many of these subcategories. The study was bound by the availability of the airline 
corporation’s publicly available yearend financial statements and the analysis of the 
financial statements was completed by me, a professionally designated CPA and CMA 
accountant, and verified by another professional accountant. 
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Limitations 
The design and methodology was constructed based upon an intervention by EU 
regulatory authorities. Should the EU have rescinded this mandated disclosure of carbon 
pollution costs or not enforced their demands with appropriate penalties, compliance by 
any of the airlines and this study might have been jeopardized. However, EU resident 
airline corporations remained within the regulation from January 2012 regardless of any 
International Civil Aviation Organization decision to refuse compliance. As stated in the 
instrumentation section, the potential design and/or methodological weaknesses of the 
study may have been internal from experimental mortality, maturation, extreme scores, 
and selection bias or externally from multiple treatment interference (Campbell & 
Stanley, 1963). 
A further limitation might have been that of the time frame for the study. A time 
frame that included more years after the intervention date would have provided more raw 
data to show potential changes over time. However, the airline industry had known of the 
EU requirement of the reporting of carbon emissions since 2005 and had been taking the 
necessary steps to gather and report these data during those 7 years. The 3-year time 
frame of this study included the year-end financial statements from 2011, 2012, and 
2013, which showed the year previous to the intervention and two subsequent years and 
therefore provided meaningful data. 
How the Weaknesses Will Be Addressed 
There were many regulatory and industry changes that might have occurred in this 
evolving carbon emissions environment. It was unknown if any of the sample airlines 
25 
 
would have ceased to fly into the EU or ceased to exist over the 3-year time frame and 
therefore experimental mortality was controlled for by increasing the sample size. The 
increased percentage in the sample size was determined by analyzing the shrinkage of 
publicly traded airlines from the EU and from the world population over the previous 5 
years. Selection bias was controlled for by random selection of the participants within the 
experimental and control groups while regression analysis in the ANCOVA and ANOVA 
controlled for extreme observances. Multiple treatment interference was controlled for by 
understanding the other independent variables and their timing effect on the participants 
such as IFRS or XBRL or ERP changed requirements. However, it was expected that 
IFRS and XBRL changes would affect all the population equally if they were introduced. 
As the industry changed in response to the EU-ETS, it was expected that 
participant maturation would take place if the EU enforced their regulation. With regard 
to the EU rescinding or airlines refusing to participate, the EU resident airlines did 
participate from January 1, 2012 and other airlines had been preparing for this eventuality 
since 2008. There was no delay in the scheme start for non-EU airline corporations flying 
into the EU, and the sample was drawn initially as outlined with results that showed 
mandated compliance against nonmandated compliance over the period. 
Threats to Validity and How Potentially Addressed 
Internal validity refers to the assignment of causes to effects (Cook & Campbell, 
as cited in Yu & Ohlund, 2010). In this airline study, the intervention of the imposed cost 
reporting to the EU was outside of my control, and there were other extenuating 
circumstances affecting the cost of carbon pollution beyond this intervention such as the 
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price of oil and the financial collapse of 2008 and its aftermath effects. These threats 
were mitigated by providing discussion on contributing variables by analyzing the notes 
to the financials for all sample participants for indications of these and other common 
complicating factors. As well, current news, websites, and periodicals were analyzed for 
the airline industry and for the EU reporting authority. 
Random assignment of the sample participants within each of the EU and non-EU 
airlines also helped to minimize the threat to internal validity. Experimental mortality 
was minimized by including for more participants in the sample than were statistically 
required. Selection maturation was expected to occur as a reality of the airlines involved 
being required to report to the EU and installing better cost gathering database programs. 
This was the sophisticated database and accounting competence, or lack thereof that the 
study looked for. 
Experimenter bias might have been present in the rationale for the inferences of 
the collected numbers. Additional readers/experts were consulted for their views. Other 
measurement errors resulting in risks to validity might have been from different analysts 
looking at the financial statements and recording incorrectly or not finding the data which 
was there within those statements (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Repeated 
testing was not a problem as there was no risk of sensitization of participants. 
Generalized results of this study may or may not have been valid for the airline 
industry as a whole, which would have added risk to external validity. A statistically 
significant sample size of 64 calculated through G power software was initially drawn 
and then increased for mortality. Statistical analysis and random sampling through the 
27 
 
entire IATA/ICAO/EU frame ensured that a proper statistical sample was employed to 
represent the underlying population and further mitigate external validity risk. 
Significance of the Study 
Significance to Theory 
One small aspect of the costs of the carbon emissions pollution was highlighted in 
this study and demonstrated support for both prior theory and future practice. This study 
was affected by a complexity of political, economic, and social pressures that drove a 
change within the design itself. Two groups of participants were transitioned into three 
groups. The additional group (Group 2) lobbied for and received a postponement 
midstudy and the Group 1 participants complied until they too won postponement in 
April 2014. Data analysis shown in Chapter 4 evidenced a decline in disclosures from the 
Group 2 in 2013 once they were no longer under the EU-ETS mandate. Until those 
postponements and to maintain their legitimacy perception, the groups were compliant to 
legislation which supported prior research that the government intervention was required. 
Many representations of agency theory were present throughout the study. The 
EU government intervened in the airline industry as agents of the people of the EU to 
attempt to reduce the pollution in their sovereign states. The UN Kyoto accord was the 
catalyst the EU agreed to as representatives of their people. IATA as agents of the airline 
industry lobbied successfully with ICAO on the airline’s behalf to postpone the penalty 
EU-ETS. As discussed in Chapter 5, operant behavior theory was also significant as 
airlines from China and the United States took behavior stances of wait and see when 
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faced with alternative orders from home country legislation that conflicted with the EU-
ETS. 
Significance to Practice 
The evidence from this quantitative study added to the work of environmental 
accounting and social researchers worldwide who have pointed theoretically to why the 
pollution of the earth must stop. Much more quantitative literature from the accounting 
academics was needed to convince and prove to accounting practitioners that these costs 
can be calculated and that there is an economic benefit to disclosure of these costs on the 
financial statements. Research may also help to highlight the obstacles that must be 
addressed in becoming compliant and to show that other organizations were complying 
and making a difference. It is only with a combination of accounting academic 
researchers and practitioners that there will be a change to the current financial reporting 
standards. 
The accounting pollution dialogue must be normalized. With increased evidence 
and attention to these pollution costs as well as highlighting the ability or desire of 
companies and citizens to calculate and report these costs, other people may be moved to 
change their attitudes and their actions. This transformation would reflect an adjustment 
in the current approach to the generation of profit at the expense of the destruction of 
natural resources, and therefore promote further positive social change. 
Significance to Social Change 
Economic considerations as portrayed on financial statements move the holders of 
wealth in the world to make decisions and perhaps to change operating behavior. Until an 
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economic argument is made or accountability is mandated for the costs of pollution, all 
the impassioned concern for the health of the environment and around the real costs of 
pollution will not create a change for finding better methods of energy. If these real and 
growing pollution costs are not disclosed on financial statements, polluting will continue 
to grow and destroy the interdependent ecosystems, which support the earth and all life. 
Summary and Transition 
Chapter 1 included the outline of the basic problem facing the continuance of life 
on earth as a result of anthropogenic pollution, the accounting profession’s role in 
pollution cost reporting, and therefore the purpose of this study. Until there is an 
economic effect on the polluters for their pollution of the earth, there will be little 
mitigation of the destruction of the life-sustaining systems that are presently under threat 
of collapse (Gaglemann & Hansjurgens, 2002; Hopwood, 2009; Janmaat & Braun, 2009; 
Kolk et al., 2008; MacKenzie, 2009; Smale et al., 2006). Chapter 1 also included this 
study’s background where due to worldwide concern over rapidly changing climates 
caused by anthropogenic pollution, the UN has been encouraging and supporting 
pollution mitigation schemes for the past 2 decades. In its accountability for the earth’s 
survival, the EU, in accordance with its self-imposed Kyoto Accord obligations, had 
created a cap-and-trade carbon emission trading scheme as well as an alternative carbon 
emissions penalty plan for the airline corporations that fly into EU airspace to calculate 
and disclose their carbon emissions. 
In Chapter 1, the international financial reporting standards were introduced 
which have given accounting practitioners some guidance for the recording of these 
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carbon emission credits on the formal financial statements of organizations. Although 
there had been limited quantitative studies to this time, the major underlying theories 
were introduced and some previous studies methods were highlighted that supported the 
design of this study. As the purpose of this study was to investigate the carbon emissions 
cost disclosure on the financial statements of the mandated airline corporations compared 
with the nonmandated airlines, the internal and external validity considerations were also 
introduced along with the limitations that may have been present and their mitigation. 
In Chapter 2, I expand on both the underlying theories of this study and the 
previous important literature that had been produced over the most recent 5 years. 
Chapter 3 follows with details of the research design that was used, as well as the details 
of the methods to secure a representative population sample, the data sources, and the 
data collection instrument. Also in Chapter 3, the plan for data analysis is discussed in 
detail along with any potential threats to reliability and validity. In Chapter 4, the results 
of the analysis are displayed and explained. In Chapter 5, the results are discussed in 
relation to the literature review and the theoretical base and describe how this research 
expands environmental accounting practice and contributes to positive social change. My 
recommendations for further research opportunities conclude Chapter 5.  
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Chapter 2: Literature Review 
Short-term commercial profit and the life sustaining systems of the planet are in 
conflict, and the earth’s ability to endure further anthropogenic pollution is now 
compromised (Brown et al., 2009; Dillard, 2010; Henriques & Richardson, 2012; 
Hopwood, 2009). In Chapter 1, I discussed some of the real costs of pollution in terms of 
biospheric, hydrospheric, and atmospheric destruction that are not being calculated, 
recorded, or reported on the drivers of all economic decisions, the financial statements of 
the offending organizations. The EU initiated carbon dioxide pollution penalties in the 
airline industry in order to promote reduction from this source of pollution and the IFRS 
accounting standards have been improved to record these pollution penalties. It has also 
been shown that without economic consequence for this pollution such as expenses on 
financial statements, the responsible organizations would have no impetus to change their 
destructive behavior (O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 2011; Pedersen et al., 2013; Perrow, 
2011; Stechemesser & Guenther, 2012; Uddin & Holtedahl, 2013). 
To date there have been limited studies that provided evidence of pollution cost 
reporting on financial statements (Apergis et al., 2013; Turner et al., 2012; Vasile & Man, 
2012) while published articles decry the need for quantitative studies on environmental 
accounting and the information systems to gather and report these data (Ajani, Keith, 
Blakers, Mackey, & King, 2013; Di Giacomo, Guthrie, & Farneti, 2012; Frias-Aceituno, 
Rodríguez-Ariza, & Garcia-Sánchez, 2012; Milne, Ball, & Gray, 2008; Stechemesser & 
Guenther, 2012). The EU-ETS intervention for airline emission disclosure, which was 
described in Chapter 1, provided a new research opportunity to determine whether there 
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was a causal relationship for carbon costs being recorded and reported on the 
corporation’s financial statements. Therefore, in Chapter 2, I review some of the current 
literature in carbon accounting, in carbon pollution, and in other industries that are 
relevant to this study. The supportive theories introduced in Chapter 1 are expanded and 
the design methods are outlined from other recent studies that I used in this investigation. 
Literature Search Strategy 
The search was conducted on the following key words: carbon, pollution, 
accounting, financial statements, environmental, green, management accounting, carbon 
trading, EU-ETS, airlines, and triple bottom line in various combinations and sequences 
using the Science Direct database, SAGE Premier, and Google Scholar. The search was 
limited to peer-reviewed articles published within the last 5 years; however, some older 
yet relevant and informative articles to the topic were also used. Some examples of 
research journal databases that were searched included the following: Accounting, 
Business Strategy and the Environment; Accounting, Organizations and Society; Critical 
Perspectives on Accounting; Ecological Economics; Environmental Development; 
Environmental Policy and Law; European Accounting Review; European Environment; 
International Journal of Business and Management; International Journal of 
Comparative Sociology; Journal of Cleaner Production; Journal of Theoretical 
Accounting Research; Organizations and Society; Long Range Planning; Oxford Review 
of Economic Policy; Journal of Air Transport Management; and Sustainability 
Accounting and Accountability.  
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This field of pollution investigation in the airline industry was very innovative 
and dynamic. Countries and industries were politically involved on a daily basis in 
mitigating or maneuvering to improve their financial positions and public image within 
their complex environments. Those environments included sustained profit with 
traditionally narrow margins versus pollution destruction of their raw material resources, 
management of all stakeholders, and legislation to reduce pollution (Porter, 1980; 
Wensveen, 2010). Therefore, several EU and airline industry websites such as 
Airwise.com, ICAO.int/environmental.com, Tranportenvironment.org, 
ec.europa.eu/clima, the National Business Aviation Association (NBAA.org), World 
Green Aviation Council (WorldGAC.org), and Cembureau.eu for EU-ETS information 
provided additional insights and current news updates to the published studies. 
Theoretical Foundation 
The political or public relations stigma to an organization of disclosing the future 
costs to the planet of its polluting behavior may have been an imposing barrier (Hillary, 
1999). In the context of the earth’s ability to sustain life, the complexity of the 
stakeholders affected by an organization expands to include all species of the earth. The 
theories that supported this study were therefore complex and considered the 
organizations and their management decisions, their public image to attract investment, 
their operational responses to environmental mandates, and the general interwoven and 
interdependency of all systems, including commerce, of this earth. Continued from the 
Chapter 1 introduction and historical basis of these theories, in this following section, the 
theories of agency, complexity, political economy theory, stakeholder, legitimacy, 
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operant behavior, and general systems are discussed as they related to this particular 
study. 
Agency Theory 
According to agency theory, a person (the agent) acting for or on behalf of 
another (the principal) should be in complete goal congruence with the principal. 
However, Eisenhardt (1989) explained that in a complex political environment the two 
may have divergent goals, and further that the principal may not be in a position to 
monitor or validate the agent’s actions (Archel et al., 2011; Funnel & Wade, 2012; 
Humphrey et al., 2011; Power, 2009). Managers of organizations make decisions based 
upon many complex marketing factors, and rely upon financial statements (both past 
performance and pro forma) to determine the most profitable course for their 
organization. As such, these managers act as agents for their organization’s stakeholders. 
These managers may also act in accordance with their own personal agenda, morals, and 
attitudes, as well taking their own personal reputation and livelihood into consideration 
(Power, 2011). Government employees, elected bodies, global organizations, and 
employees of every organization may be considered agents not only of their own 
organizations or constituents, but could in a larger sense be considered agents of the earth 
itself. 
The decisions made by management in gathering pollution cost data may be 
considered risk management on behalf of their organization. The disclosure of those costs 
publicly is a consideration that has political and profit ramifications. The role of an agent 
can therefore be a conflicted one; corporate versus personal versus the common good. 
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According to a former chairman of General Electric, Owen D. Young (as cited in 
Vasudev, 2013) on Young’s personal conflict: 
It makes a great difference in my attitude toward my job as an executive 
officer of the General Electric Company whether I am a trustee of the 
institution or an attorney for the investor. If I am a trustee, who are the 
beneficiaries of the trust? To whom do I owe my obligations? (p. 1) 
Financial auditors of the airline corporations will also find themselves as agents of 
many stakeholders. These auditors may be government or regulatory auditors owing 
congruence with the laws and regulations of both their own geographic jurisdictions and 
of the EU. They may be employed by the corporations themselves and owe congruence 
with not only their own professional code of ethics and practice, but to the corporate 
management who hired them and who may continue to employ them in the future. In all 
cases, agents may be the simultaneous agents of different stakeholders and also part of 
the global commerce system. 
Systems Theories 
Agency theory describes an interconnected system between two people but in a 
larger sense, these two people are part of many personal and professional interconnecting 
systems. Von Bertalanffy (1968) theorized that all systems interconnect and are 
interdependent with each other. One organization’s financial statements may appear as a 
system within themself and yet their receivable and payable accounts as well as their 
shareholder accounts reflect concrete ties to a much broader system of interactions and 
interdependencies. As such, the financial statements of one organization represent the 
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interconnected balance between the organization and its commercial environment. The 
information within an organization’s financial statements affects the operational 
decisions made within the organization and the external decisions made by investors, 
clients, suppliers, and government auditors on behalf of the country’s population, all 
interconnected in a flow of goods, services, and monetary valuation. 
All of the ecosystems of the earth are also interconnected with each other in a 
balance of give and take. The life sustaining ecosystems of the earth not only provide the 
natural resources that are exploited for profit, but also the natural resources to provide 
food, water, and oxygen to the human power exploited for profit. Financial statements 
have, to this point, not considered the full extent of the costs to the interconnected 
systems of the planet in their reporting or decision making (Brown et al., 2009; Dillard, 
2010; Henriques & Richardson, 2012; Hopwood, 2009; O’Dwyer, Owen, & Unerman, 
2011; Pedersen et al., 2013; Perrow, 2011; Stechemesser & Guenther, 2012; Uddin & 
Holtedahl, 2013). However, in the complexity of the interconnected systems of 
commerce and the resources of the earth, the disclosure of these costs may be considered 
critical so that decision making organization management may reduce these costs and 
mitigate the destruction of the resource. The disclosure of the costs and the burden of the 
ecosystem destruction expense of airline carbon emissions was the topic of this study. 
According to Weaver’s (1948) complexity theory, the complexity of the pressures 
facing an organization to perform profitably, to appear as a good corporate citizen, and to 
appear as a respected employer may also be a conflicted role (Anderson, 1999; Weaver, 
1948). To become and remain successful, the organization must be adaptable to its 
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complexity of interacting dynamic pressures and uncertainty. To do this an organization 
applies risk management techniques that include forecasted analysis of what-if scenarios 
by empowered employees who engage in collaborative information sharing and strategy 
fulfillment as a team. Within an adaptive organization, there may be an ordered or a 
chaotic response to perceived risk. The ordered response is dependent upon a set of 
governing rules within which each employee knows their part and limitations. In the 
chaotic adaptive organization, there is formal tracking of results through analysis of the 
adaptive actions taken. 
To remain successful in such a complexity of forces requires technology that 
allows human interaction in asynchronous or synchronous mode, which will depend upon 
the corporate structure and the risk management strategy taken. Airline’s information 
systems need to provide instant operational data on issues of mechanical fitness, airplane 
availability, communications systems, personnel, weather, passenger and freight loading, 
fuel and food provisioning, destination slot and baggage handling availability, as well as 
air traffic control (ATC) restrictions. These are in addition to strategic considerations 
within the profit or loss equation, and existing or evolving regulations such as the EU-
ETS. There is also a complexity of dynamic forces that affect the economics of climate 
warming and all of the global stakeholders. 
As society gains knowledge of the earth’s vulnerability from pollution generated 
by the practices of corporate profit taking, pressure from investors beyond the making of 
profit is becoming a critical issue. In today’s business environment organizations are 
faced with the five forces of competition as described by Porter (1979), that is, the threat 
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of new competitors or substitute products, the power of supplier and customers, and the 
competition within an industry. They also now face rapidly changing technology 
enhancements and the destruction of their raw materials. Information on polluted and 
diminishing water resources, loss of carbon sinks and oxygen producing forests, loss of 
species, the takeover by invasive species with no natural predators, and the depletion of 
corporate material resources, should be considered in the risk management of 
organizations which depend upon earth’s natural resources. 
Adding further complexity to the organizational climate and pressure to respond 
is seen in the power of investor’s demands for environmental information. Large 
institutional investors with trillions of dollars to invest are seeking stable, viable 
companies to support. Pollution penalty legislation that may reduce a company’s profit or 
the loss of future raw material availability is a looming threat that investment houses 
must consider. The SEC’s SOX legislation introduced in Chapter 1 and in the SEC 2010 
and 2011 risk factor disclosure requirements are further operational factors that are 
regulated to be calculated, compiled, and disclosed to maintain investor and regulatory 
compliance. 
IFRS guidelines as well as country specific accounting GAAP such as FASB 
(FAS topic 450, formerly FAS 5) in the United States are changing to include for 
environmental cost disclosure. The large institutional investment houses looking for 
corporations with long term environmental strategies have made demands on previously 
documented polluting industry members, such as Exxon, and on the SEC to ensure 
compliant disclosure and to validate the information (Davis Polk, 2011; McCarthy, 
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2013). With the EU-ETS intervention, the SEC disclosure requirements, along with IFRS 
guidance on how to account for these environmental risks, the disclosure of many 
airlines’ carbon emissions on financial statements should have been assured. However, 
studies had shown that proof of compliance remained an issue (Archel, Husillos, & 
Spence, 2011; Alrazi, de Villiers, & van Staden, 2010; Ball & Craig, 2010; Lidstone, 
Miller, & Joseph, 2013; Power, 2011). This study was intended to provide quantitative 
proof of whether there was compliance in the airline industry to the EU-ETS mandate and 
IFRS guidelines. 
Political economy theory, a subsidiary of complexity theory, includes human life 
as a combination of economic, social, and political pressures (Bebbington, et al., 2008; 
Gray et al., 1996; Jevons, 1871). For corporations, Gray et al. (1996) suggested that 
financial disclosures like everything else in corporate action, was part of their public 
relations strategy. For airline corporations, this carbon pollution disclosure may bring 
unwanted negative political attention. Disclosure may also push future costs onto their 
income statements and their balance sheets as contingent liabilities that may present the 
company as unviable, not a going concern given airline’s traditionally small profit 
margins (Porter, 1980; Wensveen, 2010). 
In an example of overt political action in 2012 that defied the EU’s pollution 
monitoring, China, India, and the United States forbade their country’s airlines to 
participate in the EU-ETS. China in fact threatened to cancel its order of French 
manufactured Airbus airplanes if the EU-ETS went forward (EU, 2013). This political 
action that affected French manufacturing jobs and therefore the commercial profit of a 
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related industry had the effect of temporarily rescinding the EU-ETS scheme for non-EU 
airlines at the end of 2012. 
Further in 2012, IATA formally submitted a refusal to participate in the EU-ETS 
on behalf of the non-EU resident airline IATA members, citing each airline corporation’s 
own economic viability if forced to incur further costs. In November 2012, the United 
States had independently passed the EU emissions trading scheme prohibition act (S. 
1956). The EU agreed to a postponement of the EU bound airlines in the hope of a 
collective airline agreement and waited for subsequent discussions in 2012 and the 
triennial ICAO meeting in September 2013 in Montreal. At that meeting the IATA 
membership agreed only to begin EU-ETS in 2020. The EU rejected that proposal and 
declared they would recommence the cap-and-trade scheme or the alternative carbon 
emissions penalty charging on January 1, 2014 for airline corporations that were non-EU 
resident collecting emissions on only portion of the flight journey through and in EU 
airspace (EU, 2013). This penalty charge did not take place and in April 2014, the EU 
parliament further amended the timing for EU bound airlines, as well as the EU resident 
airlines, to begin in 2016. Nevertheless, the EU resident airlines and any airline that 
travels from one point to another point inside the EU have continued to be required to 
submit their carbon emissions to the EU. 
The politics and economics of carbon pollution and GHG in general, as well as 
the EU-ETS emission penalties specifically, have generated many concerns. These 
concern elements have come from the differing value systems within world cultures, 
from countries attempting to maintain or improve living standards, and from commercial 
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viability concerns. Those cultural norms may include corporate social responsibility for a 
corporation’s identity in keeping with its stakeholder’s perceptions. The stakeholder’s 
perceptions would also include political economic theory’s subordinate theories of 
stakeholder and legitimacy theories. 
Stakeholder theory, a subsidiary of complexity theory, was described by Freeman 
(1984) as a description of the roles of the many stakeholders of an organization, along 
with their interests, and suggestions on the type of management attention that should be 
given to each of these stakeholders. This attention may include the many perceptions and 
politics that should be considered. While corporate management is charged with decision 
making on behalf of the organization, the politics of their position may appear to be of 
profit making. However, underlying that profit taking lie layers of productive behaviors 
of employees, of suppliers, of customers, of the society norms within which the 
organization operates, the various regulatory authorities of safety, security, industry 
regulations, and income tax laws, as well as the direct investors into the organization. 
Stakeholders as a collective may also exist in lobbying associations within an industry. 
Those stakeholders in the airline industry may be for example, the IATA group lobbying 
for fewer regulations, or institutional investors lobbying both the SEC and the industry 
membership for environmental cost disclosure on their financial statements (McCarthy, 
2013). Institutional investors have become one of the most powerful stakeholder voices 
in corporate governance with their control of trillions of investment dollars (Vasudev, 
2013). 
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Legitimacy theory, another subsidiary of complexity theory, is part of the 
corporate politics of being or appearing legitimate in the eyes of all of the organization’s 
stakeholders. This includes its public relations and the appearance of compliance with its 
stakeholder’s values and regulations (Bebbington et al., 2008; Ebrahim & Weisband, 
2007; Gray et al., 1996; Hurst, 1970; Lindblom, 1994). In the complex and rapidly 
changing imperative to stop anthropogenic destruction, airline management must 
consider their own commercial survival as well as the directives of investors, regulators, 
and customers, and to manage those relationships. The EU-ETS has confronted the 
airlines with a challenge to each airline’s legitimacy in the perception of investors and 
customers. The legitimizing power of the public relations of the EU labels the airlines as 
a polluter and has given the airline industry an opportunity to legitimize itself through 
carbon emission mitigation or public penalties for misbehavior. 
In response, the airline industry may choose to use any or all of Lindblom’s 
(1994) strategies to manage their legitimacy perceptions by (a) make the changes 
required to mitigate carbon emissions and disclose their carbon emission costs, (b) put 
forward an education or awareness campaign for the public or (c) associate their stance 
against disclosure and penalty by associating with another symbol of legitimacy, or (d) 
adjust the public perception through a PR campaign, none of which the airline industry 
had appeared to have initiated. The strategy appeared at this time to be one of 
compliance, but at a future date, thus giving themselves more time to adjust. The 
knowledge of what was to come has been in place since 2005 yet the time horizon for 
replacing airplane assets with more fuel efficient and less polluting aircraft is a long one. 
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Perhaps as Skinner (1978) and Reynolds (2007) show in operant behavior theory, the 
airlines may also have been waiting to understand whether enforcement would actually 
occur. 
Operant Behavior Theory #2 
 
In Chapter 1, Skinner’s (1978) operant behavior theory #2 was described as 
corporate management’s willingness to comply with any stakeholder pressure or 
regulation as long as the management perceived that enforcement would be consistent 
and continual. In the political battle of carbon emission disclosure, the airlines had not 
appeared to refute their polluting or to minimize their GHG participation in climate 
warming. As a collective within their own industry, under IATA and within some 
specific governments, such as China, India, the United States, and Russia, the airlines 
were pushing back the timeline for disclosure but not resisting that this carbon reduction 
must happen or that they would comply eventually. 
At the time of this study and according to operant behavior theory #2, the airlines 
may also have been waiting to see what would change in the energy sector’s EU-ETS 
which was the first industry scheme put in place in 2005 in the ETS pilot. This pilot was 
eventually completed in 2007 with the start of phase 2. The focus on its reporting and 
robust monitoring/audit may appear to have been tolerant. Since 2008 and the global 
financial crisis, the financial well-being of the EU’s collective economies had taken 
priority over additional penalty costs to its industries. Additional considerations had been 
implemented in the ensuring years since 2008. As an example, in April, 2013, the EU 
undermined the value of its carbon allowances that had been allocated to affected energy 
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producers, by the auction of emission permits. A wait and see attitude by the airline 
operators may have been judicious and apparent in this dynamic environment. 
The unfolding chronicle has just begun on this emerging fight to mitigate GHG 
emissions and assign economic penalties to profit taking by the disclosure of those costs 
on financial statements. As parties try to reach agreement on how to stop the 
anthropogenic pollution which threatens to destroy the earth and the resources of 
sustainable commerce, accountants may find that the carbon cost financial statement 
disclosure through IFRS, and the resulting economic effect, may provide a consistent 
platform for reform that investor’s power will force. The literature review that follows 
described some of the very recent approaches to deal with the economics of this 
anthropogenic destruction. 
Literature Review 
The Kyoto Protocol, (1997, 2005), the Chicago Accord (2002), the Copenhagen 
Accord (2009), the Cancun Agreements (2010), and potentially the 20th conference of the 
parties (COP) in Peru in December 2014 for GHG emissions have given signatories, such 
as the EU, the obligation to control their GHG emissions, concentrating on CO2 in the 
first instance. The EU has capped CO2 emissions from heavy industry (Grubb & Neuhoff, 
2006) as part of their emissions trading scheme (EU-ETS) and is now demanding this 
reporting from the airline industry (original date January 1, 2012). The EU expected an 
airline consensus agreement to occur in Montreal, Canada in September 2013. The 
consensus that was reached at that meeting agreed only to participate in the EU-ETS from 
2020. As this was unacceptable to the EU, the EU announced in November 2013 that 
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they would impose carbon dioxide penalties immediately to the offending airlines rather 
than allow the more lenient cap and trade scheme of the EU-ETS. In April 2014, the EU 
suspended the entire EU-ETS for airlines until 2016. A great deal of controversy 
continues to surround the extent of this carbon dioxide pollution, its economic costs, the 
parties responsible, and the financial reporting and disclosure of those costs (Frais-
Aceitano et al., 2012; Helm, Hepburn, & Ruta, 2012; Matisoff et al., 2012; Milne, Ball, & 
Gray, 2008; Pedersen et al., 2013; Stechemesser & Guenther, 2012; Uddin & Holtdeahl, 
2013). 
Much qualitative, management, and theorized literature about GHG has been 
produced since 1992 when the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC) began work on a process and costing framework for the control and 
reporting of GHG emissions. Researchers have been discussing the requirements and the 
economic effects of the European Union’s carbon emission schemes, the EU-ETS, since 
2001 (Grubb & Neuhoff, 2006), while consulting firms have created mathematical 
formulae to calculate these carbon costs. The EU has demanded this reporting on the 
basis of all airline carbon emissions within their collective sovereignty airspace. 
However, while it was not a demand in most other jurisdictions at the time of this study it 
might have been included in data collection in airline corporate ERP systems and in the 
footnotes to the financial statements (Smale et al., 2006). 
Specific reporting requirements and guidelines which were currently broad 
definitions of these costs, have been included in general language terms by the 
International Accounting Standards (IAS) organization, the parent of IFRS, the ISO 
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standards for documentation, the EU, and the SEC in the United States. These 
organizations have described the relevant sections which might be used for pollution 
disclosure and certificates, which include: IFRS section 38 for recording of intangible 
assets (carbon credits/allowances could be considered here), IFRS 5 (noncurrent assets 
held for sale, that is, carbon credits), IAS 37 (liability funds), IAS 41 (FMV of biological 
assets), IAS 8 (estimates and errors), IFRS 6 (exploration and evaluation expenses for 
income statement), and ISO 14001 and 14064 (organizational documentation processes). 
However, the extent to which voluntary disclosure on financial reports was made or the 
readiness of industry for this eventuality was unknown (Kolk et al., 2008; Lidstone et al., 
2013; Power, 2011). In addition, the new extended business reporting language (XBRL), 
a new format of disclosure reporting that is being adopted in developing countries, may 
soon be the standard requirement under IFRS. In January 2014, the IASB continued to 
recruit members to its IFRS Taxonomy Consultative Group to assist the IASB in its 
XBRL development. 
Consistent Language and Costing Approaches 
Beyond these reporting requirements and guidelines, what remains problematic 
are the issues of readiness to collect and report data, use of consistent language, reliable 
interpretations of financial accounting guidelines and regulations, and audit of reported 
data. As examples of scholastic efforts to aid consistent language, Pedersen et al. (2013) 
conducted a mixed methods review of the literature to synthesize a common definition to 
help academics and practitioners in monetary and nonmonetary calculations for carbon 
dioxide pollution accounting. Uddin and Holtedahl (2013) also conducted a study of the 
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emission trading scheme language and compared the many different GHG accounting 
programs in another attempt to synthesize some standard language amongst the 
regulatory agencies. They found that there was so much variation in the regulations of 
these agencies that it would be very difficult for any third party auditor or organization to 
be competent in all regulations. At the time of this study it remains unclear whose 
regulation model will survive or be effective. 
The models of airline carbon footprint costs can be a simple cost of the fuel while 
over the EU airspace or a complex engineered cost accounting exercise (Uddin & 
Holtedahl, 2013). There is a direct relationship between an aircraft’s base weight and 
engine type (together designated as ‘the base’) to the fuel burn on specific routes flown. 
There is a further direct relationship between that base plus the additional weight in the 
fuel loaded on the plane, passengers and freight carried, the altitudes reached, wind and 
temperature variations, and maintenance schedules of the planes on specific routes flown 
(Grubb & Neuhoff, 2006). These direct relationships will vary widely with the age of the 
aircraft, its engine age and efficiency, how well the aircraft and its engines are 
maintained, and the weather that the aircraft encounters on its flight path. Unfortunately 
daily wind and weather are not recorded for individual routes by the airlines. Due to the 
EU regulations and IFRS, a significant increase in the carbon costs reporting of any EU 
resident airline, including specific reporting on their financial statements, should have 
been clearly apparent to readers of their annual reports. However, it was possible that no 
increase in carbon pollution cost would have been seen on a non-EU resident airline’s 
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current financial statements even though those same airlines must have disclosed those 
carbon costs to the EU authority. 
As IFRS was also mandated in the EU, several authors have sought to quantify 
the commercial costs and benefits to organizations of carbon pollution accounting and 
ETS schemes rather than simply appeal to human logic regarding the destruction of their 
own life systems. One foundational suggestion from Ajani et al. (2013) for a starting 
point to calculate the progress of environmental destruction was to inventory and 
benchmark of all current water, land, and forest resources. In another study, Apergis, 
Eleftheriou, and Payne (2013) used the formal financial statements of 1230 United 
Kingdom, French, and German manufacturing firms to track a cost/benefit scenario. 
Apergis et al. performed an econometric linear regression to analyze whether accounting 
and tax changes to deductions for research and development (R&D) expenses would 
affect CO2 emissions for the years 1998 to 2011. This time horizon surrounded the 2005 
mandatory adoption of IFRS in EU countries. Apergis et al. found that CO2 emissions 
declined with increased R&D spending. Tax allowances for increased R&D spending 
gave the organizations in EU countries some needed capital investment into pollution 
reduction technologies. 
To attempt further proof of economic benefit of calculating and disclosing carbon 
dioxide costs, Turner et al. (2012) analyzed the metal/steel industry in Wales (also an EU 
country) and used a pretest-posttest repeated measures factorial ANOVA CGE input-
output model. They concluded that under the EU-ETS, assigning the costs of pollution 
under the country of production (PAP) accounting rather than the country of consumption 
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(CAP) accounting would prove economically beneficial to Wales. They also pointed out 
that it was likely that the steel production would move offshore and thereby make the 
ETS, and possibly their study, moot. Others such as Tsai et al. (2012) chose to create a 
mixed activity based costing (ABC) econometric model to assist airlines in their choice 
of airplanes to fly based on available cost and carbon minimization attributes. In these 
few examples, economics, profit, and shareholder equity metrics were the basis of 
persuasive quantitative studies. 
In another study to provide common language and a common costing approach 
for pollution accounting, Pedersen et al. (2013) using 2008-2009 data, analyzed 142 
Danish corporate annual reports with 16 follow-up interviews. This was a mixed methods 
literature review and logistical regression to synthesize a common definition and 
approach for monetary as well as nonmonetary costs for carbon pollution accounting. 
These Danish organizations were all under both a Danish government and EU mandate to 
disclose environmental costs. In that study they looked for those company’s responses to 
institutional pressures for CSR reporting and concluded that while environmental 
reporting appeared to improve over the 2-year period, most first time reporting 
companies mimicked other previous reporters and perceived little or no value in the 
reporting exercise. Others who admitted not reporting even under the Danish and EU 
mandate excused themselves with reasons of misunderstanding, lack of expertise, lack of 
technical equipment to gather the data, or lack of computerized reporting systems.
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Carbon Studies 
How carbon emissions can be assigned or allocated to countries and industries 
was also a contentious issue. Within the EU, carbon emission quotas were allocated 
based upon the country that produces those emissions. A study mentioned previously, 
Turner et al. (2012) conducted a repeated measures factorial ANOVA to analyze the 
metal/steel manufacturing in Wales. In their quantitative analysis of assigning and 
accounting for the carbon emissions to the country or industry of production (PAP) 
versus the country of consumption (CAP), their results showed a complexity of trade 
issues as well. In Wales, which exports much of its domestically produced metal, steel, 
energy production, oil refining, and chemicals, Turner et al. demonstrated that as exports 
rose there was a corresponding rise in CO2 emissions but not a parallel rise in GDP or 
wage driven domestic consumption. Turner et al. further concluded that Wales, with a 
carbon trade surplus, under the EU rules would benefit from PAP accounting only 
because the rise in CO2 penalty costs was outweighed by the increase in export trade 
profit. Should the EU transition to a carbon penalty system on the importing country, 
CAP, Turner et al. concluded that exports from Wales (and profits from those exports) to 
other EU countries might lessen as those importing countries bore the CO2 penalties. The 
politics of the carbon emissions allocations remains dynamic. 
Politics for and against pollution penalties have been vigorous in the currently 
identified polluting industries. In addition to the steel industry with its heavy pollution 
emissions, other industries such as the energy industry, oil and gas in particular, cement, 
and now airlines and transportation have received the earliest carbon pollution attention 
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by Australia and the EU. Realizing that industry lobbies and their member commercial 
organizations might wage industrial war if outright penalties for carbon pollution were 
legislated, the airline industry ETS legislation was created by the EU officials in 2008. 
This legislation required that all airlines flying in the EU collective airspace and airports 
first use their allocated 2010 threshold carbon credit allowances and subsequently buy 
any additional credits or permits needed for each ton of CO2 the airplanes emitted 
(Reuters June 8, 2011; MacKenzie, 2009). This penalty for airline carbon emissions was 
originally scheduled to begin on January 1, 2012; however, political threats of retaliatory 
actions from countries such as Russia, China, and the United States prevailed temporarily 
to derogate the ETS for EU bound airlines in November 2012 until January 1, 2014 and 
then subsequently this was moved to 2016. The EU resident airline’s compliance 
benchmarked in 2010 was required continuously from the original date January 1, 2012 
but it too was postponed in April 2014 until 2016. 
The 2010 airline’s carbon emissions benchmarking data for all EU resident and 
EU bound airlines was public record (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008). The disclosure 
requirements demanded that airlines flying to and from EU airports collect emissions cost 
data based on an acceptable formula approved by the EU. These reported cost data were 
audited by the EU or by approved agencies or auditors. Through a grandfathering 
process, airlines received free credits amounting to 85% of their 2010 market share 
(European Commission, 2011). Subsequently, the airlines had to buy credits from other 
organizations or regimes that did not use their free allowances or from another industry 
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also under the EU-ETS mandate and who may be producing emission credits through EU 
approved global green carbon projects (GCP) (Malina et al., 2012). 
There were many economic as well as political implications of the EU-ETS. The 
implications of the EU-ETS pollution costing scheme for the airline companies that are 
included in this cap and trade, were analyzed by Preston, Lee, and Hooper (2012). The 
United States, which currently contributes 10% of the total airline industry GHG 
emissions, had taken both unilateral action and group leadership of the refusal to 
participate in the EU-ETS for airlines (Reuters, 2013). According to IATA (2013) airlines 
argued their position to resist another cost by citing the economic traditionally low profit 
margins of the airline industry as well as the economic adversities of the next few years. 
The 2008 global financial crisis that reduced air travel, the 2010 volcanic ash preventing 
flying in Europe for 2 months, and the new 2011 European air tax were hardships that 
caused the bankruptcy of many major airlines and the consolidation of other carriers to 
remain solvent (Wensveen, 2010). From an environmental perspective, the importance of 
the airlines inclusion in the ETS was pointed out by Preston et al. who stated that airlines 
represented nearly 5% of the carbon pollution emissions which are anticipated to grow at 
an average of 4.8% year on year for the foreseeable future. 
Preston et al. (2012) were not hopeful that the politics that surrounded the airline 
industry and the lack of good accounting models would see a cohesive conformance in 
the near term. Airlines were not included in the actual Kyoto Accord but referenced in 
article 2.2 to be the responsibility of the UN under the ICAO. In fact, ICAO has been 
trying to achieve global agreement from the airlines on a pollution reduction and cost 
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system but at September 2013 they had yet to succeed and could only gather agreement 
in principle for some action in 2020. The main topic of this study was to show the 
reporting readiness and compliance of EU versus non-EU destined airlines to collect this 
ETS data. This readiness was analyzed through the extent of carbon emissions data 
tracked and reported on their formal financial statements in the EU reporting periods of 
2012 and 2013.  
Management Accounting 
Academic researchers have explored management accounting techniques for the 
reporting of CO2 emissions. Management accounting reports use a data collection process 
and computer software to calculate their costs of the pollution, but these are internal 
reports and may not be divulged to the public at large (Christ & Burritt, 2013; Vasile & 
Man, 2012). Vasile and Man reported that employee competence in constructing carbon 
emission costing models and information computing abilities has been seen as one of the 
operational obstructions in the reporting of the real costs of pollution. The use of 
management accounting cost models and available costing software was seen as an 
innovation to assist financial accountants in addressing this operational barrier to 
pollution cost reporting on financial statements (Vasile & Man). 
Several costing models have been put forward by researchers for environmental 
management accounting (EMA). In defining what EMA included, Vasile and Man (2012) 
used two views, one of environment protection and the other, the costs of the flow of 
materials and energy usage. They created a table (Appendix A) of how environmental 
costs, those associated with routine charges for water, energy, and power, and those that 
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estimate the costs of environmental effect, could be incorporated into both financial (past 
focused) accounting and into management (future focused) accounting. The authors 
pointed out that a variety of EMA models has been developed by researchers. Those 
models included Tsai et al (2012) with an activity-based costing decision model for 
airplanes, Ajani et al.’s (2013) inventory of carbon flows and reservoirs, as well as 
Apergis, Eleftheriou, and Payne’s (2013) study of IFRS accounting guidelines that may 
offer costing incentives for ETS compliance. According to Vasile and Man, the multiple 
emerging EMA costing models have constituted an ongoing controversy and a defacto 
limitation to practical adoption. 
Vasile and Man (2012) identified other economic benefits complementary to an 
organization’s increasing ability to gather and report acceptable EMA data. Those 
benefits consisted of improved pollution information for decision making in pricing 
policies, in acquiring pollution reducing technologies, lower operating costs, and 
improved competitive advantages to the enterprise. Vasile and Man’s work was an 
overview on the topic of management accounting’s role in pollution cost calculations. 
Follow-up specific company and industry studies may prove beneficial to EMA. 
The use of EMA may not be accepted in accounting practice. Although 
management accounting researchers have created some airline industry and object 
specific quantitative management accounting models as discussed above, others have 
investigated the willingness to actually use any of the environmental management 
accounting techniques in their firms. Wilmshurst and Frost (2001) surveyed 500 
Australian CEOs and CFOs to determine the importance of accountants in the climate 
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change discussion. Wilmshurst and Frost, from their survey, concluded that while 
industry leaders saw a business need to address environmental issues, for those surveyed 
there appeared to be no important role for the accountants. Christ and Burritt (2013) 
conducted a survey of 1585 Australian accountants to determine their attitudes toward 
environmental management accounting (EMA). Australia, like the EU, has been 
mandating pollution and environmental policies, actions, and reporting since the late 
1980s. Christ and Burritt used a Likert scale survey questions and multiple regressions to 
analyze the results on a dichotomous dependent of present use and future use of EMA 
techniques. Christ and Burritt found that the company’s own environmental strategy, the 
industry norms, and the organization’s size (to have the people and means to gather data) 
were good predictors of EMA usage, but that organization structure was not.  
The value of waste product and operations emissions as reported by accountants 
has also been studied. Gale (2005) in his study performed under the UN Division for 
Sustainable Development (UNDSD) attempted to trace the material purchase value of 
wastes and emissions. Gale concluded that companies had either hidden these costs 
within overhead accounts or not recorded them at all within the traditional, conventional 
accounting systems. The implications from these research studies would suggest either a 
lack of understanding of what information EMA can provide, or what benefits there may 
be in business decisions that are predicated on complete, detailed costing information. 
With complete costing information models, future profits may be forecasted from sage 
investments in new technologies for both reporting detailed costs and for illuminating 
where operational efficiencies could be gained (Ratnatunga & Balachandran, 2009). 
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EMA uniform practice remains an enigma to be solved so that EMA procedures, 
calculations, and reporting can be more easily implemented to promote universal 
consistency. Academic researchers have shown that academics, UN and accounting 
organizations, and some governments have given general explanations of what should be 
reported. Unfortunately, the plethora of voices in this ongoing discussion, have created 
several costing models that are without regulatory specifics or detailed mandates on 
financial statement reporting. 
Corporate Social Responsibility and Pressures to Disclose 
Many researchers since the late 1970s have dealt with the stimuli of economic and 
environmental disclosure. These economic and environmental issues are inextricably 
linked as economic success depends upon the resources of the earth and also upon the 
manpower that the earth sustains. Global economic and business sustainability decisions 
are made based upon the financial reports of organizations and of countries. Di Giacomo 
et al. (2012) and Pedersen et al. (2013) have shown that pollution or environmental cost 
disclosure may reflect CSR to its stakeholders and its society but other researchers have 
also shown that government or regulatory intervention is necessary for a sustained and 
consistent approach to pollution disclosures (Apergis et al., 2013; Ball & Craig, 2010; 
Frias-Aceituno et al., 2012; Matisoff, et al., 2012; Turner et al., 2012). Nevertheless, 
without senior management’s conviction and direction, there is evidence that many firms 
simply feign environmental concern and display a public relations façade in both 
voluntary and mandated disclosure schemes (Matisoff et al., 2012; Milne et al., 2008; 
Pedersen et al., 2013).  
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The motivators for environmental pollution disclosure are varied. Frais-Aceituno 
et al. (2013) and Matisoff et al. (2012) investigated the motivators of disclosure for 
companies which had already begun to disclose carbon and environmental cost 
information or which were thinking about disclosure. Frias-Aceituno et al. used the 
Forbes 2000 global corporation list to analyze the motivators of financial and 
environmental integrated financial reporting. Frias-Aceituno et al.’s 2008–2010 logistic 
regression used a sample of 1590 international companies and found that monopolies 
were unlikely to publish integrated financial reports and that the proposed predictors of 
business growth opportunities and industry segment did not predict integrated reporting. 
However, company size and profitability were predictors that indicated organizations 
may produce and disclose this environmental information. There was no inference 
suggested as to why this difference in predictors might have been true. 
The quality of environmental reporting has been an issue. Quality was the focus 
of a 2003-2010 longitudinal survey study by Matisoff et al. (2012) of 2900 world-wide 
firms. While the perceived quality and the quantity of reporting improved over the years 
due to government intervention, their results also showed that the United States actually 
declined in environmental reporting despite the fact that the SEC (17 CFR parts 211, 231, 
and 241) and the EPA have rules and penalties to support this reporting. The authors 
speculated that companies might be waiting to see what consequence power the U.S. 
regulations had. 
CSR is the topic under which environmental disclosure often resides. The quality 
and management CSR motivators, oftentimes called triple bottom line accounting (TBL) 
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or corporate sustainability accounting, were critiqued in a literature exposé by Milne et 
al. (2008). These authors who had been writing in this discipline from the early 1990s 
analyzed the carrying capacity of the earth, its growing population, and the ecological 
risks that reliance upon voluntary or even mandated ecology reporting would have. Milne 
et al. strongly suggested that TBL and the global reporting initiative (GRI) as forms of 
CSR were simply a form of deception and were in fact detrimental to the actual need for 
GHG reporting. These sentiments have also been strongly stated by other renowned 
scholars in this discipline such as Brown et al. (2009), Elkington (2004), Ebrahim and 
Weisband (2007), Giddens (2009), Gray and Bebbington (2000), Henriques and 
Richardson (2012), Hopwood (2009), O’Dwyer, Owen, and Unerman (2011), and 
Pedersen et al. (2013). Di Giacomo et al. (2012) had also supported the notion that 
companies make the appearance of success in addressing and reducing their 
environmental impact by manipulating their results.  
Manipulation of results remains a problem in the credibility of company reports. 
In the case study of a U.K. based international management and technology consulting 
firm with over 250,000 employees and revenues of US$25 billion, Di Giacomo et al. 
(2012) found that a lack of management commitment failed to produce carbon footprint 
reductions. This U.K. company fell under the EU carbon reduction mandate and had been 
awarded the environmental ISO 14001 classification. This company set its carbon 
reduction goals in part based on a commitment to reduce corporate travel. The company 
did not give the training or the technology tools to the employees in time to offset their 
previous travel practices and the company in fact had a larger carbon emissions footprint 
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during the study. The company’s response to this outcome was to increase its carbon 
emission measurement goals in order to be perceived as successfully striving to be an 
ecologically responsible organization. 
In the CSR and disclosure section of this airline industry report, the early 
reporting response evidence from companies in the emerging field of GHG reduction was 
not encouraging. Companies may have been struggling to economically justify changing 
operations or accounting methods in order to actually reduce their carbon footprint. 
However, companies were thinking about their image as good corporate citizens and 
putting some thought into their practices, even if sometimes it may have been only public 
relations words. With time and experience, as other members and other industries find the 
economic benefit in pollution mitigation, specific pollution operations and reporting 
practice may become more widespread. 
Industry Polluting Emissions 
Despite the EU regulation, the struggle to assign pollution responsibility and 
reporting continues as several countries have not adopted IFRS or accepted the EU-ETS 
scheme that would affect their countries airlines. Countries such as China, India, and the 
United States objected on economic bases indicating that additional costs would damage 
their airlines’ ability to continue operations (Malina et al., 2012; Stechemesser & 
Guenther, 2012). To evaluate this stance, specific country studies have been done. Malina 
et al. (2012) analyzed the effect of the EU-ETS on U.S. airlines that would be involved 
through their North Atlantic flight routes to Europe. Through a CGE model regression 
they used the EU-ETS projected costs and allowances to forecast fuel prices and GDP 
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from 2012 through 2020. They found that no matter whether costs were put through or 
not to passengers, the U.S. airlines would reap profit windfalls and would be better off to 
accept the EU-ETS scheme. 
There is controversy as to whether the EU-ETS would be more profitable or more 
costly to the airline industry. Contrary to the more profitable scenario presented by 
Malina et al. (2012), Tsai et al. (2012) reported that a Reuters’ aviation study forecasted 
that the EU-ETS would cost the airline industry 1.4 billion Euros ($1.95bn) in the first 
year. In the Matisoff et al. (2012) already mentioned on the quality of environmental 
reporting, curiously the U.S. corporations (not just airlines) involved were actually seen 
to be reducing their environmental disclosure during 2003 to 2010 despite SEC and EPA 
policies and penalties for nondisclosure. The United States has put in place 
environmental protection committees, agencies, and acts at the direction of President 
Obama, but it is not yet clear how successful these will be. 
Pollution created by industry and the billions of people living around the globe 
were starting to be given attention by governments and other stakeholders for the real 
environmental costs. These pollution costs were being analyzed in terms of current and 
future health care costs, ecosystem remediation costs, and the resulting changes in 
climate and therefore loss of economic stability (Gagelmann & Hansjurgens, 2002; Smale 
et al., 2006). These future costs and the potential change in energy sources away from 
carbon based in order to mitigate costs, has received attention from the investing 
community as well. The devaluation of carbon based assets on a balance sheet and the 
increasing costs of pollution penalties have caused a coalition of institutional investors to 
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communicate with fossil fuel producers and the SEC to bring pressure to bear on 
disclosing the future risks and costs on their financial statements (McCarthy, 2013). This 
coalition included Goldman Sachs and Citigroup as well as the membership of the 
nonprofit sustainability advocate Ceres, whose membership includes the California 
Public Employees Retirement System (Calpers) and the New York State retirement fund. 
Investors look to the future of a corporation and need to be informed of the fiscal risks. 
Because of the trillions of investment dollars they control, the demands of this investment 
coalition was being listened to by publicly listed corporations. 
The costs of pollution, similar to the costs of quality, are subjects of future 
accounting research and practical application (Ellerman & Joskow, 2008). There is a need 
to build these pollution costs into generally accepted accounting procedures in a similar 
manner to the importance and the rules surrounding asset values and amortization. To 
ensure that the future costs of pollution will be borne by the polluting organization, 
financial statements as well as forecasts must be affected with real data. If accounting is 
to measure the depletion costs of the carrying capacity of the earth there must be a 
starting point for quantification of the earth’s resources. 
A standardized methodology for calculating the cost of pollution and the 
depletion of natural resources and carbon sink reservoir continues to be a complex and 
debated issue. A description of the earth’s carbon stock reservoirs and flow was provided 
by Ajani et al. (2013) who also suggested an accounting methodology to inventory and 
benchmark the land, forest, and water reservoirs. A tracking and costing of maintenance, 
restoration, and destruction could be done with that benchmark foundation. There are 
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many risks to human’s inability to stop the ecological destruction, three of which are (a) 
if these costs are not being gathered and made apparent, they will not be minimized, and 
(b) if the remediation costs are not being accrued for and appropriate expense funds built 
the risk is no remediation in the future. The third and more important risk is (c) that the 
calculation methods of the real costs must be incorporated into IFRS and GAAP so that 
these can be accurately reported on financial statements. The EU’s demand for airline 
CO2 reporting presented an opportunity to compare one industry’s ability to cost and 
report pollution costs. 
Gaps and/or Deficiencies in Prior Research 
The costs of carbon pollution, as well as accounting’s ability to calculate, record, 
and report those costs were a new area of research. The prior research showed limited 
studies into environmental reporting of costs, none on airlines, and published studies 
continue to highlight the need for technical information systems to gather and report data. 
Just one element of carbon pollution costs was analyzed in this study, that of the airline 
industry and the EU-ETS or the alternative of Co2 emission penalties.  
A complete cost of the historical manufactured costs as well as the cost of lost 
future resources remains critical if humans are to place the real value on their purchases 
and actions. The limited academic research and corporate carbon cost disclosures on 
financial statements to date have focused on the costs of securing energy sources such as 
fuel costs (scope 1 emissions) and providing the costs of dumping locations for pollution 
laden water, soil, garbage, and other wastes of all types. Matisoff et al. (2012) reported 
that almost no disclosure or focus had been placed on the costs of the Scope 2 emission’s 
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value to society of the devastated water, land, and air resources that are destroyed in the 
pursuit of gaining profits. Further, that little focus had been placed on the Scope 3 
complete supply chain costs of GHG pollution within the product or service costing and 
pricing. 
The highest polluting industries and their environmental impacts had been 
targeted by scientists and environmentally concerned societies but disclosure of the costs 
of the impacts remains inconsistent and most often, elusive. Transportation energy users 
in addition to the oil and gas producers were the largest contributors to GHG. Grubb and 
Neuhoff (2006) pointed out the progress that was being made for GHG calculations as 
each new country or industry regulation was being formulated; however, a consistent 
calculation method had not been agreed globally. Smale et al. (2006), as well as 
Gagelmann and Hansjurgens (2002), reported on the need to also calculate the costs of 
health and economic effects of pollution from carbon burning. Both researchers pointed 
to consulting firms as providing the formula for at least the EU-ETS purposes and the 
data gathered by these sample airlines has had their calculation process vetted and 
approved by the EU emission administration. However, a lack of understanding of 
requirements and unpreparedness to collect the data were some of the excuses given by 
mandated companies in other industries who had not reported beyond the historically 
reported scope 1 fuel used. This study did not look specifically for delineated scope costs 
but for emissions costs in the airline industry. Kolk et al. (2008) reported that it was 
unknown if any industry was ready to record the Scope 2 and 3 data either because of 
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computer software issues or the competent employees needed to calculate the costs for 
this reporting eventuality. 
The real financial costs of Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions are complex and 
multifaceted; difficult to collect, record, and report for the pollution effects. The 
UNFCCC mandate for reduction of GHG reflected the willingness of 196 countries to 
agree to reduce all three emission scopes in an effort to return to within 2 degrees 
centigrade of preindustrial levels under the UN directed inventory metrics of those GHG 
levels. Country GHG emissions were begun by the UN in 1990 and are updated annually.  
IFRS may be the solution for consistent disclosure. To assist in the financial 
statement disclosure of GHG emissions IFRS included some global accounting guidelines 
that could be used for recording the EU-ETS emission penalties and for remediation 
liabilities for the restoration of land, water, and atmosphere degradation. These IFRS 
guidelines were used generally for all accounting valuations and were not specific to 
environmental accounting. The United States SEC filing requirements did include some 
sustainability accounting standards (SASB) but most environmental pollution costs for 
the ecosystem destruction were not recorded in any financial way. Researchers had 
covered some aspects of the models, motivators, and predictors of environmental cost 
disclosure in some industries; however, no research was found with evidence of airline 
adherence to the EU-ETS or EU emission penalties for airlines which fail to reduce 
emissions. This gap may be a topic of future study as the ETS scheme continues and 
other countries adopt similar legislation. 
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Previous Environmental Research Designs and Frames 
In this study, I used the pretest-posttest repeated measure factorial ANOVA 
design that was utilized by Turner et al. (2012) in their study of the carbon emission costs 
of manufacturing of steel in Wales. Turner et al. used an economics CGE model to 
forecast the carbon emissions and concurrent GDP. Their model was based upon the 
Kyoto (2005) and Copenhagen (2009) accords on climate change mitigation, input-output 
accounting, and the attribution of penalties to the carbon emitting company/country, 
Their study was completed over a 25 year span, based on a 2003 base year data 
regression which used a statistical comparison with real data for 2007 and 2008. Turner 
et al. compared the carbon emissions attributable to either the country of production 
(PAP) versus the country of consumption (CAP) over the period. In my study, this 
pretest-posttest method allowed for testing before and after the intervention of the EU-
ETS and the changing IFRS standards during the 3-year period of this study. The 
repeated measuring showed any disclosure changes in the financial statements over the 
time frame that surrounded the intervention and permitted the ANOVA as well as an 
ANCOVA comparison between the EU resident and other mandated airlines with the 
non-EU or nonmandated airlines. 
The data collection framework presented in Chapter 3 was constructed drawing 
upon two previous studies. These are, the Stechemesser and Guenther (2012) criteria 
frame for carbon dioxide allowances and financial statement inclusion recording as well 
as the Uddin and Holtedahl (2013) scope and emission criteria frame. Stechemesser and 
Guenther researched over 2000 publications and carbon collection criteria which included 
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for all monetary and nonmonetary evaluations and monitoring costs. Their analysis 
included the entire value chain with all Scope 1, 2, and 3 emissions. Uddin and 
Holtedahl’s study concluded a common language and treatment through a review of 
publications and public practice literature inclusive of 2011 listings in both regulatory 
and voluntary schemes of carbon emission reporting. Uddin and Holtedahl also 
commented that “all standards and programs have a more-or-less uniform approach in 
accounting for greenhouse gases from projects or organizations”; however, the audit 
assurance rigor was much less consistent (p. 6). With the foundational information from 
these studies, in this study I included data gathering criteria for all current sections of 
regulatory and reporting standards of the IAS, IFRS, EU-ETS, SEC, and ISO. Together 
these standards comprise the possible recording and reporting opportunities for airline 
corporations to disclose present and future carbon pollution costs. 
Summary 
The regulatory and social responsibility for carbon emissions reporting to provide 
business sustainability information appeared inconclusive in the literature; however, 
many scholars have tried to identify the issues to be addressed. Regulatory frameworks 
for the reporting of GHG emissions were presented in the literature review as well as the 
current problems associated with the calculation and disclosure of those costs on the 
financial statements of corporations. Corporate governance for financial accounting, 
social responsibility, and corporate legitimacy toward the environment remain 
inconsistent in the perception of stakeholders. Consistent accounting language, guideline 
interpretations, and audit remain elusive, and compounding these reporting issues, 
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corporate management’s role also appeared to be conflicted as they responded to diverse 
stakeholder demands for profit and GHG disclosure, as well as to regulatory mandates. 
Researchers showed that even when these pollution costs are disclosed, there are 
diverse calculation models. Disparate geographic regulations and GAAPs used different 
cost calculations and not surprisingly, the verification of those costs and the audit of 
specifics were troublesome for the audit agents to be considered competent. In addition, 
the ability of corporations to actually gather and report these costs may not be 
economically available to some industry members due to the need for trained personnel 
and sophisticated information software. For this airline industry study, while all of these 
issues were emerging, this study looked to quantify the number of costs being disclosed 
at this particular juncture given the regulatory intervention imperative of the EU-ETS, 
carbon cost penalties, and the use of evolving IFRS accounting guidelines for the 
environment. 
Importance of the Study 
Why the study should be pursued. The survival of the earth and the politics of 
profit are in conflict. The reviewed literature has called for more quantitative research to 
convince economic decision makers to support the disclosure of pollution costs in order 
to prevent the destruction of the earth’s natural resources needed for life and commercial 
use. A consistent global accounting framework that included the many environmental 
costs of operations would support the fair and equal treatment of all commercial entities 
and therefore support the availability of life and commerce supporting resources. 
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Disclosure of pollution costs on financial statements, the engine of financial decisions, is 
imperative. 
The airline industry has a global reach and according to the UN 
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (UNIPCC), aviation in 1990 contributed 330 
billion Metric tons (Mt) of CO2 which rose to 480 billion Mt by 2000 or 1.5 times in 1 
decade. To put the airline emissions into perspective as part of the much larger crisis, in 
the UNIPCC fifth assessment report of 2014, scientists have forecasted that regression 
analysis put the anthropogenic atmospheric CO2 at 450 parts per million (ppm) by 2030 
and 770 ppm by 2100. Further, cumulative anthropogenic CO2 emissions since 2010 are 
forecasted to exceed 700 Gigatons (Gt) the equivalent of 700 billion tons of CO2 by 2030 
and exceed 1500 Gt by 2050, and over 4000 Gt by 2100 (UNIPCC, 2014). The earth’s 
ecosystem flows are even now unable to handle the increasing pollutants and concurrent 
destruction of its natural reservoirs and ecosystem processing systems that are being 
destroyed through anthropogenic activity (Ajani et al., 2013).  
If there is no disclosure of the pollution costs on financial statements and 
therefore no economic impetus to reduce these emissions through different energy 
sources, better engines, better engineered airplane bodies, more efficient loading, more 
efficient flying and landing, and better maintenance, it is estimated that by the year 2020 
airline carbon emissions will have grown at 3 – 4% per year (Tsai et al., 2012). Tsai et al. 
reported that these emissions will rise to over 954 Mt per year of CO2 GHG by the year 
2020 that will be dumped into the air and thence to the land and the water. These are just 
the airline industry projections. Other industries such as oil and gas, cement, agriculture, 
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and other transportation modes will also be growing their GHG emissions during that 
same period. 
The focus in this study was the airline industry’s carbon emissions and the 
disclosure of the costs of those emissions in financial statements. The EU-ETS 
intervention provided an opportunity for a comparative study to discern whether carbon 
costs are being disclosed on financial statements. Concurrent with this EU intervention, 
the international accounting standards committee (IASC) continued to update the IFRS 
standards to include for asset devaluation (S. 8) and rehabilitation (S. 6) as well as 
pollution control costs (S. 8), market value of intangibles such as emission allowances 
(S.38), and (S. 41) contingent liabilities (Firoz & Ansari, 2010; Frias-Aceituno et al., 
2012; Stechemesser & Guenther, 2012). These accounting treatment sections could have 
been or may have been used to record environment assets, liabilities, or expense items, 
but were not forced upon companies and most IFRS guidelines were not specific to 
environmental wording and may not have been used. As IFRS is currently in over 140 
global countries and not well audited in some of those; this research study did include the 
current state of IFRS reporting and adoption by specific country in the airline random 
sample used. 
Scholarly authors pointed out why the issue of pollution costs is becoming so 
important. This importance stems not only from the remediation costs of pollution to 
future generations, but the cost to any future economic development and to life on earth. 
An understanding was needed of how these costs were being captured, how reported 
under GAAP, how international regimes were handling this emerging issue, and how 
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these might have indicated a method to gain consistency across the globe. All of these 
understandings were in an attempt to try to bring some equity in terms of pollution 
generation and its affects to all peoples, animals, and vegetation which live on earth now 
and in the future. This study was a first step to determine the degree of compliance and 
the effect of this new regulation intervention on the airline industry. 
For whom is it important? This study should be important to the governments of 
the world as it showed the extent of disclosure and willingness of one industry to be 
accountable for the pollution costs of their economic profits. It should be important to the 
airline industry, health authorities, accounting professionals, and consulting firms 
(accounting, database systems, and remediation specialists). A former UN Director of 
Emissions, Frank Joshua, felt that this study was important to the UNFCCC as it was the 
first accounting study to try to analyze the impacts of two global interventions, EU-ETS 
and IFRS, on climate change. 
Conclusion 
My literature review revealed no studies in the airline industry on the disclosure 
of carbon emissions costs on their financial statements. In order to provide further 
quantitative data on the incidence of the recording of the costs of anthropogenic carbon 
pollution, as well as the impact of IFRS on these same airline corporations, this study 
may help to close this gap in the literature. In this analysis, I built upon previous research 
in the environmental accounting discipline and used airline corporations from the global 
industry population. In Chapter 3, I expand on Chapter 1 material to provide the specific 
attributes of the chosen ANOVA and ANCOVA research designs, and my rationale for 
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those designs as well as the methodology for sampling from within the population frame. 
In Chapter 3, I discuss the design details of the data being analyzed from the formal 
financial statements of the sample as well as the collection instrument and analysis 
procedures. The weaknesses or threats to validity in the study introduced in Chapter 1 are 
further described in Chapter 3 along with their mitigation so that the study’s results may 
be generalizable within the airline industry.  In Chapter 4, the results of the analysis are 
displayed and explained. In Chapter 5, the results are discussed in relation to the literature 
review and the theoretical base and how this research expands environmental accounting 
practice and contributes to positive social change. Chapter 5 concludes with my 
recommendations for further research opportunities beyond this study.  
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Chapter 3: Research Method 
In this study, I examined whether the EU-ETS intervention for airlines (the 
primary independent variable) and the evolving IFRS guideline sections (the secondary 
independent variable) that deal with environmental reporting were influencing carbon 
pollution disclosure on the financial statements of airline corporations. Three groups were 
compared; those airlines mandated by the EU-ETS (Groups 1 and 2), and those that were 
not (Group 3). Additionally, the airlines resident in the EU countries (Group 1) have 
IFRS as their GAAP; however, there were other airlines in the population whose 
countries have also adopted IFRS. As a control in this study there were airlines in the 
population frame (Group 3) that were not flying into an EU airport but may or may not be 
from a country that has adopted IFRS guidelines. To accomplish this examination 
purpose, in Chapter 3 I discuss the research design, the sampling strategy used with the 
specific population data sources, the data collection instrument, and the analysis methods. 
The threats, weaknesses, or any ethical issues that might have been present in the study 
along with my plan to mitigate those are also detailed to ensure reliability and validity. 
Research Design and Rationale 
The research questions from Chapter 1 are as follows. 
Research Question 1: To what extent is there a difference in the frequency means 
for reporting carbon footprint costs between the EU bound airlines and the non-EU bound 
airlines?  
Research Question 2: Do international financial reporting standards influence the 
reporting of carbon emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations? 
73 
 
These research questions were then translated into the following hypotheses: 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: µ1 = µ2. On average there is no difference between EU bound and non-EU bound 
airlines in tracking the carbon costs of carbon emissions and reporting on financial 
statements. 
H1:  µ 1 ≠  µ 2. On average there is a difference between EU bound and non-EU bound 
airlines in tracking the carbon costs of carbon emissions and reporting on financial 
statements. 
Where µ1 is the average number of carbon credit or debit or penalty accounting 
disclosures on the financial statements of the Group 1, EU mandated airlines and µ2 is the 
average number of accounting disclosures on the financial statements of the Group 2, 
non-EU mandated airlines. 
The statistical methodology to test Hypothesis 1 was an ANCOVA that compared 
three independent population means, that is, a comparison of average carbon cost 
disclosures between EU resident airlines, EU bound airlines, and non-EU mandated 
airlines. This comparison measured the differences in the reporting of carbon costs on the 
financial statements of corporate airlines, classified by carbon credit or EU-ETS 
terminology. 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: µ1 = µ2. International financial reporting standards do not influence the reporting of 
carbon emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations. 
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H1: µ1 ≠ µ2. International financial reporting standards influence the reporting of carbon 
emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations. 
Where µ1 is the average number of IFRS allowable carbon emissions accounting 
references disclosed on the financial statements of IFRS country airlines and µ2 is the 
average number of IFRS allowable carbon emissions accounting references disclosed on 
the financial statements of non-IFRS country airlines. 
The statistical methodology to test Hypothesis 2 was an ANOVA that compared 
two independent population means, that is, a comparison of average carbon cost 
disclosures between IFRS country airline corporations and non-IFRS country airline 
corporations, as classified by the allowable, but not environment specific, IFRS treatment 
sections for financial statements. 
Variables 
The main independent variable, the intervention, was the carbon cost trading 
scheme of the EU-ETS or carbon emission penalties that required airline corporations 
landing in EU sovereign territories to disclose the carbon burn of their flights. Through 
this information, carbon credits or debits were generated by the EU for trading or penalty 
beyond an allowance benchmark. A secondary independent variable was the IFRS 
requirements at the time of the study. Confounding variables that were considered were 
the eXtensible Business Reporting Language (XBRL) interactive data reporting 
requirements and the sophisticated computerized environments that would have been 
required in order to report on EU-ETS, IFRS, and XBRL (i.e., the technological readiness 
to report these costs).  
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The population of interest was the EU resident airlines, the EU bound airlines, 
and the non-EU bound airlines as the nominal variables and the dependent variable was 
the demonstrated compliance by EU destined airlines or noncompliance compared with 
non-EU destined airlines. This dependent variable was included as the reporting of 
carbon costs on one or more of different financial statement presentations either on the 
income statement as expenses, the balance sheet as accumulating funds for remediation, 
carbon debits as a liability, or as a destruction of some asset value, carbon credits or 
allowances held. These may have been held as an intangible asset, a current asset 
available for immediate sale, a nondepreciable noncurrent asset not immediately to be 
sold, or reported as a note to the annual, formal financial statements. Further, should the 
management discussion and analysis (MD&A) section of the financial statements have 
reflected a discussion of EU-ETS, IFRS, or a software installation, these were also 
counted. The definition section of Chapter 1 described the relevant accounting sections of 
IFRS, IAS, and SEC that outline the appropriate accounting treatments. Table 1 indicates 
the variables of interest and their levels within which responses were gathered: Counting 
the carbon emission disclosures on formal financial statements across airline industry 
corporations.
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Table 1 
Carbon Emission Costs Disclosed on Financial Statements  
                                                         ----------------Independent variables --------------- 
Demonstration of                
 __disclosure______________________________________________________________                                                                  
Presence of depletion account 
   for a remediation/green fund? 
 
Presence of liability accounts? 
 
Presence of intangible asset? 
 
Presence of current asset? 
 
Presence of pollution costs  
   expense line on income 
   statement? 
 
Presence of EU-ETS penalty costs? 
 
Presence of EU-ETS carbon credits or revenue? 
 
Presence of pollution costs dialogue 
or information system 
____ in (MD&A)?            ___________________________________________________ 
Note. Each demonstration of disclosure was sought within the samples’s individual 
financial statements under the independent variables of: Pre-EU-ETS; Post EU-ETS; the 
disclosure frames or guidelines of IFRS, IAS, and ISO; the formally recognized auditing 
frame or organization of the SEC or UN; and the software or ERP system used by the 
corporation. The frame is based upon the work of C. A. Tuck-Riggs, RSCH8250Z, April 
11, 2013. 
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Paradigm and Design 
The design that was used for this study was a straightforward comparison of the 
frequency means of three independent groups in a classic quasi-experimental design, 
longitudinal 3-year pretest-posttest control group design. The design took into account 
the most recent studies, their intention, and design as a foundation. Previous quantitative 
literature in this specific carbon cost area was extremely limited and no studies on airlines 
were found. The strategies to calculate the costs of pollution and remediation and to 
disclose those on formal financial statements are in their infancy. As seen in the literature 
review in Chapter 2, quantitative researchers have begun very recently to quantify some 
of the emerging issues as the UN, the EU, and IFRS-interested countries become aware 
of their responsibilities for global warming. 
A number of research designs had been used previously for commercial and 
environmental studies. Some of the current literature in studies that are in this 
environmental area were completed with survey designs with multiple regression (Christ 
& Burritt, 2013), logistic regressions to find predictors of disclosure (Frias-Aceitano et 
al., 2012), and mixed methods to synthesize common definitions of CO2 costs (Pedersen 
et al., 2013). Researchers have used ABC models to compare airline strategies that might 
be used in order to lower costs (Tsai et al., 2012), CGE models in pretest-posttest 
repeated measures factorial ANOVA to compare the costs of production using carbon 
based energy (Turner et al., 2012) and to project the effect of CO2 penalty costs (Malina 
et al., 2012). Although there is much literature regarding the carbon disclosure project 
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(CDP) and global reporting initiative (GRI), at the time of this study there was a gap in 
airline emissions disclosure. 
The design of this study comprised elements of previous carbon studies. The 
design was constructed to include for the European Union’s initializing airline polluter’s 
penalties within the collective EU sovereignty. In this study the incidence of carbon 
pollution costs being reported by the airline industry and the frequency of reporting of 
these costs was investigated in a global context. Within the analysis, the computer 
systems each airline was using was recorded but not in enough technical or operating 
detail to make an inference for changes to accounting database systems to collect and 
report these costs. The protocol and attribute frameworks used were based upon both the 
Stechemesser and Guenther (2012) criteria frame for carbon dioxide allowances and 
financial statement inclusion recording as well as the Uddin and Holtedahl (2013) scope 
and emission criteria frame. The design followed the pretest-posttest repeated measures 
factorial ANOVA design of Turner et al. (2012). 
This analysis was a longitudinal, quasi-experimental causal process form 
(Reynolds, 2007) with the classic experimental design of three compared groups, pretest-
posttest control group design (Campbell & Stanley, 1963). The frequency of reported 
carbon costs were counted across EU and non-EU bound airlines and then compared. 
This analysis to answer Research Question 1 used a repeated measures factorial 
ANCOVA, two tailed. 
Secondary data were examined. The public financial statements of airline 
corporations were analyzed to ascertain the number and accounting type of disclosures of 
79 
 
this carbon emission cost data in a modified Guttman frame. The contrasted groups 
design type model was used as the study observed three intact groups over two 
independent variables in a longitudinal study over the 3-year period beginning January 
2011 (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). According to the research methodology 
studies described in Campbell and Stanley (1963), the pretest-posttest control group 
design comparison model was appropriate for this type of study. It was expected that the 
EU airport bound airlines would be compliant experimental groups with the EU-ETS 
mandate, while the non-EU bound airlines would be the control group and under no 
requirement from the EU authority. 
The study had a 3-year series; a pretest of financial statement analysis before the 
EU-ETS intervention and 2-years financial analysis posttests, one immediately following 
the EU-ETS, with annual separations for delayed effects. This was a multiple measures 
design which included a within subjects design of each of the participants and the three 
levels of the independent nominal groups. It was also a between subjects design which 
measured the means of the participants taking each of the independent nominal groups as 
a whole. The factorial multiple model repeated measures ANCOVA, two tailed, assessed 
whether the average scores had differed meaningfully over the time frame. Additionally, 
the public record of reported emission costs to the EU authority was sought as a 
comparison to reported data on financial statements. As the number of world and EU 
specific airlines formed the population, the individualistic fallacy was minimized as data 
was gathered by each company. Ecological fallacy was minimized as not only was this 
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investigation done by individual airline corporation but there was also a sufficient 
population of data gathered from multiple airline carriers. 
Rationale for the Quasi-experimental Design Chosen 
The quasi-experimental design was appropriate for this study as I had no control 
over the intervention itself. The treatment or intervention was the EU-ETS regulation 
effective January 2012, then postponed for the 2013 reporting to 2016 for the Group 2 
airlines from non-EU countries which fly into the EU. The EU-ETS was the only 
regulatory mandate at that time for carbon emissions cost tracking in the airline industry. 
The EU resident airlines remained mandated from the original January 1, 2012 date along 
with any airline that traveled from one point to another point within Europe. The quasi-
experimental design using contrasted groups was appropriate for the research questions 
which were (a) to find out if there is a direct causal relationship between the EU-ETS 
demand for EU formatted carbon cost reporting and carbon costs reporting on financial 
statements and (b) whether IFRS guidelines were having a direct causal relationship on 
carbon cost reporting on financial statements. 
The study had three comparison groups, the EU resident airlines, the EU destined 
airlines, and the non-EU destined airlines. Airline corporations were assigned to any of 
the population comparison groups by virtue of their planned or nonplanned routes to EU 
airports. The sample airline corporations were then randomly assigned specifically from 
within those three strata. The contrasted groups design allowed for a second or possibly a 
third intervention cause which was either or both of the IFRS and also XBRL 
requirements had XBRL become mandated. IFRS was assessed for its covariate effect. 
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The study made use of metric and discussion information from the annual reports 
and financial statements. Footnotes containing any changes to the financial statements in 
accordance with GAAP and/or IFRS (2009) were scrutinized for additional information 
from all participants, from all stratum. This contrasted groups design type included some 
elements of the control-series design type that uses longitudinal studies in order help 
control for “history, maturation and test-retest effects” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2008, p. 128, para.1). As the public financial data from previous years of these three 
sample groups was available as well as potential macro data from the EU and other 
jurisdictions, past and present trends over time allowed inferences to be made. 
Approaches Not Chosen 
A mixed methods study was not considered at this time due to time and resource 
constraints. A qualitative study may be appropriate as a subsequent study in order to 
attempt to understand management’s motivations and actions regarding their financial 
statement carbon cost accounting disclosure seen in this study. Therefore, in this initial 
airline study no attitudinal questions through survey or interview were administered. 
Data was gathered to support or refute the research questions and hypotheses that 
the EU mandate for carbon cost reporting was causing additional financial statement 
reporting in advance of any GAAP or IFRS mandate. This research question called for a 
quantitative approach. The nonexperimental design would not be appropriate as the study 
is not simply an observation of behavior over time; there is a defined intervention and a 
regulatory change in the circumstance of the participants which might have driven the 
effects shown on the financial statements. The preexperimental design with a one shot 
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case strategy was not appropriate as there were three comparison groups with reported 
data gathered for statistical causal inference. 
The experimental design could not be used for this study as I was not in control of 
the intervention and participants could not be randomly assigned to the comparison 
groups from the entire ICAO/IATA population (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
The comparison groups were already intact and it was within the EU bound groups and 
non-EU bound group of airlines that random sampling was done. The cross-sectional 
design was also not appropriate as it usually requires a survey or interview wherein the 
participants answer questions about their attributes and attitudes—the variables—with 
researchers using the data collected to attempt some “pattern of relationship amongst 
[those] variables” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, pp. 116-117). 
This study was quasi-experimental due to the defined intervention; however, there 
were also design type models under quasi-experimental that I did not recommend for this 
study. The planned variation design would have been appropriate only if the stimuli (the 
EU mandate) could be varied systematically to observe any effect on the reporting, which 
could not be done in this study. There could be no researcher control on the treatment 
therefore the research question sought to quantify if there was a direct causal relationship 
between the EU-ETS and any reporting on the financial statements of the affected airline 
corporations. This was observed over a 3-year period beginning in the year previous to 
the proposed enforcement date. Even with the delay in enforcement, airline corporations 
had been preparing for this eventuality since 2008. 
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The quasi-experimental panel is a design type used when there is no comparison 
group and the research is simply testing one group at different times; again, this was not 
the case here. Although the statements and reports of the comparison groups were 
analyzed over time, the time series design type would have been appropriate for testing 
just one group, not comparison groups over time, which was not the case in this study and 
the same rationale was true of the extended time-series design. As three comparison 
groups were present in this study, neither of these designs was appropriate. 
Population and Sample 
Population. The population was the airline industry companies. At the time of the 
study there were over 5,500 airlines listed with an ICAO and/or IATA code. According to 
the EU, there were 4,000 airline companies affected as of April 2011and required to 
report under their EU-ETS beginning on January 1, 2012. 
Sampling. The population of EU bound airlines at the time of this study 
constituted 72.7% of the entire airline industry population (4,000/5,500) therefore this 
sampling was a stratified probability sample, with random sampling from within the 
stratified sampling using three strata, EU bound (Groups 1 and 2) and non-EU bound 
airlines (Group 3). Figure 1 shows the G power statistically calculated sample size of 64. 
From within the three strata 64 experimental and control participants were gathered from 
companies whose financial statements were published. This sample stratification ensured 
proportional representation from all groups by analyzing the annual reports and financial 
statements of the sample for disclosure of carbon costs.  
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The stratification began with the population from the listing of the ICAO of the 
airline industry companies. This list was verified by a comparison to the IATA 
membership list to ensure a complete population frame. This resulting list was then cross-
referenced to that of the EU regulatory authority mandate listing thereby creating the 
three groups, two experimental and one control which also minimized the ecological risk 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Each member of the ICAO/IATA and EU-ETS 
population was compared through an Excel spreadsheet using the sort application in 
Excel to compare and confirm the absence or inclusion of each air carrier to minimize an 
incomplete frame. 
The resulting three strata listed in Excel allowed the random sampling within each 
group (i.e., EU bound Groups 1 and 2 and non-EU bound Group 3) drawing out units 
until the appropriate sample size was reached (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
The random sample was compared with public corporation listings as these corporations 
had accessible data available for quantitative study. Random sampling continued until the 
required number (64 participants spread approximately evenly across the three stratum) 
of airline corporations with published financial statements had been reached.  
Through a classic quasi-experimental test design the three randomly chosen 
approximately similarly sized groups, from both the treatment (Groups 1 and 2) and 
control (Group 3) groups, formed R1 and R4. For Group 1, pretest observations labeled O1 
were followed by immediate intervention posttests O2 and delayed posttest O3. For Group 
2, pretest observations labeled O4 were followed by immediate intervention posttests O5 
and delayed posttest O6. For Group 3, pretest observations labeled O7 were followed by 
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immediate intervention posttests O8 and delayed posttest O9. The amount and nature of 
disclosure of pollution carbon costs on their financial statements pre and post intervention 
was analyzed using a modified Guttman framework that had been created by Tuck-Riggs 
(April 2013) shown as Table 1 in Chapter 3. No blank foreign elements were included in 
the sample as each of the sample units had published financial statements that were 
analyzed for disclosure of carbon costs (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
Sampling strategies not used. As the entire population was known and after 
several comparison and culling passes as previously noted, neither a convenience sample, 
a purposive sample, nor a quota sample would have been appropriate as they would have 
limited the randomness and therefore the validity of the study (Frankfort-Nachmias & 
Nachmias, 2008). The stratification of the experimental and control groups was done 
through the comparison culling process of ICAO/IATA versus EU-ETS listings. A 
systematic sample (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008) rather than a random sample 
within the three groups would have been an alternative. 
Sample size and why this was chosen in relation to the population size. The 
sample size had to be large enough to be representative of the underlying population 
within an acceptable level of error (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008) but 
statistically small enough to be practical and economical. Even with large enough 
numbers in the sample, if the sample was not representative, the study’s results might 
have been unreliable and invalid (Trochim, 2006). The confidence level that was used in 
the study was 95% or within two standard deviations of the estimated mean. According to 
Burkholder (2010) the sample size could have been calculated using the Cohen d formula 
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with t test for two independent samples based upon the gathering of data to compare the 
groups EU bound (1 and 2) and non-EU bound (3). 
G*power (Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009), a sample size calculator, was 
used to confirm the valid sample size as shown in Figure 1. A statistical F test ANCOVA 
for fixed effects, main effects, and interactions between three independent means (three 
groups) .05 alpha reject region that is, only 5% chance of the wrong hypothesis 
conclusion (Burkholder, 2010), effect size .4 (large) and with 80% power, was run; 80% 
was the chance of finding a mean difference between the groups if one existed (Sherperis, 
2010). The parameters of that test are displayed below in Figure 1 where a total sample 
size of 64 was required. From the EU-ETS resident airline list of public corporations a 
sample was drawn of 15 companies for which formal financial statements over the study 
period were available. From the EU bound group of airlines a sample of 27 airlines was 
drawn and a similar 27 from the non-mandated remaining list of public corporations was 
drawn for which formal financial statements over the study period could be gained for a 
total of 69 airlines analyzed. To control for maturation and mortality, a further five 
participants, from the 64 required, was chosen from the beginning of the test period 
(Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
To confirm the sample size required for Hypothesis 2 for IFRS effect, a further 
G*Power was run for t test, means: difference between two independent groups as well as 
F test ANOVA for repeated measures, within-between interaction. The t test used two 
tailed, effect size .5, .05 alpha reject region with 80% power and confirmed a total sample 
size required of 52. The G*Power calculation F test ANOVA, effect size .4, .05 alpha 
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reject region, with 80% power, 2 groups and 9 measures confirmed a required sample of 
12. As shown in Figure 1, the ANCOVA sample of 64 plus an additional five for 
maturation and mortality was sufficient for all statistical tests performed.
88 
 
 
Figure 1. G*Power: Central and noncentral distributions of F test statistical 
ANCOVA: Fixed effects, main effects, and interactions, three independent 
groups. Software retrieved from the Institute for Experimental Psychology, 
http://www.psycho.uni-duesseldorf.de/abteilungen/aap/gpower3 
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Data Collection 
Procedures. To create a comparison in the study, a sample of public airline 
companies was required; two independent groups under EU-ETS intervention mandate 
and one group which was not involved in this carbon emissions disclosure scheme. The 
population comprised the airline industry corporations beginning with the IATA/ICAO 
airline listings of approximately 5,500 corporations. A secondary list from the EU-ETS 
listings 2012 to 2014 was secured through its public website, which allowed a 
stratification to be done within the IATA/ICAO listing to identify airlines for the 
intervention groups (Groups 1 and 2) and those for the control (Group 3). The EU-ETS 
airline listing was cross-referenced for the actual assigned EU-ETS numbering system for 
each airline. Bloomberg’s airline listing was consulted for public corporations as well as 
regional airlines. This cross referencing was done through an MS Excel spreadsheet.  
Subsequently from these four large listings of those involved in the EU-ETS 
scheme (Groups 1 and 2) and those not involved (Group 3), a random selection was 
completed within each of the three strata. These randomly sampled airline corporations 
were investigated for their public financial statement availability and further random 
sampling was done within the three strata until the statistically significant number of 
corporations was achieved. A larger than required sample was drawn to ensure a 
statistical sample size was maintained through the study period. The Sample section 
above in Chapter 3 described the details.  
The public financial statements of the randomly chosen sample airlines were 
analyzed for their reporting disclosure according to the data collection instrument shown 
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in Table 1. Publicly available financial statements were found or solicited from company 
websites. The names of individual airline corporations were protected from publication 
by the use of aggregate reporting. Excepting where positive examples were needed in the 
results discussion, the results of individual airline corporations will be held in confidence 
by the principal investigator (PI) in password protected files on the PI’s main computer 
and in locked backup in the PI’s residence. The names of individual airline corporations 
will be protected by the assigning of numeric codes in the aggregate data. Original data 
will be destroyed within 10 years of initial publication. While no contact with company 
employees was expected during the study, the Walden University IRB was solicited for 
their approval of this study. The IRB approval number for this study is 02-20-14-
0077664. 
Appropriateness of survey or Internet research methods. The Internet 
provided the major source for the data collection. The ICAO and IATA provided the 
population. The EU regulator’s Internet site provided the participants for the 
experimental stratum. From both sites, participants in experimental and control strata 
were chosen at random and the public financial records of the participants on each 
corporation’s website provided the resulting dependent information. Other IFRS and 
XBRL influences as well as computer competency for providing of this information were 
analyzed from specific corporate documents available online. Where financial data for 
listed public corporations were missing or incomplete, four airlines were contacted by e-
mail and one provided the missing public documents for that airline. There was no need 
for a survey of corporate employees or regulator employees in this quantitative study as 
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the data was provided by the compilation from publicly available information websites as 
described. 
Instrumentation and Materials 
Instrument. In measuring the carbon costs disclosure of the EU resident and EU 
bound (Groups 1 and 2) compared with the non-EU bound airlines (Group 3) there were 
elements of content, empirical, and construct validity to ensure. The instrument used a 
matrix record of observed line items or footnotes within the financial statements of the 
sample as evidence of disclosure items (Jang, 2005). As the instrument was a developed 
structured filter based upon a modified Guttman scale as exampled in Table 2, no pilot 
testing was done. 
Table 2 
Coding of Carbon Cost Disclosures  
________________________________________________________________________ 
Participant    Reported on   Reported on    Reported in    Reported to       Guttman 
  Group     Income    Balance    Footnotes EU-ETS         cumulative 
  1,2, or 3           Statement         Sheet              or MD&A                              total            _                  
 
  1, 2, or 3          Yes-Y, No-N   Yes-Y, No-N   Yes-Y, No-N  Yes-Y, No-N  Range:0->∞ 
________________________________________________________________________ 
Note. Adapted from “A basis for scaling qualitative data,” by L. Guttman, 1944, 
American sociological review, 9(2), pp. 139-150. doi:10.1177/001316444700700204 
 
The Guttman scale was appropriate to use for this study as it is a unidimensional 
and cumulative scale (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008) which supported the data 
collection. Across each of the Groups 1, 2, and 3, data was gathered with either an 
affirmative or negative response (Janmaat & Braun, 2009). The cumulative total score 
gained through the eight dependent disclosure options as shown in Table 1, allowed my 
manipulation and statistical inferences using SPSS, to be apparent both initially and at 
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each subsequent testing time (Bolivar & Galera, 2007). The constructed data collection 
instrument is shown in Table 1 in the Variables section of Chapter 3. 
Reliability. The measurement instrument gathered the needed specific reporting 
data at several various intervals across the time frame to ensure that the results were 
consistent and therefore reliably gathered by this instrument. Reliability was ensured by 
using the test-retest method (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008) in this longitudinal, 
time series delayed design model (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). As the 
airline’s personnel were not interviewed, there was no risk of the participants being 
sensitized by repeated testing. This repetition risk could be problematic in future 
attitudinal studies using survey instruments. Another risk to the reliability of the 
instrument was that something not yet identified, other than the EU-ETS regulation, 
might have caused a change in the carbon cost behavior of the groups (Frankfort-
Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). 
At the time of the study IFRS were not mandated for participants for the financial 
statement reporting of carbon costs (Abeyratne, 2010). IFRS guidelines included sections 
on accounting treatments that could be applied to environmental costs should 
organizations choose to use them for that purpose. Hesford and Potter (2010) pointed out 
that companies were reluctant to invest in the technology or reporting systems to gather 
and report this data voluntarily. It was expected that this initial study would be early 
enough and just ahead of any ecology changes, and that this study’s results might set a 
benchmark in place that would serve as a foundation for any subsequent changes that 
may come forward (Hesford & Potter, 2010). 
93 
 
As previously discussed, there could have been a weakness in reliability in the 
test-retest model due to sensitization or another new phenomenon that was actually 
causing the results to change over the time period (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 
2008). In this case, the test-retest itself did not sensitize the participants as corporate 
employees were not contacted. However, it was expected that the corporate reporting 
would improve not only due to the regulatory instructions but also, as was seen in Fauré, 
Brummans, Giroux, and Taylor (2010), improvement was caused in accounting reporting 
by the effects of social actions demanding accuracy and risk disclosure on accounting 
reports. Therefore, as social action evolved in the years of the study, a positive effect on 
additional disclosure accounting was expected (i.e., a maturation threat). 
Data Analysis Plan 
A data analysis plan is described in order to satisfy the Chapter 1 research 
questions and hypotheses. 
Research Question 1: To what extent is there a difference in the frequency means 
for reporting carbon footprint costs between the EU bound airlines and the non-EU bound 
airlines?  
Research Question 2: Do international financial reporting standards influence the 
reporting of carbon emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations? 
 Hypothesis 1: 
H0: µ1 = µ2. On average there is no difference between EU bound and non-EU bound 
airline corporations in tracking the carbon costs of carbon emissions and reporting on 
financial statements. 
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H1:  µ 1 ≠  µ 2. On average there is a difference between EU bound and non-EU bound 
airline corporations in tracking the carbon costs of carbon emissions and reporting on 
financial statements. 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: µ1 = µ2. International financial reporting standards do not influence the reporting of 
carbon emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations. 
H1: µ1 ≠ µ2. International financial reporting standards influence the reporting of carbon 
emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations. 
There were two independent and multiple dependent variables in this study. The 
disclosure of carbon costs data was gathered from the public financial statements and 
annual reports of the sample through a Guttman style scale (Bebbington et al., 2008). The 
main independent variable, the intervention, was the EU-ETS carbon trading scheme that 
mandated airlines flying into their territories to disclose the carbon burn of their 
airplanes. A further secondary independent variable was the IFRS financial reporting 
regulations that might or might not have had an effect within the country of the airlines 
analyzed or even be in effect during the study time frame. The ability to gather and report 
costs through some technology computing might also have been a confounding variable 
in this study. The dependent variable with eight levels was the carbon cost disclosure on 
the formal financial statements and annual reports of the corporations as described in the 
Sample and Instrumentation sections of this Chapter 3. 
The analysis of the data was completed using SPSS. A norm referenced test 
compared the nominal disclosure incidence of each airline company across the five 
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reporting areas that were under consideration (Criterion and Standards Tests, 2007). 
Those were (a) income statement, (b) balance sheet, (c) footnotes to the financials, (d) 
annual reports, and (e) EU-ETS reporting. Further subcategories were described in the 
collection instrument of Table 1. Aggregate data from the EU-ETS public documents for 
EU destination airline’s reporting was compared in SPSS with individual airline 
corporation’s data to derive correlation between the reported data (Jang, 2005). 
Further delineation of the variables for this plan was described in levels of detail. 
This plan used a multivariate quantitative test and considered three independent nominal 
groups which were assessed against several nominal reported outcomes over a repeated 
measures longitudinal study. In the study, a pretest and two posttests (i.e., three different 
reporting time intervals) was used. This was a multiple measures design including within 
subjects design of each of the participants within the levels of the independent nominal 
groups. It was also a between subjects design which measured the means of the 
participants taking each of the independent nominal groups as a whole. A factorial mixed 
model repeated measures ANCOVA though SPSS was used to assess whether the 
average scores had differed meaningfully over the time frame. 
Threats to Validity and Reliability 
External Validity 
Generalizability was a strength of this study’s results as the entire airline industry 
population from ICAO was used as the frame and verified against the IATA membership 
listing. Ecological fallacy was also minimized by the use of the airline industry 
population frame. This resulting complete airline industry population frame was first 
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stratified into two comparison groups and subsequently into three groups when the EU 
bound airlines reporting requirement was postponed after their 2012 reporting. This 
further stratification of Group 1 was done by analysis against the EU-ETS data which 
showed the airline corporations that were required to report under the EU-ETS mandate. 
Those airline corporations that were not mandated originally comprised the original 
Group 2 control population strata. In 2012, with the Group 1stratification into Groups 1 
and 2, the non EU bound airlines control group became Group 3. From within these three 
strata a random sample of 72 was initially chosen and 69 participants were analyzed. 
Their formal financial statements and annual reports were reviewed for raw data. Also the 
raw cost data were gathered by individual airline corporation thereby eliminating the 
individualistic fallacy. 
Internal Validity (Content, Empirical, Predictive, Construct) 
Validity was a strength of this measurement instrument. A modified Guttman 
scale instrument assured the face and sample validity within the content validity. The 
collection instrument recorded all possible options within the reporting of the carbon 
costs (face validity) and used a randomly chosen, statistically significant calculated 
sample size. There was also empirical validity in the modified Guttman scoring 
instrument as it allowed a relationship to be seen between the alternatives and the 
nominal groups and a further comparison between those nominal groups. Group 3 (non 
EU bound) was the control group. Empirical with predictive validity was present and by 
comparison to the known-group data collection by the EU-ETS itself (Kolk et al., 2008), 
the strength of the construct validity was in this measurement instrument (Frankfort-
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Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008). Based upon the results of each of the pretest, first posttest, 
and second posttest, the coefficient of reproducibility (CR) was calculated representing 
the “extent to which the total response pattern on a set of items can be reproduced even if 
the total score alone [was] known” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, pp. 426-
427). 
CR = 1 - ∑e 
   Nr 
Where ∑e = the number of inconsistencies in the data collected 
and Nr = the total number of responses (number of cases x number of items [variables]) 
Although Jang (2005) pointed out that each nationality had slightly different reporting 
requirements and GAAP, the EU gathered and reported carbon cost reports from all 
group’s airlines from January 2012 and forward, and therefore some measure of 
predictability was assured when the EU publicly reported Groups 1, 2, and 3 carbon costs 
were compared within this study’s measurement instrument. Construct validity came 
from the known groups technique using the EU publicly reported data on all Groups 1, 2 
and 3 airlines (Chan & Lam, 2001). 
Reliability 
Further reliability elements were assured in the study. As discussed in the Design 
section and in the Instrument Reliability section of Chapter 3, the contrasted groups 
design type was applied in this longitudinal study in order help control for “history, 
maturation and test-retest effects” (Frankfort-Nachmias & Nachmias, 2008, p. 128, 
para.1). The records that provided the random sample came from the regulatory bodies of 
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the ICAO under the UN as well as the EU-ETS and the raw cost data came from public 
published audited financial statements. An additional five airline corporations were 
drawn beyond the statistically significant requirement in the random sample to minimize 
the maturation concern over the time frame. To the extent that these data sources could be 
relied upon as valid data, there was a good basis for inference from the results. 
Summary 
The reliability of the research design, the methodology, the data collection, and 
the instruments for data analysis have been described in Chapter 3 in detail along with a 
discussion of the threats and mitigation to internal and external validity. The independent 
and dependent variables for this study were discussed and then presented as the axes of 
the data gathering instrument in Table 1. Chapter 3 included the intervention in this study 
which was provided by new regulatory mandates of the primary independent variable, the 
EU-ETS, and also the secondary independent variable, the IFRS guidelines. Therefore, 
the design was ex-post, quasi-experimental. 
The data was collected through a pretest-posttest longitudinal frame across 3-
years of data. The dependent variables were the disclosure of carbon emissions on the 
formal financial statements of the randomly sampled airline corporations. As the airline 
corporations must have sophisticated data information systems in order to collect this 
flight data on a per flight basis, there might have been confounding variables of 
inadequate computer programs, and incompetent employees to set up this data gathering. 
No requirement for XBRL language submission to the EU was found. In Chapter 4, the 
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results of this data collection and analysis are discussed followed in Chapter 5 with the 
results discussed relative to the literature, accounting practice, and positive social change.   
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Chapter 4: Results  
The results of this study indicated that regulatory intervention was required to 
ensure that the full costs of conducting business within a sustainable environment, 
including the costs of environmental destruction, were disclosed. The study was a 3-year 
longitudinal ex-post analysis of financial statements and annual reports of airlines under 
the EU-ETS carbon emission intervention encompassing pretest 2011 through the 
intervention period, 2012 and 2013. The initially planned striated sample of an 
experimental group, airlines subject to EU-ETS and a control group not subject to EU-
ETS, were further stratified into three groups; (a) EU resident, (b) EU bound, and (c) non 
EU bound as global politics forced an EU-ETS postponement for the EU bound airlines 
at the end of 2012. The 2012 EU-ETS reporting data were available for all mandated 
airlines. 
Both ANOVA and ANCOVA were performed on the data. A one-way repeated 
measure factorial ANCOVA considered the differences in the number of pollution 
disclosures across 3-years, 2011 to 2013, made by each airline using one independent 
variable, the EU-ETS, and the dependent carbon emissions variable. The dependent 
variable comprised the number of disclosures in European Union certificates of exchange 
(CER) from green projects plus a number of IFRS allowable accounting methods as 
shown in Table 1. The mark scored range was 0 to 8 possible outcomes in any one year. 
A further test used the particular group, either EU resident, EU bound, or non EU bound, 
to which each airline belonged, as a covariate in the analysis. In addition, an ANOVA of 
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the number of users of IFRS and the frequency of their disclosures by group was 
compared with the non-IFRS prepared financial statements. 
The main ANCOVA to answer Research Question 1 was conducted to compare 
the carbon disclosures of the airline groups. The independent variable, the ETS for 
airlines, included three levels; EU resident airlines, EU bound airlines, and non-EU 
bound airlines. The dependent variable was the financial statement and annual reports 
carbon disclosures by each of the sample airlines during 2012 and 2013 during the EU-
ETS intervention. The covariate was the 2011 carbon disclosures on the financial 
statements before the EU-ETS. The data were collected through a pretest-posttest 
longitudinal frame across 3-years of data. The emissions certificates and allowances 
reported were cross-referenced to the EU airline carbon emissions repository. 
Purpose, Research Question, and Hypotheses 
Purpose 
The purpose of this research study was to determine if involved EU-ETS airlines 
were disclosing carbon emissions costs on financial statements and annual reports and 
whether the evolving international reporting standards (IFRS) were having a disclosure 
affect in conformity with the European Union’s carbon emissions trading scheme (EU-
ETS) for airlines.  
Research Questions. The research questions were (a) to what extent there was a 
difference in the frequency means for reporting carbon footprint costs between the EU 
bound airlines and the non-EU bound airlines and (b) whether IFRS influence the 
reporting of carbon emissions costs on the airline’s financial statements? 
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Hypotheses. 
Hypothesis 1: 
H0: µ1 = µ2. On average there is no difference between EU bound and non-EU bound 
airline corporations in tracking the carbon costs of carbon emissions and reporting on 
financial statements. 
H1:  µ 1 ≠  µ 2. On average there is a difference between EU bound and non-EU bound 
airline corporations in tracking the carbon costs of carbon emissions and reporting on 
financial statements. 
Hypothesis 2: 
H0: µ1 = µ2. International financial reporting standards do not influence the reporting of 
carbon emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations. 
H1: µ1 ≠ µ2. International financial reporting standards influence the reporting of carbon 
emissions costs on the financial statements of airline corporations. 
Chapter Organization 
Chapter 4 is organized to have a logical information flow following the review of 
the study purpose, questions to be answered, and hypotheses through to the actual 
methodology and design used. The flow continues with the quantitative analyses 
performed and the results of those analyses along with any conclusions that could be 
drawn. Chapter 4 includes the details of the data collection time frame, the random 
sampling design, the collection method, and any discrepancies from the original plan 
described in Chapter 3. The results of the data analyses are discussed including the 
intervention univariate effects and the covariate effects of both the EU-ETS carbon 
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trading scheme and IFRS guidelines mandates; a summary of the findings as well as 
figure and tables for display are included. 
Data Collection 
Time Frame, Recruitment, and Response Rates 
Time frame. The study encompassed the 2011, 2012, and 2013 annual reports 
and financial statements of the sample of 71 airlines. Two airlines were removed for lack 
of available English reports. IFRS had been adopted by many countries over the past 
decade while the EU-ETS carbon dioxide emissions for airlines was benchmarked in 
2008-2010 with formal carbon disclosure reporting mandated from January 1, 2012. 
Although this date was postponed in late November 2012 for EU-bound airlines, they 
were required to report to the EU-ETS for 2012. The EU-ETS for EU resident airlines 
continued to report throughout 2012 and 2013 but like the suspension for the EU bound 
airlines, the EU resident formal reporting mandate was suspended in April 2014. Annual 
reports with financial statements during the study period did present data for analysis for 
the three stratified groups. EU resident airlines (Group 1) reported to the EU-ETS 
throughout the study, EU bound airlines (Group 2) reported to the EU-ETS until the end 
of 2012, and non EU bound airlines (Group 3, the control) which were not required to 
report to the EU at any time. 
Recruitment. The stratified probability sample with random sampling of publicly 
traded airlines used three strata within which random sampling was completed until a full 
complement of 64 airlines was reached. A sample of 71 airlines was chosen to adjust for 
mortality. The complete population was taken from the ICAO airline listing cross-
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referenced to both the EU airline and IATA listings of the then 5,787 airlines in the 
airline industry. The full listing was subdivided into three strata, the airlines that were EU 
residents, EU bound airlines, or non EU bound airlines. These constituted Groups 1, 2, 
and 3 respectively. Group 1 airlines were under the EU-ETS mandate during the study 
period and were also using IFRS as their GAAP. Group 2 airlines flew into one or more 
EU airports; some of the airlines used IFRS as their reporting GAAP in their own 
countries. Group 3 airlines did not fly into any EU airport and might or might not have 
been using IFRS in their own country for financial reporting. Each selected airline had to 
have publicly available annual reports. Shown in Figure 1, G power (Faul, Erdfelder, 
Buchner, & Lang, 2009) .05 alpha reject region, effect size .40 (large) and with 80% 
power, F test ANCOVA sample size calculator confirmed the valid sample size of 64; 
however, 71 airlines were selected across all three comparison groups to allow for 
mortality across the study years. Two airlines were eventually removed for lack of 
complete, available data leaving 69 airlines in the analysis set. 
An additional t test for the means differences between the airlines that prepared 
their financial statements using IFRS and those that did not, made use of the same 
random sample within the three strata. The required statistical sample for this t test was 
42; therefore, the main sample for the main ANCOVA provided sufficient data. In 
addition, a further ANOVA F test was performed to consider the effects of IFRS 
financial reporting on carbon emission disclosures. The required statistical sample 
number was 12 and this too was satisfied by the main ANCOVA sample data. 
105 
 
Response rates. A sample of 69 airlines remained in the study throughout the 
study period. Within the 69 airlines, 15 were from the EU resident group, and 27 were 
represented from the EU bound group, and 27 from the non EU bound groups. As the 
data was ex-post secondary data taken from public records, the response was as expected; 
97% response data of the 71 airlines originally randomly chosen. Two airlines were 
removed as no English data could be gathered from their public websites or from e-mail 
contact to the shareholder relations departments.  
Discrepancies From Chapter 3 Plan 
The study design was conceived to include for multiple measures within and 
between two sample groups which was subsequently increased to three groups. This 
study included a within subjects design of each of the participants and the three levels of 
the independent nominal groups. It was also intended as a between subjects design 
measuring the means of the participants taking each of the independent nominal groups 
as a whole. As described in the time frame section, the original design of two stratified 
groups, EU-ETS mandated, and those which were not, transmuted into the three stratified 
groups of EU resident, EU-Bound, and non-EU bound due to the postponement of the 
EU-ETS for the EU bound group at the end of the first mandated reporting year, 2012.  
The plan for a t test or ANOVA was modified to conduct an analysis of 
covariance (ANCOVA) for the EU-ETS using the airline groups (three levels) as 
representing the ETS effect, the independent variable, holding the reported data from 
2011 as the covariate constant. The dependent variable was constructed as the repeated 
measures disclosures in 2012 and 2013. A further ANCOVA was performed holding 
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IFRS as the covariate with 2011, 2012, and 2013 being the repeated measures. An 
ANOVA test was performed to analyze the effect of the IFRS mandate on the airline 
disclosures by having the identified IFRS user airlines as the independent variable and 
the disclosures across the 3-years of the study as the dependent variable. 
The conceived contrasted groups design allowed for a second or possibly a third 
intervention cause which may have included the airlines being compelled to report to the 
EU-ETS in XBRL language. Although XBRL language was present in all companies that 
reported data to the SEC, no XBRL language reporting was required for the EU-ETS 
during this study’s time frame. A measure of the complex computer systems to gather 
and report data that may have been present was considered in the design; however, due to 
a lack of reporting within the annual statements, the extent of the ERP systems was 
limited in this secondary data study.  
Sample Baseline Descriptive and Demographic Characteristics and Representation 
The study used only publicly traded airline corporations for which annual reports 
were available. These airlines were from countries around the world. The airline industry 
is comprised of very large or medium sized international passenger and freight 
companies, medium sized regional passenger carrying or freight forwarding companies, 
with over 95% of the industry as small privately held or military airlines for which no 
data could be obtained. This was according to my comparison of the Bloomberg (2013) 
publicly listed airline index with the IATA/ICAO listings, wherein publicly traded 
corporations comprised approximately 3.5% of the industry. To verify the EU-ETS 
reporting as shown on the annual reports, the EU official repository record of ETS airline 
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environmental reporting was scrutinized for corroborating evidence of carbon certificate 
allowances, purchases, and green offsetting credits. 
Large public companies were most represented in the sample due to their publicly 
traded shares. These public companies were most prevalent in the industrialized, western 
cultures with sophisticated and long standing corporate legislation, income tax 
regulations, and audit. In the randomly achieved sample from within the three strata, not 
segregated by EU-ETS mandate, 22% were resident in the EU (including 1 Denmark, 1 
Finland, 1 France, 2 Germany, 1 Greek, 1 Iceland, 2 Ireland, 1 Netherland, 1 Spain, 1 
Turkey, 5 UK), 7.25% Australia, 7.25% Canada, 1.5% Columbia, 17.4% United States, 
4.35% China/Hong Kong, 4.35% Taiwan, 1.5% Egypt, 5.8% India, 1.5% Israel, 1.5% 
Japan, 1.5% Kenya, 2.9% Malaysia, 1.5% Mexico, 1.5% New Zealand, 1.5% Pakistan, 
1.5% Panama, 1.5% Philippines, 4.35% Russia, 1.5% South Korea, 1.5% Singapore, 
1.5% South Africa, 1.5% Sri Lanka, 1.5% Tanzania, 1.5% Thailand, and 2.9% UAE for a 
100% total of the sample (rounding in individual percentages caused slight excess in 
totaling). 
Results of Basic Univariate Analysis and Further Inclusion of Covariates 
A univariate analysis of airline penalty disclosures for EU-ETS carbon fuel burn 
and a univariate analysis conducted on the IFRS prepared annual reports versus the non-
IFRS prepared reports did not take into consideration the covariate affect that may have 
been present. A subsequent multivariate analysis was required. As a result, several 
analyses were conducted as repeated measures ANCOVA holding 2011 and/or IFRS as 
one or two covariates concurrently in response to Research Question 1 regarding the EU-
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ETS effect on reporting. In addition, an ANOVA to determine the effect of IFRS on the 
reported carbon emissions was also done in response to Research Question 2. 
In order to set the context to answer the Research Question 2 which referred to the 
use of IFRS for standardized financial reporting, a univariate base comparison was run 
between the IFRS user and non-IFRS users. Within the 69 sample airlines, the EU 
resident Group 1, which comprised 22% of the sample and within which all airlines were 
mandated to use IFRS, had 100% IFRS compliance in their annual reporting. Of the EU 
bound airlines which comprised 39% of the sample, just 19 of the 27, or 70.4% were 
reporting compliance with IFRS. Of the non-EU bound airline group, which comprised 
39.1% of the sample, 15 of the 27 airlines or 55.6% were IFRS compliant. These 
comparisons are shown in Figure 2. Therefore, while just 34 of the 69 airlines (50.7%) 
were from IFRS mandated countries and were required to report in IFRS, there were 
actually 49 airlines, or 71% of the sample, that did report in IFRS. Of the 50.7% of the 
sample which were from IFRS mandated countries, just one airline from Hong Kong 
failed to indicate that they had reported in IFRS or HKFRS which is the Hong Kong 
replication of the IFRS. 
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Figure 2. Bar graph of the frequency of IFRS reported prepared annual reports across the 
three represented groups of airlines. 
 
The results of this ANOVA of IFRS based reporting through the study period and based 
in each group is shown in Table 3; the chi-square test of this reporting data with X(!) (2, N 
= 69)= 9.263, p = .010.  
Table 3 
 
IFRS Users Compared With Non IFRS Users: Chi-Square Test 
____________________________________________________ 
    Value  df Asymp. Sig. 
       (2-sided)___ 
Pearson Chi-Square    9.263  2 .010 
 
Likelihood Ratio  13.168  2 .001 
 
Linear-by-Linear Association  8.711  1 .003 
 
N of Valid Cases  69__________________________ 
Note. N = 69, p<.05 
Treatment and/or Intervention Fidelity 
Plan 
The ANOVA design was enhanced to also provide an ANCOVA to investigate 
the covariate relationships within the interventions and the repeated measures of carbon 
IFRS 
IFRS 
IFRS 
Not 
IFRS 
Not 
IFRS 
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disclosures across the 3-years of the study. The ANCOVA was performed to include for 
the IFRS covariate and used 2011 as the benchmark year against which the repeated 
measures in 2012 and 2013 were compared. The two group plan was modified to three 
groups due to a postponement of the EU-ETS intervention for the EU bound airlines in 
2012. The data collection instrument was expanded to provide information on additional 
categories of CSR dialogue categories and green project offset credits. The data 
collection instrument was also broadened to include any evidence of derivative hedging 
contracts for forward Certified Emissions Reduction (CER) contracts taken on by the 
airlines to hedge exposure to carbon emissions allowance trading volatility.  
Intervention Limitations 
The EU-ETS mandate for the proposed groups, all airlines under the EU-ETS 
mandate, was not universally enforced. The EU-ETS intervention applied only to the EU 
resident airlines during the full period of the study. Other airlines using EU airports (EU 
bound Group 2 in the study) were given a moratorium in late November 2012 on the 
assigned penalties until the ICAO could establish a globally acceptable scheme. The EU 
bound airlines were required to report to the EU-ETS for the whole of 2012 and were not 
required to report for the year 2013, the final year of the study. The EU bound airlines, 
which had prepared for the EU-ETS since 2008 like the EU resident airlines, became a 
separate Group 2 for this study. This moratorium was based in the airline industry 
(through IATA) and United States/China country lobbies which claimed low profit 
margins and a continuing poor economic climate remaining from the 2008 financial 
crisis. That economic crisis affected the airline industry with bankruptcies and losses that 
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continued into the study period. During this study period, the continuing poor profits of 
the airlines was exacerbated by the need for the airlines to invest in upgrades to their 
airplane assets and IT infrastructure in order to reduce their carbon emissions. 
The secondary intervention of IFRS was evident in those airlines whose countries 
had accepted the IFRS guidelines. IFRS adoption was mandated by the EU for all EU 
members’ financial reporting but remained voluntary for all other world regimes. On a 
country by country basis, the airlines were analyzed for their IFRS use as GAAP. Figure 
2 depicted the IFRS reporting by the three groups and while 50.7% of airlines belonged 
to IFRS GAAP mandated countries, 71% of the sampled airlines were reporting in IFRS. 
Results 
To satisfy Research Question 1, whether the EU-ETS CO2 penalty scheme had an 
effect on the financial reports of the airline industry, a one way analysis of covariance 
(ANCOVA) was conducted. The F test ANCOVA using a statistically significant sample 
of 69 airlines was performed for fixed effects, main effects, and interactions between 
three independent means (three groups) .05 alpha reject region, effect size .4 (large) and 
with 80% power. The results indicated that the EU resident airline participants, 100% of 
which were IFRS mandated and who remained under the EU-ETS mandate throughout 
2012 and 2013, did disclose and report carbon penalty costs in significantly more IFRS 
adapted methods or green project credits, which continued to increase over the time 
frame. The EU-bound airline group under the EU-ETS mandate for 2012 which were 
70.3% from IFRS mandated countries, had mean disclosures that were 76% fewer carbon 
emission costs in 2012 than the EU residents and subsequently showed a within group 
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46.5% mean decrease in their disclosure from 2012 to 2013 when they were no longer 
required to report to the EU-ETS. The non EU bound group, never under the EU-ETS 
mandate, in 2012 disclosed 87.5% less mean carbon costs than the EU resident group and 
47.7% less than the EU-bound group. 
For the ANCOVA, the independent variable, the airline groups, included three 
levels; EU resident airlines, EU bound airlines, and non-EU bound airlines. The 
dependent variable was the financial statement carbon disclosures on each of the airlines 
in the sample throughout 2012 and 2013 during the EU-ETS intervention, and the 
covariate was the 2011 carbon disclosures on the financial statements before the EU-
ETS. A preliminary analysis evaluating the homogeneity of slopes assumption indicated 
that the relationship between the covariate and the dependent variables did not differ 
significantly as a function of the independent variable; for 2012, F(2, 63) = .125, MSE = 
.635, p =.883, and partial ƞ2 = .004, small effect, and the interaction was non-significant; 
for 2013, F(2, 63) = 1.445, MSE = .337, p =.224, and partial ƞ2 = .044 and again, the 
interaction was non-significant. Based upon the results of the partial ƞ2 and verified 
homogeneity of slopes, an ANCOVA could have been conducted; however, an 
ANCOVA with a main effects test was conducted that allowed for the homogeneity of 
slopes in order to obviate the assumption.  
The one way ANCOVA tests for the main effects with the covariate. The results 
of the analysis indicated that the null hypothesis, that the adjusted population means are 
equal, should be rejected as the ANCOVA was significant. In comparing the groups in 
2012, F(2, 65) = 55.51, p = .00, and the partial ƞ2 of .631, a strong relationship was 
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suggested between the different groups and their 2012 carbon disclosures controlling for 
the disclosures in 2011. The strength of the relationship between the EU resident group 
and the carbon disclosure, as assessed by the partial ƞ2 with the EU resident group, 
accounted for 63.1% of the variance of the dependent variable, the carbon disclosures, in 
2012, and 79% of the variance in the dependent variable, the carbon disclosures, in 2013, 
holding constant the 2011 carbon disclosures. The comparison of the groups with 2013 
disclosures, F(2, 65) = 122.49, p = .00, and the partial ƞ2 of .790 again suggests a strong 
relationship between the different groups in the 2013 carbon disclosures controlling for 
the disclosures in 2011. 
The relationship between the 2011 carbon disclosures, the covariate, and the 2012 
and 2013 dependent variables within the three groups is significant; for 2011 with 2012, 
F(1, 65) = 57.08, p = .00, with the 2011 disclosures accounting for about 46.8% of the 
variance in the 2012 carbon disclosures. For the 2011 comparison with 2013, F(1, 65), p 
= .00, with 2011 disclosures accounting for 51.1% of the variance in the 2013 
disclosures. 
The means of the number of carbon disclosures adjusted for the initial differences 
in 2011 were ordered as expected across the three airline groups. Appendix B depicts the 
estimated marginal means of each group’s reporting wherein the EU resident group had 
the largest adjusted mean of M = 3.141 (2012) and M =3.240 (2013), the EU bound group 
with M = 0.751 (2012) and M =0.402 (2013), and the non EU bound group with the 
smallest means at M = 0.393 (2012) and M =0.354 (2013). The results of the pair-wise 
comparisons in Table 4 showed the differences in the adjusted means of the three groups 
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in 2012 and 2013. The differences in the EU resident group with the other two groups is 
significant in both 2012 (p = .00) and 2013 (p = .00) and non-significant between the EU 
bound and non EU bound groups in both 2012 (p = .10) and 2013 (p = .76).
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Table 4 
Pair-wise Comparisons Main ANCOVA   
 
Depende
nt 
Variable 
(I) Group (J) Group Mean 
Differenc
e (I-J) 
Std. 
Error 
Sig.b 95% Confidence 
Interval for 
Differenceb 
Lower 
Bound 
Upper 
Bound 
TtlYes12 
EU resident 
group 
EU bound 
group 
2.390* .266 .000 1.860 2.921 
non EU bound 
group 
2.749* .271 .000 2.207 3.290 
EU bound 
group 
EU resident 
group 
-2.390* .266 .000 -2.921 -1.860 
non EU bound 
group 
.358 .215 .100 -.070 .787 
non EU 
bound 
group 
EU resident 
group 
-2.749* .271 .000 -3.290 -2.207 
EU bound 
group 
-.358 .215 .100 -.787 .070 
TtlYes13 
EU resident 
group 
EU bound 
group 
2.839* .198 .000 2.444 3.233 
non EU bound 
group 
2.887* .202 .000 2.484 3.289 
EU bound 
group 
EU resident 
group 
-2.839* .198 .000 -3.233 -2.444 
non EU bound 
group 
.048 .160 .763 -.270 .367 
non EU 
bound 
group 
EU resident 
group 
-2.887* .202 .000 -3.289 -2.484 
EU bound 
group 
-.048 .160 .763 -.367 .270 
Based on estimated marginal means 
*. The mean difference is significant at the .05 level. 
b. Adjustment for multiple comparisons: Least Significant Difference (equivalent to no 
adjustments). 
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Regression plots of the ANCOVA depicted by airline, 2013 disclosures compared 
with 2011 constant covariate and 2012 disclosures compared with the 2011 constant 
covariate, are shown in Figures 3 and 4.
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Figure 3. Scatterplot of main ANCOVA 2013 confirming carbon disclosure frequencies 
of three airline groups. In the regressions, the fixed means and variable slope components 
indicated a positive trajectory of reporting carbon pollution costs with the continuation of 
the interventions. 
 
 
y=0+1*x 
y=0.38 + 0.88*x 
118 
 
Figure 4. Scatterplot of main ANCOVA 2012 confirming carbon disclosure frequencies 
of three airline groups. In the regressions, the fixed means and variable slope components 
indicated a positive trajectory of reporting carbon pollution costs with the continuation of 
the interventions. 
 
The scatterplots and regression lines of best fit in 2012 and 2013 showed a 
positive trajectory for increasing carbon emissions cost disclosure. For the EU resident 
airline sample, the carbon disclosure regression line in 2012 of y =2.81 + .8x increased to 
y =3.03 +.6x in 2013 reporting. This increase was significant as there were just eight 
IFRS or carbon related categories that might have been used and once an airline had 
chosen its disclosure guideline, consistency principle in GAAP would have had them 
remain constant from year to year. For the EU bound airline sample, the carbon 
disclosure regression line in 2012 of y =.38 + .88x decreased to y =.04 + .88x. This was 
also significant as this result indicated a decline in the airline’s own annual formal 
reporting of carbon emission costs once the regulatory EU-ETS mandate had been 
removed for 2013. 
To investigate Research Question 2, the effect of IFRS on carbon reporting, a one 
way ANOVA was conducted to evaluate the relationship between IFRS prepared 
financial statements and the disclosure of carbon cost penalties on the financial 
statements of the airline industry for the 3-years of the study. An ANOVA, for mean 
differences between the independent group means, .05 alpha reject region (i.e., only 5% 
chance of the wrong hypothesis conclusion [Burkholder, 2010]), effect size .8 (large) and 
with 80% power, was run; 80% is the chance of finding a mean difference between the 
groups if one exists (Sherperis, 2010). The independent variable, the IFRS prepared 
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financial statement airlines and the dependent variable was the carbon disclosures on 
their financial statements in the study years, 2011, 2012, and 2013.  
The ANOVA showed significant differences in disclosures amongst the groups in 
years 2012 and 2013; (2012) F(1, 67) = 9.206, p = .003 and (2013) F(1, 67) = 8.434 
(2013), p = .005, but non-significant differences in 2011, F(1, 67) = 2.70, p = .105. The 
strength of the relationship between the IFRS user airlines and the number of carbon 
disclosures, as assessed by ƞ2, was of medium strength in the 2012 and 2013 years with 
IFRS representing 12.1% of the variance in the dependent variable, carbon disclosures, in 
2012, and 11.2% of the variance in 2013. The strength of the relationship was very small 
in 2011 with IFRS users representing just 3.9% of the carbon disclosures dependent 
variable. 
The F tests for 2012 and 2013 were significant and follow-up tests were 
conducted to evaluate the pair-wise differences amongst the means. The mean variances 
across the 3-years varied from 0.239 to 3.587, the lower end applicable to all 3-years of 
not IFRS prepared, and the upper end approximately applicable to all 3-years of IFRS 
prepared, indicated that the variances were somewhat different from each other. The test 
of homogeneity of variance was significant at p = .013 (2011), p = .000 (2012), and p = 
.000 (2013) which implied that there are differences in the population variances. Post hoc 
tests of Tukey and Dunnett C were not possible as there were less than three levels in the 
independent variable. In the pair-wise comparison the 2011 results showed non-
significant differences at p = .105 between the IFRS users and non-IFRS users in their 
carbon disclosure. In 2012, p = .003 and in 2013, p = .005, there were significant 
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differences between the IFRS and non-IFRS user’s carbon disclosures. The 95% 
confidence intervals for the pair-wise differences, as well as the means and standard 
deviations for the two IFRS groups are reported in Table 5. With p values in the 
intervention years of less than .05, the difference is significant and the null hypothesis for 
Research Question 2 is rejected. The alternate hypothesis is accepted and it is inferred 
that IFRS makes a difference in the reporting on the airline annual statements. Graphic 
illustration of the comparative carbon reporting across the study is shown in Figure 5. 
Table 5 
 
95% Confidence Intervals – Pair-wise Differences: Mean Changes in CO2 
Disclosures 
 
Disclosure Year IFRS user/not user M SD IFRS User   Not IFRS user 
2011   IFRS user    .55 1.042   [-.086, .888] 
   Not-IFRS user    .15     .489 [-.888, .086] 
2012   IFRS user  1.51 1.894   [.448, 2.172] 
   Not-IFRS user    .20   .523 [-2.172, -.448] 
2013   IFRS user  1.35 1.809   [.374, 2.020] 
.   Not-IFRS user    .15   .489 [-2.020, -.374] 
Note. M = Mean, SD = standard deviation. 
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Figure 5. ANOVA. IFRS user generated financial statement carbon disclosure. Graphic 
confirmation of the variation in carbon pollution reporting between those airlines whose 
countries had adopted IFRS and those who had not. Note: Consideration in these results 
is mitigated by the knowledge that all EU resident airlines were mandated to both EU-
ETS and IFRS GAAP reporting. 
 
Summary 
The analysis completed led to the acceptance of the alternative hypotheses for 
both research questions. The analysis implied that the EU-ETS demand for airline carbon 
reporting had made a difference in the airline’s carbon pollution reporting and so too had 
the IFRS financial reporting standards mandate that has been adopted by many countries. 
The results supported previous research (Apergis et al., 2013; Ball & Craig, 2010; Frias-
Aceituno et al., 2012; Matisoff, et al., 2012; Turner et al., 2012) that indicated 
government intervention was needed to garner compliance to any environmental issue. 
Without the economic ramifications of pollution and environmental damage costs 
2011               2012              2013 2011            2012            2013 
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imposed and then included on the financial statements of the offending corporations, 
there will be little incentive to mitigate and reduce current GHG emissions. These 
findings indicated that previous research (i.e., size of company, senior management of 
company, profitability, industry norms, and sophisticated computerized systems) 
appeared to be present in the airlines that produced more disclosure and enabled 
compliance as indicated by the ANCOVA results (Christ and Burritt, 2013; Frias-
Aceituno et al., 2012). This study’s results did not support any one of the academic 
researchers’ compiled or suggested pollution costing models (Ajani et al., 2013; Apergis 
et al, 2012; Vasile & Man, 2012). 
The regressions in Figures 3 and 4 indicated that the trajectory was positive for 
carbon reporting and carbon minimization initiatives as a result of government/regulatory 
intervention. The disclosure results showed that the EU resident airlines, under the 
mandate throughout the study, continued to increase their reporting and carbon 
minimization initiatives, while the EU bound airlines, though increasing their disclosure 
during their mandated 2012 year from the foundational 2011 year, decreased their 
reporting in 2013 when they were no longer mandated. The non EU bound airline’s 
reporting remained relatively constant throughout the study period and in some cases, 
such as Australian regional airlines, had home country mandates for environmental 
protection. The results revealed that government/regulatory action was indicated if 
responsible companies were to disclose carbon pollution on financial statements and 
thereby begin to include the full costs of conducting business. As a result of both the 
attention being given to carbon pollution and the airlines’ increased operating costs of 
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penalties, the annual report evidence indicated that both operating efficiencies and 
technical changes were initiated by EU-ETS airlines to lower fuel consumption. The 
lower fuel consumption indicated increased profits, and a CSR appearance for the 
responsibility for the sustainability of global ecosystems.  In Chapter 5, the results are 
discussed in relation to the literature review and the theoretical base, as well as how this 
research expands environmental accounting practice and contributes to positive social 
change. Chapter 5 is concluded with my recommendations for further research 
opportunities beyond this study. 
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 Chapter 5: Discussion, Conclusions, and Recommendations 
This study was conducted to discover whether corporations required regulatory 
imperatives to reduce anthropogenic CO2 and would disclose the economic effects of that 
pollution on their financial statements. The airlines represented in the experiment and 
control groups in this study were publicly traded airlines for which annual reports were 
available and that may have been disclosing carbon or GHG emission costs due to the EU 
mandate and/or IFRS guidelines adopted as GAAP in their home countries. The EU and 
IFRS provided an environmental accounting analysis opportunity through the EU 
environmental trading scheme for CO2 penalties (EU-ETS). This EU-ETS opportunity 
concerned airlines using the EU airspace along with the evolving IFRS international 
accounting guidelines, which provided the reporting framework. Annual statements of a 
statistical airline industry sample provided 3-years of reporting data for a quasi-
experimental repeated measure ANCOVA. The study results confirmed the positive 
effect of regulation on the airline industry’s compliance and on their ability to gather and 
report their CO2 pollution data in increasingly formal disclosure over the period. Through 
the study, a review of annual statements also revealed the details of operating adjustments 
made by airlines to minimize their carbon pollution that concurrently resulted in 
reductions of their operating costs through fuel savings and operational efficiencies. 
Key Findings Summary 
The study results indicated that both the EU-ETS airline mandate as well as IFRS 
accounting guidelines made a significant difference in the carbon emissions reporting of 
the industry. The ANOVA and ANCOVA analyses with accompanying regression 
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figures inferred that the trajectory was positive for carbon reporting and carbon 
minimization initiatives as a result of government/regulatory intervention. Significant 
differences in carbon pollution reporting were identified between the airline groups that 
flew into EU airports and those that did not.  
In response to Research Question 1, the regulatory legislation that created the EU-
ETS mandate for airlines flying into and within the EU sovereign space did affect the 
carbon emissions disclosure on the annual reports of the sample airlines. As this sample 
was both statistically significant and randomly chosen from within the three groups 
represented in the industry frame, the sample is representative of the entire industry. As 
discussed in the Chapter 4 results and shown in Appendix B, the carbon disclosures for 
the EU resident Group 1, which remained under the government regulation throughout 
the study, were significantly higher than the disclosures of both of the other two groups 
with Group 1 at M = 3.141 (2012) and M =3.240 (2013). The refusal of some large 
countries to allow their airlines in Group 2 to participate in the ETS scheme such as the 
United States and China, as well as the EU postponement for 2013 for Group 2, did 
reduce the EU bound group disclosure results. However, the within group analysis of 
disclosure did indicate that EU bound Group 2 with M = 0.751 (2012) and M =0.402 
(2013) were in those respective years significantly higher disclosures than in the control 
Group 3 non EU bound airlines. The reduction in disclosure in the 2013 results of Group 
2 appeared to be a direct result of the postponement until 2016 for that group. The control 
Group 3 results of carbon disclosure as shown in Appendix B were M = 0.393 (2012) and 
M =0.354 (2013). The EU-ETS was forced by geopolitical lobbying by IATA through 
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ICAO, into postponing the pollution penalty ETS in late 2012 for the EU bound group 
and resulted in the study’s three group delineation of EU resident, EU bound, and non 
EU. As reporting data was available for the 2012 period for the two ETS mandated 
groups, I was able to analyze the effect through the 3-years on the groups flying into the 
EU. This analysis indicated, as shown in Figure 4, a decline in disclosure reporting due to 
the EU postponement for the EU bound group. This was further confirmed in Table 4 
which showed the mean difference widening between the EU resident group and the EU 
bound group in 2013 which moved from 2.390 in 2012 to 2.839 in 2013 while the mean 
difference gap between the EU resident group and the non EU bound group remained 
more stable at mean difference 2.749 in 2012 and 2.887 in 2013.  
The widening gap in 2013 disclosures between the first two EU user groups, 
shown in Figures 3 and 4 as well as Table 4, indicated both an increasing disclosure from 
the EU resident airlines and a decreasing disclosure from the EU bound airlines in 2013 
when no longer under the EU-ETS mandate. The small increase in the mean differences 
between the EU residents and the non EU bound group in 2013, were indicative of the 
increasing disclosure from the EU resident airlines in 2013.  
Positive economic effects in operating savings in many of the sample airlines 
were evident in their annual reports. Within the mandated Groups 1 and 2, as their 
number of flights and therefore fuel burn increased over the study period, their EU-ETS 
disclosed penalties did not rise in corresponding percentages. Although several major 
airlines forecasted ETS expense for 2012, which were subsequently revalued by those 
airlines for 2012 and 2013, the nonescalating carbon penalties were a result of reduced 
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operational fuel burn per flight or increased green project offsets. Some examples of this 
were; Air Berlin, Air Lingus, and British Airways. While conducting this research, other 
private airlines whose annual reports were not available, were nevertheless found to have 
environmental protection policies, such as in South Africa, Kenya, and Australia as a few 
examples. 
In response to Research Question 2 and as discussed in Chapter 4, the study 
results indicated a high correlation between those airlines using IFRS and their carbon 
disclosure. The analysis of IFRS mandated airlines compared against their country of 
origin GAAP mandate, as well as their disclosed IFRS reporting during the study, was 
compared with the ETS reporting. This comparison, discussed in Chapter 4 and depicted 
in Table 5 as well as Figure 5, indicated a high correlation between IFRS reporting and 
carbon emissions disclosure with 2012 disclosure mean of 1.51 (IFRS users) compared 
with 0.20 mean (non-IFRS users). The same disparity was seen in the 2013 results with 
disclosure mean of 1.35 (IFRS users) compared with a mean of 0.15 (non-IFRS users).  
Significant differences, as shown in Table 5 and Figure 5, were found in the IFRS 
based reporting of CO2 between the 2011 previous year to the regulation and the ensuing 
2012 and 2013 disclosures. The carbon reporting remained flat for the non IFRS prepared 
statements throughout the study as shown in Figures 3 and 4 with regression lines of y = 
0 + 1x in both 2012 and 2013. A significant disclosure increase was seen in the IFRS 
prepared statements in the 2012 EU-ETS mandated year with regression line of 
disclosures of the EU resident airlines moving from y = 2.81 + .8X in 2012 to y = 3.03 + 
.6X in 2013. EU Bound airlines disclosure regression line declined from the 2012, y = 
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0.38 + .88x to y = .04 + .88X in 2013 due to the EU bound group no longer being 
required to report carbon burn metrics to the EU for 2013. 
An example of a global conglomerate airline’s carbon footprint disclosure, 
publicly traded, is Virgin Australia Holdings. Headquartered in an IFRS mirrored GAAP 
country and that has just one corporate segment that flies into the EU. Virgin Australia 
Holdings will begin to use Australian Accounting Standards Board (AASB), AASB 9 and 
AASB 13 in 2014 which is mandatory for the classification and measurement of financial 
and nonfinancial assets and liabilities on the fair market value rather than historical cost. 
AASB is a reflection of IFRS guidelines. Their notes to the financials including their 
future risks do not mention specifically carbon credits or debits that may be assigned to 
them by Australia or the EU. On page 162 of their 2013 annual report they stated that 
since 2011 they have been following the GRI or triple bottom line disclosure guidelines, 
displayed separately from Virgin’s FS. They present their GRI metrics under the 
environment section which rose due to their increasing consumption of energy, aviation 
fuel, and ground fuel. Virgin further showed their carbon dioxide emissions from Scope 1 
and 2 emissions as rising but Virgin has had passengers donate money as offset carbon 
pollution credits. Virgin then used the donations to purchase green credits (CERs) from 
the green project originating country. Virgin’s GRI efficiency measures both in carbon 
and fuel have consistently increased as a percentage of revenue ton kilometers (RTK) for 
fuel and revenue passenger per kilometer (RPK) for carbon emissions. In the 2011 GRI 
report, Virgin began showing the categories of number of fines, value of fines, and non-
monetary sanctions. In all 3-years of annual reports, nothing has been entered in these 
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categories. Clearly while public pressure has Virgin participating in GRI disclosure and 
they anticipated the evolution of airline emissions penalties in 2011, by 2013 they had not 
been penalized. Pollution penalties or costs were not dealt with on Virgin’s financial 
statements or with any negative costs attached. 
Interpretation of the Findings 
Confirm, Disconfirm, or Extend Previous Research 
The theories and previous carbon literature that I discussed in Chapter 2 were 
positively supported and extended by the results of this study. In Chapter 2, I discussed 
previous research findings that indicated that government intervention was required in 
order to have companies change their operating paradigm and reduce their pollution of 
the earth (Apergis et al., 2013; Ball & Craig, 2010; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2012; Matisoff, 
et al., 2012; Turner et al., 2012). Also discussed from the literature was the value of 
consistent language and consistent costing approaches and penalties to provide a 
homogeneous, fair economic operating environment for all industry participants (Grubb 
& Neuhoff, 2006; Uddin & Holtedahl, 2013). The commercial costs and benefits of 
carbon accounting and ETS schemes reported in Chapter 2 based upon European multi-
country studies by Apergis et al. (2013) and a Welsh study by Turner et al. (2012) were 
confirmed in apparent economic benefits that were discussed by some of the participants 
in this study and demonstrated in their write down of previously accrued for ETS 
pollution credits (i.e., Aer Lingus, Ireland and Atlantic Air, Denmark). In Chapter 2, the 
literature was discussed that described the corporate attributes that would enable 
compliance to regulation. The financial ability to make operating changes as well as a 
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philosophical change in senior management’s thinking was required if the previous 
polluting business models were to change (Christ & Burritt, 2013; Frias-Aceituno et al., 
2012). 
This study confirmed previous research that indicated government intervention 
was needed to force mitigation of anthropogenic pollution (Apergis et al., 2013; Ball & 
Craig, 2010; Frias-Aceituno et al., 2012; Matisoff et al., 2012; Turner et al., 2012). The 
EU resident airlines in Group 1, forced into compliance with EU-ETS and IFRS, not only 
demonstrated explicit compliance in reporting and paying penalties but found additional 
profit in their innovative strategies to reduce fuel consumption. Tactics were employed 
such as new aircraft, maintained engines, lighter weight seating, and cargo containers. 
Finnair produced an 88 page sustainability report in 2012 that detailed their fuel reducing 
strategies, their increased profits from those strategies, and their reduced carbon 
emissions for the year. Finnair reduced fuel consumption to 785,000 kilos (-2%) and CO2 
emissions to 2.5million kilos (-2%) in 2012 and a further 5.5% less in 2013. In addition, 
each airline in Group 1, the EU residents, over the study period dedicated increasing 
space to discuss other aspects of their changing business model. These operational 
changes regarding anthropogenic pollution were reduction initiatives such as their use 
and handling of mechanical chemicals, their employees’ participation, and other societal 
environmental projects such as reforestation. 
Airlines in Group 2, EU bound, did not show on-going compliance in 2013 to the 
EU-ETS as they had been given a postponement. Although the EU bound airlines had 
been part of the initial mandate since 2008 and had sent in their benchmarking data for 
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2010 this group of EU bound airlines were given a reprieve for 2013. This reprieve was 
due to the political lobby environment of IATA member countries which through ICAO 
confirmed their compliance willingness for 2020. EU-ETS intends to begin again in 2016 
after the next ICAO global meeting. In these EU bound airlines there was evidence of 
carbon reduction innovations, dialogue, and readiness in the annual reports of 2011 and 
2012. After the ETS postponement in late November 2012 for the year 2013 there was a 
noticeable decrease in carbon emission disclosure in MD&A or sustainability reports in 
some Group 2 airlines (e.g., El Al Airlines). Many airlines from Group 2 such as those 
from China, India, and Pakistan had little or no discussion or awareness of mitigating 
their CO2 emissions or climate change responsibility across all 3-years of the study (e.g., 
China Airlines, Kingfisher, and Pakistan. Aeroflot, another Group 2 airline from Russia 
noted the EU-ETS regulation, but described only the Russian environmental requirements 
and penalties. 
Group 3 airlines were under no EU mandate to comply with carbon emissions 
penalties; however, some showed compliance to their own countries mandates such as 
Australia, Kenya, South Africa, and Malaysia. Their compliance was in the metrics of 
their own geographic regulation. For example, Group 3 Australian airlines reported 
according to Australia’s regulations, some African airlines in accordance with GHG 
Protocol or GRI G3/G4, and still others were more anecdotal in their 
emissions/environment discussion (i.e., Comair, Kenya Airlines, and EVA). Comair from 
South Africa, as an example, which operates regionally with international flight 
agreements through British Airways (BA), was not part of the EU-ETS. However, they 
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adhered to the GHG protocol for accounting and protocol standards and disclosed Scope 
1, 2, and 3 emissions because of their relationship with BA. Comair identified climate 
change as the most urgent and significant sustainability issue on their 2013 annual report. 
From Australia, other Group 3 airlines such as Alliance Airlines had posted their energy 
efficiency opportunities (EEO) reports and Regional Express Airline had posted both 
EEO and GHG reports on their website.  
Australia has had an EEO reporting requirement as well as a National Greenhouse 
and Energy Reporting (NGER) requirement since 2005 and 2008 respectively. In the 
aftermath of the EU rescinding its ETS airline mandate for EU bound airlines for 2013 
and for all airlines in April 2014, Australia also changed their carbon penalties. Due to a 
political party change in the 2013 Australian government elections, the Australian carbon 
tax law for airlines and all industries was repealed in July 2014. Economic hardship was 
the rationale for the law’s repeal. 
Previous research regarding the company attributes that would enable compliance 
to regulations, such as the size of company, senior management of company, profitability, 
industry norms, and sophisticated computerized systems (Christ & Burritt, 2013; Frias-
Aceituno et al., 2012) were not statistically confirmed. In Chapter 2, I discussed the 
previous research findings on the characteristics of corporations which chose to disclose 
their pollution emission. Frais-Aceituno et al. concluded that the predictors that may 
support a company’s pollution disclosure were company size and profitability. Both of 
these attributes may potentially be linked to a larger pool of cash flow, employee and 
asset resources needed to gather data and produce meaningful information. Large 
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international airlines resident in regulatory sophisticated, highly computerized, and 
accounting regulated countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia, and Europe 
prepared the most detailed disclosures and detailed financial statement notes. These 
attributes included company size, senior management’s supportive dialogue, available 
asset and operational investment funds, and competitor’s compliance. Air Canada, as an 
example, created an additional operations analysis department, trained in six sigma 
techniques, specifically in response to the EU-ETS and an increasing regulatory 
environment. On the IS and BS of many participants, sophisticated enterprise resource 
planning systems (ERP) coupled with additional extensive application software appeared 
as assets purchased and upgraded for support of the required compliance.  
Sophisticated computerized environments needed for carbon emissions data 
gathering are available but not universally used. Most airlines in the sample of Group 1 
(EU residents) did not specifically detail ETS allowance costs as a separate line item on 
the IS or BS. It is unknown if this was due to a lack of computer system or employee 
sophistication in report writing or whether the cost was immaterial and therefore not 
worth disclosing alone. I also gathered data on ETS allowances (EUA) and green project 
credits (CER) by airline from the EU climate action transaction log (EU, 2014). The EU-
ETS repository data was used to verify the IS and BS disclosures as well as add valuable 
underlying detail for each sample airline. 
Some airlines did create sophisticated pollution reporting systems. One airline, 
Finnair Cargo (Group 1), in partnership with CGI Group (Logica), an IT consultancy 
firm, had developed an emissions reporting tool that provided CO2, SO2, NOx emissions 
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on every shipment through the entire delivery chain, air, road, and sea. Finnair had shared 
this software with their forwarding agents. Finnair had been tracking against the GRI G3 
calculation guidelines and encompassing not only their airline fuel emissions but their 
used technical services chemicals, as reported through the their own company extensive 
regulated environmental performance indicators.  
The public airline corporations were analyzed through their annual reports. The 
larger global airlines, many of which had 2013 revenues of several billion dollars, were 
apparent in their pollution reporting and public relations publications. Unlike the detailed 
economic analysis of Apergis et al. (2013) or Turner et al. (2002) for regulatory effect, 
this study was focused on pollution disclosure compliance. Data was gathered on revenue 
and employee numbers as well as references to their ERP systems within MD&A or on 
financial statements; however, the statistical analysis to determine mean reporting 
differences by size and profitability were not performed. Also, as the data was gathered 
from published annual reports the detailed metrics of comparing operating profits before 
and after EU-ETS upgrades and process changes was not done in this study. Even though 
there was anecdotal evidence in the MD&A as well as increasing operating profits for 
some airlines, the underlying details of the costs and benefits was unavailable in this 
study design. 
The analysis completed did not support any of the academic researcher’s 
compiled or suggested pollution costing models shown in Chapter 2 (Ajani et al., 2013; 
Apergis et al., 2013; Tsai et al., 2012; Vasile & Man, 2012). Where pollution was 
calculated, it was to the EU mandate and/or a specific government mandated formula in 
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whichever jurisdiction the airline resided or operated. Specific calculation and reporting 
requirements were set out for the EU-ETS. The EU-ETS emission factors used in the 
2010 benchmark and ensuring years were 3.15 t CO2 per ton of jet kerosene and/or 3.10 t 
CO2 per ton of aviation/jet gasoline (Price Waterhouse Coopers, 2011). The Group 1, EU 
resident airlines, were also required to report annual financial statements in IFRS and 
some IFRS asset and liability categories were used in the financial statements in the 2011 
reports and to a lesser degree in 2012. Group 2 airlines resident in an IFRS user country 
followed the same pattern of disclosure as the Group 1 airlines in the analysis. This 
curious anomaly of less financial statement and more MD&A disclosure in 2012 occurred 
as airlines discovered the passenger offset green project credits which became a flow 
through to that airline’s EU account. The green project credits became highlighted in the 
MD&A and separate environmental reports and fewer detailed economic disclosures 
were made on the actual financial statements. 
As disclosed in Ellerman and Joskow (2008), anticipated EU-ETS penalty costs 
were substantially reduced. This resulted from the application of generous free 
benchmark credits assigned by the EU, airline technical and operational improvements, 
plus the passenger paid for offset green credits. As examples of this, China’s green offset 
credits were purchased by Aer Lingus (216,537 or 15% of their required carbon unit), Air 
Berlin (344,340 or 14% of their carbon units), and British Airways (381,531or 15% of 
their carbon units) in 2012.  
The free benchmark allocation, harmonized, EU-wide transitional rules were 
constructed in an EU-wide consultative process and passed into law in the 2011 
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Benchmarking Decision. This provided the benchmark calculation from 2010 submitted 
emissions data from each airline from which the airlines were given approximately 80% 
of their 2010 emissions in free emission certificates in 2012. This free allocation was to 
gradually diminish by 6.25% annually to 30% by 2020. It is also worth noting that for 
some airlines who continued to increase their flying miles post 2010, due to operationally 
reduced airline emissions, the EU benchmark allowances resulted in Aer Lingus having 
EUAs that represented 80.4% of their required 2012 units, Air Berlin had a benchmark 
allocation of 137.7% of their 2012 requirement, and British Air’s benchmark free 
allocation was 406.7% of their 2012 penalty.  
The reporting and costing of EU carbon allowances on financial statements was 
performed using different accounting treatments and did not adhere to the research 
recommendations for consistency such as those discussed in Chapter 2 of Uddin and 
Holtedahl (2013) or Grubb and Neuhoff (2006). For EU resident airlines as well as other 
countries in the sample, IFRS was regulated as early as 2006. For the EU resident 
companies three of the sample used hedging contracts and provisional liabilities in 
accruing for their EU allowance payments (IFRS 19). Those companies included gains 
and losses on the hedge in an equity reserve account. Other EU resident companies in the 
sample recorded the EUA on the IS in the year of disclosure as well as a current liability 
until paid the following year. Saleable assets in the short term were not evident in any of 
the EU resident companies. Three of the EU resident airlines considered the emission 
certificates as noncurrent assets. 
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Other airlines flying into the EU disclosed further different accounting treatments 
in recording their EU-ETS obligation beyond the IFRS usage results for Research 
Question 2. Several airlines opened an EU-ETS registry account wherein the EUAs were 
deposited along with any further CERs purchased or green project CERs generated, (i.e., 
Thai Airways). Passenger offset donations were used to invest in green project CERs. For 
Thai, the registry account debits and credits were not included on either the IS or BS of 
the company. SriLankan Airlines, another EU bound airline with a registry account, 
disclosed only a carbon unit expense on the IS and a liability on their BS in the following 
year when they needed to purchase any further CERs. 
In this airline industry sample of 69 airlines, 44 airlines publicly acknowledged 
their responsibility for their carbon footprint in their annual reports. These 44 provided 
varying lengths of detailed environmental discussion along with their on-going individual 
efforts. Although the industry had been aware of the EU-ETS airline mandate since 2007-
2008 and reporting their fuel burns to the EU during the benchmarking period, strong 
political pressures remained throughout the study time frame. The start up evidence of 
EU-ETS compliance behavior within this airline sample appeared consistent with several 
of the underlying management theories in Chapter 2.  
Analysis and Interpretation  
Complexity theory along with its subordinate theories of political economy, 
stakeholder, and legitimacy, was discussed in Chapter 2 for its relationship to this study 
wherein the airline EU-ETS was mired in sovereignty and economic issues throughout 
the study’s time frame. Involved in the on-going discussion were all the large global 
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economies including the United States, China, Japan, India, and Europe. The impacts of 
the global recession of 2008 lingered on and were discussed in most airlines MD&A 
sections in 2011. The costs to gather and disclose the metrics, to begin to reduce the 
operating carbon burn, and the costs to pay for penalties or offsetting credits, was stated 
as a hardship. Stakeholders and shareholders around the globe were engaged. There were 
political issues of the EU’s sovereign right to penalize non EU airlines, the EU tourist and 
trade industry’s fear of retribution, and the lobby effects of IATA and of other non EU 
nations to protect their airlines and their own tax based economies. Although the 2013 
revenue data from each airline was gathered in this investigation the covariate analysis of 
the effect on net income by comparing the decreased fuel burn, reduced carbon emissions 
reported to the EU (Research Question 1 results of this study), and increased flying miles, 
was beyond the scope of this study and may be the subject of future research. 
The airline investors and the travelling public were also involved as airlines felt 
the pressure to appear good global citizens or legitimize public perception. The strategy 
of asking passengers to donate towards their carbon footprint appeared successful as 
many of the airlines were able to buy into green projects put in place by countries such as 
China, India, Brazil, Argentina, Africa, Mexico, and Russia . These green passenger 
donations were used as offset credits to benefit the airlines as payment within the EU-
ETS, but were a strategic win for the countries who received the foreign dollar donations 
to build positive non-polluting or pollution reduction projects in their countries. The 
benefits of employee and passenger engagement in new operational paradigms, new 
technologies, and greater efficiency demands across the entire organization in order to cut 
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fuel costs and therefore carbon emission penalties, was noticeable in the MD&As. Across 
the Groups 1 and 2 MD&A spectrum this appeared as excellent public relations, CSR, as 
well as strategic management.  
In keeping with the Chapter 2 discussion of legitimacy and stakeholder theories, 
companies such as Air Canada, from Group 2, created a mission critical strategic 
analyses department with Six Sigma training to address operational issues across the Air 
Canada value chain (P. Torell, Air Canada Dispatch, personal communication, 2013). 
Adapting to its complexity of stakeholder perceptions and in response to the EU 
regulatory mandate, Air Canada showed itself as an adaptive organization. Air Canada’s 
response appeared to be an organized response as described in Chapter 2. Calculated and 
specifically ordered changes were put into operation to gain specific monetary benefits. 
This operational response was demonstrated within the ANCOVA analysis of Chapter 4 
that indicated that the EU resident airlines and the EU bound airlines increased their 
financial and annual report carbon disclosures in 2012. While large airlines, like Air 
Canada, would have had the capacity and technology for an ordered response, there 
might also have been some additional chaotic response to the EU regulatory intervention 
with the effects tracked after the fact through their ERP systems. 
Throughout the years of this study, the politics of agency theory conflicts were 
apparent. Several airlines acted unilaterally to disclose CO2 costs to the EU-ETS acting as 
agents for their shareholders and employees despite their government’s opposition to the 
scheme. Cathay Pacific, a Group 2 airline, chose to disclose green projects, hedging 
contracts, and pollution discussions in compliance with the EU-ETS while concurrently 
140 
 
their government threatened to cancel a major purchase of French manufactured Airbuses 
if the EU-ETS continued. In the United States, the federal government acting as agents 
for the U.S. airline industry and the U.S. economy overall, passed legislation in 
November 2012 to forbid their airlines from participating in the EU-ETS. Federal 
Express, a Group 2 airline and U.S. resident, as agents of their many stakeholders 
disclosed their fuel burns to the EU, were audited by the French authority under the EU, 
and created a large pollution discussion in the MD&A with an extensive environmental 
report. Although Federal Express did not report in IFRS GAAP, the Group 2 collective 
results for Research Question 1 carbon reporting, increased in 2012 over 2011 by a 
means difference of 0.321 (.751 - .43). This disclosure may also have been a component 
of legitimacy theory, disclosure as a part of the marketing strategy of the complying 
airlines to appear good global citizens to their stakeholders. 
The conflicting behavior in these previous examples that was seen between the 
airlines acting as agents for their many stakeholders, was also indicative of Skinner’s 
(1978) operant behavior theory #2 discussed in Chapter 2. The airline management might 
or might not have disclosed based upon their perception of whether the EU-ETS would 
prevail and whether their landing rights would be rescinded in the EU. While some of the 
participant airlines, such as Cathay Pacific and Federal Express, chose to mitigate their 
operating risks and began disclosure, other Group 2 airlines from China, such as Hainan 
and Air China chose to disregard the EU-ETS requirements on their annual reports 
although both flew into the EU. Others such as Thai Airways International and SriLankan 
Airlines, without a strong central government voice to oppose the EU-ETS on their 
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behalf, appeared politically expedient and disclosed and complied with the EU-ETS and 
mitigated their future or potential risk.  
It might have been expected that like the successful energy sector EU-ETS 
moving into phase 2, the airline industry EU-ETS would likewise be successful and 
therefore most of the airlines complied. The energy industry affected was more 
geographically contained within the EU and more easily EU controlled. Similarly, one 
hundred percent of the EU resident airlines in the sample, under EU legislation and aware 
of the successful energy sector EU-ETS, were fully compliant in reporting. These Group 
1 participants’ incidence of carbon reporting moved to a means of 3.141 in 2012 and to 
3.240 in 2013 from the pre-ETS 2011 means of 0.43 as shown in Appendix B.  
The operant behavior theory, wait and see, strategy of some Group 2 sampled 
airlines was indeed gratified with the postponement of the EU bound mandate at the end 
of 2012 and the further EU resident mandate postponement in 2014. According to operant 
behavior #2, the EU may face a credibility gap with future pollution reduction strategies. 
A future qualitative study to understand the management motivation of the airline 
industry during the time of this study may clarify the disclosure behavior. 
Limitations of the Study 
Data was gathered based upon each airline’s visible recording of the carbon 
trading scheme effects on the year-end annual reports and financial statements. A 
limitation to the findings in the study was the lack of specifically named line item 
detailed disclosure of carbon emission allowances within the EU resident airlines in 
Group 1. In the design of this study it was anticipated and subsequently verified in this 
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study that footnotes or MD&A would provide further disclosure should specific line 
items not be apparent. Group 1 airlines were buying additional emission allowances or 
creating carbon offset credits beyond their free benchmarks. IFRS 9 does not require 
underlying offset debit and credit disclosure until January 1, 2018 (originally 2013, then 
2015) and therefore any carbon item details that netted to zero during the time of this 
study would not have been disclosed. Based upon other disclosures in the IS, for instance 
for a future provision on the balance sheet, the data collection instrument was labeled 
with the assumed double entry corresponding dependent IS cost categories with a ‘3’ 
collection instrument category indicating a cost assumption in the IS rather than a simple 
yes or no (1 or 2). 
Evolving limitations were created within the research design of the study as 
carbon pollution in the airline industry remained a very dynamic political environment. 
This study was conceived to analyze the carbon cost disclosures on the financial 
statements of the airline industry given the EU-ETS intervention. The study was 
conceived to have a quasi-experimental group and a control group. Data was gathered 
from years 2011, 2012, and 2013, the year before the inception, as well as the 2-years 
following. During that period, in addition to the United States and China actively denying 
the airline EU-ETS, in late 2012 IATA successfully lobbied for a postponement of the 
EU-ETS from 2013 until 2016 for all EU bound airlines. The EU bound sample airlines 
were required to report for 2012 but not for 2013 and it was therefore necessary to split 
the original intervention group of airlines into two groups, thus making the study into a 
three group study, Group 3, non EU airlines became the control. The carbon disclosure 
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effect of this 2013 EU bound postponement was demonstrated in the ANCOVA Research 
Question 1 results. In Appendix B, the reported EU bound Group 2 disclosure mean 
dropped from .751 in 2012 down to .402 in 2013, while the EU resident group disclosures 
increased from a mean of 3.141 in 2012 to 3.240 in 2013. 
The potential for politics to cancel the airline EU-ETS, and this study, remained 
apparent. Despite global politics surrounding the airline industry, all EU resident airlines 
(Group 1) remained mandated during the study period but they too received a 
postponement eventually. In April 2014, the EU parliament voted to suspend the EU-ETS 
for resident airlines until 2016, but this postponement did not change the reporting of the 
EU resident airlines during the study period. Given the potential economic consequences 
of this additional tax as forecasted by IATA members, it was anticipated that the EU 
resident airlines would clearly disclose that cost for its public relations value and 
reduction of corporate income tax on the lower profit. In this study’s data, the EU-ETS 
repository record was cross referenced to the annual report data collected from the 
airlines to confirm the penalties assigned and both EU allowances given and green 
project credits applied.  
Several airlines in the study expressed dismay at the accounting confusion 
perpetrated by the constantly volatile ETS environment. Luftansa, from the EU resident 
group, stated that the EU’s refusal to negotiate the airlines concerns throughout 2008 to 
2012 and then to suspend the ETS in November 2012 for just the non-EU airlines had 
caused abstruse changes to liabilities. In addition, German air traffic tax liabilities on the 
statements of EU resident airlines were systematically reduced approaching 2012 
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anticipating the EU-ETS implementation. Due to the ETS confusion, the German air 
traffic taxes were not rescinded causing airlines to recalculate and restate. Several other 
Group 1 airlines discussed, in their MD&A, the economic unfairness at EU resident 
airlines bearing a further expense than those of all other non-EU airlines. 
A major challenge to the airlines economic stability and to this study was the 
length and depth of the global financial crisis of 2008 as well as natural disasters in 2010 
and 2011. The lingering recessive economic effects of those crises negatively affected the 
acceptance and the enforcement of the EU-ETS intervention in the airline industry from 
its inception year, 2012. From the 2008 financial crisis, in Euro zone insolvent countries 
such Greece, Portugal, Italy, Belgium, Cyprus, Slovenia, France, and Spain airline traffic 
was affected resulting in losses and bankruptcies. The 2010 Iceland volcanic eruption 
stopped all airline traffic in western and northern Europe for 6 days in 2010 and a 
subsequent 4 days in 2011. The 2011 Japanese earthquake with nuclear station collapse 
provided still further economic imperatives for IATA members to refuse participation in 
the EU-ETS. Many EU resident airlines provided for the additional emissions burden in 
2011 and 2012; however, some airlines from other countries, such as those from the 
United States, refused to burden their organizations financial reports with these additional 
EU taxes. This reaction in some of the U.S. airlines was expected given the U.S. 
economy’s value to Europe and the U.S. legislation passed to prevent U.S. airlines from 
EU-ETS participation. 
The delimitations to external validity, generalizability, and trustworthiness to this 
study’s results were controlled by the design, population frame, sampling technique, and 
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EU-ETS participant external formal audit. The entire industry listing from ICAO was 
cross referenced with the IATA membership listings, Bloomberg’s corporation listing, 
and the EU-ETS airline industry repository to ensure a complete data frame. From that 
frame, the airlines were divided into the three study groups with random sampling within 
those groups until the requisite statistically significant sample size was reached, as 
depicted in Figure 1. A further five airlines were included to ensure requisite sample 
numbers from mortality. The data was considered trustworthy as each corporation’s 
financial statements were formally audited by licensed professional accounting firms 
before their publication. The data submitted to the EU by each airline was audited by 
professional auditors within the EU country to which that airline had been assigned.  
The delimitation to the internal, content, and construct validity that were present 
in this study as well as instrument validity and reliability were controlled by the extensive 
data collection instrument. The instrument assured the face and sample internal validity. 
A modified Guttman scale was used as the collection instrument which recorded all 
possible reporting options under IFRS guidelines as well as other EU-ETS allowances 
and green project offsets. This collection allowed comparisons within the assigned groups 
and between the groups. Empirical and predictive validity was confirmed in the Figures 4 
and 5. In these regressions of the carbon data disclosures during years 2012 and 2013, a 
positive trajectory of carbon disclosures was seen when airlines were under the regulatory 
mandate. The construct and content validity were assured from the comparison with the 
EU-ETS publicly reported data for Groups 1 and 2.  
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Recommendations 
Future years, beginning with the 2014 annual statements of the airlines, should be 
analyzed following the methodology of this study to continue to monitor the airline 
industry for the evolution of observable disclosure of carbon emission costs on the 
financial statements. Despite the periodic postponements of the airline EU-ETS, 
consistent annual monitoring of annual financial statement carbon disclosure to see the 
effects of regulatory and non-regulatory intervention phases would be important 
information for governments to have as they plan their intervention strategies. It is 
expected that with the passage of time, anthropogenic pollution may be fully recognized 
by humans as the cause of climate change and the death of species and ecosystems. 
Going forward, it is expected that financial reports will show more completely the 
costs of pollution as technologies evolve and are purchased to minimize pollution 
production. Based upon the changing accounting reporting, from both the rules and 
software support already accomplished, it is hoped that IFRS guidelines and jurisdictional 
tax regulations and GAAP will evolve more fully to be very specific on what Scope 1, 2 
and 3 emissions must be reported on financial reports. This should include the categories 
of the GRI-G4 and the GHG Protocol. None of these expectations can be assumed and it 
is critical that research attention remain focused on the full costs of anthropogenic 
pollution and its residual economic effects. 
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Implications 
Positive Social Change 
The fight to reduce anthropogenic pollution’s destruction of the earth, given the 
growing numbers of humans who inhabit the earth, is the major social issue for this 
millennium. For positive social change to occur, research such as this study on the airline 
industry must show what efforts are being successful in addressing and reducing 
anthropogenic pollution. Technologies and strategies to help humans reduce their waste 
and destruction can be studied in every discipline.  
The impetus for the accounting discipline to participate in this fight is two-fold. 
One is the sustainability of the biological world. Without accounting showing the 
economic effects of this pollution on financial statements there will be little economic 
incentive to mitigation and therefore few efforts to stop the destruction of the earth. The 
second is the sustainability of commerce. Strategies and operational changes that show on 
financial statements to be both a cost and provide savings or benefits will be the 
foundation and the engine of change to our societal norms in living behavior and its 
responsibility to sustain life. The annual report analysis conducted in this study found that 
those in the airline industry that had been mandated to reduce their carbon impact, found 
cost saving and efficient operational methods to reduce their footprint and to engage both 
their employees and their citizens in their efforts (Atlantic Airlines, 2011, p. 40). Data 
gathered in this study from financial statements and the EU-ETS repository, but not 
analyzed as part of the core design, indicated increased margins and reduced penalties per 
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mile flown. This appeared as a direct result of the airline’s efforts to reduce their carbon 
footprint stimulated by the catalyst of reporting under the EU-ETS. 
Recommendations for Practice 
The financial accounting for the costs of carbon emissions can be financially and 
biologically beneficial (i.e., commercial and ecosystem sustainability). It was indicated 
by many airlines’ annual reports that by applying carbon emissions reduction strategies 
that eventually display on accounting records, innovative operating efficiencies were 
promoted. These commercial sustainability efforts should reduce costs on financial 
statements and concurrently mitigate the destruction of the earth’s ecosystems. The 
individual airline’s 2010 benchmark carbon emissions were close to or higher in some 
cases than the emission penalties imposed by the EU during the penalty periods, 2012 
and 2013. Although the EU allocated a significant portion of the benchmarks, airlines 
among the mandated EU residents took steps to reduce their emissions and worked to 
obtain carbon offsets. 
There were economic benefits to airlines to reduce fuel weight and operating costs 
to be operationally efficient and environmentally friendly, that along with green CERs 
offset much of the carbon emission penalties imposed by the EU-ETS. While few airlines 
followed possible IFRS classifications for carbon credit asset or liability accounts, the 
operating costs of not carrying duty free on board, of less water in the plane, of reduced 
excess fuel carried and sometimes dumped, all related to significant cost reduction of 
those items and of the weight they once contributed to. In addition, less fuel was required 
with more efficient newer airplane fuselage designs, added winglets, and more efficient 
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takeoff, landing, flight routes, and cruising strategies. All of these innovative strategies to 
reduce carbon emissions reduced operational process costs and also reduced the largest 
cost of airlines, the cost of fuel.  
The accounting effects on the income statement and balance sheet may be 
multiple. The reduced operating costs may lower expenses on the IS. The increased asset 
value of the airplanes will be shown on the BS as is the increased amortization expense 
on the income statement. Any remaining EU-ETS penalties would show as a cost on the 
IS and the offset initially would show as a noncurrent or intangible asset which is reduced 
as the CERs or EUAs are submitted to the EU. 
Consistency in the treatment and use of IFRS or IAS guidelines would enable 
equitable industry comparisons and transparency for investors. Airlines in the EU 
resident Group 1 were EU reporting compliant but not all recorded every aspect of the 
debits and credits of the emission certificates. On January 1, 2018 (originally 2013, then 
2015), IFRS 9 will come into effect wherein companies will disclose both the debit and 
credit transactions underlying a swap arrangement for carbon debits and credits. During 
the period of this study, IAS 39 was in force which demanded the net effect only of any 
carbon debits (charges) or credits.  
This net effect was seen to be immaterial by most airlines in the experimental 
sample and therefore often included within the other operating expense line items. Six of 
the Group 1 EU resident airlines showed emissions certificates as individual line items. 
Three showed noncurrent assets in 2011 and 2012 that they had purchased, and also 
showed the EU benchmarked granted certificates as other receivables. EU resident 
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Lufthansa also showed a provision to return the benchmarked granted certificates should 
the ETS be disbanded. The other three of six showed emissions certificates as liabilities. 
Fourteen airlines across the sample groups, such as Air Nippon, spoke extensively about 
their carbon reduction efforts and in particular their carbon offset projects such as 
reforestation. EU resident airlines (Group 1) appeared compliant to the legislation and 
made some disclosures on their financial statements, but although all airlines in Group 2 
were EU compliant in their 2010 benchmarking exercise, the resistance to the actual 
program in 2012 continued. 
Consistency in treatment and use might assist in eliminating purposeful or 
inadvertent manipulation of data. The political and public relations pushback to the ETS 
legislation was evident in a Russian airline from Group 2 flying into the EU and a user of 
IFRS. This airline appeared to misinterpret IFRIC 21 of 2013 to avoid financial statement 
presentation of the EU-ETS related penalties. IFRIC 21 specifically excludes emission 
trading schemes from the new liability disclosure timing guidelines for government 
levies. This same airline appeared misinformed within their 2011 disclosure of all 
pollution penalties of their home country. Their 2011 report partially blamed the EU-ETS 
in the overarching accountability wording for their 2011 penalty cost of 1.2 M USD 
equivalent. This accusation occurred despite the fact that no EU penalties would have 
been assigned at that time. Specific disclosure and consistent practice of these costs may 
become more important as other political regimes mandate further pollution penalties. 
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Recommendations for Further Study 
The legislative interventions have been shown to make a difference in this study. 
Continued analyses of airline financial statements will provide data to indicate what 
carbon disclosure reporting will be done in the ensuing years between this study and the 
next 2016 implementation date. With so much legislative and media attention on GHG 
and climate change, the airlines, whether for legislative compliance or public relations, 
were pollution aware both as economic enterprises and as humans making efforts to 
reduce their carbon footprint. One South African airline stated that “while slowing down 
aviation growth is not an option, not doing anything about the emission issue is not the 
solution either as the current growth in emissions will not be environmentally and 
economically sustainable” (Comair, 2012, p. 39). One postal freight airline in Group 2 
summarized the situation as they described the regulations they are now under within the 
United States and the European Union. This airline stated that regardless of the 
legislations, without constructive GHG mitigation, they were vulnerable to economic loss 
as their customers may stop using their service due to perceptions of the airline’s GHG 
pollution, and further vulnerable “to the physical risks of climate change that could affect 
all of mankind—such as shifts in ecosystems” (Federal Express, 2011, p. 38). 
Airline management’s willingness to disclose CO2 costs on financial statements is 
another important area of future research. Qualitative studies to understand the reasons 
for airline management’s willingness to disclose CO2 is important for successful public 
relations rhetoric surrounding change management techniques for compliance in the 
future. The importance of air travel to economies is growing and so too is the pollution 
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from airline emissions. The airline industry in 2013 contributed just over 2% of the GHG 
emissions worldwide and 3% within the EU mainly due to carbon based fuel emissions in 
Scope 1 category. Some included the Scope 2 such as electricity use and Scope 3 in the 
full supply chain of their operations (EU climate action, 2014).  
It has become imperative to understand management’s motivation to disclose all 
scope emissions. In 2013, the airline industry enabled tourism, trade, investment, and 
global integration which provided a direct contribution to global economic profit and 
business sustainability. The airline industry contributed directly or indirectly one in every 
12 global jobs and approximately 9% of global GDP (UNWTO, 2013). However, the 
airline industry emissions by 2020 are projected to be approximately 70% higher than in 
2005 with a further 300 to700% emissions growth by 2050. Growing GHG and 
atmospheric deterioration are expected to continue to destroy the life supporting 
environmental systems as well as the industrial raw materials for sustainable business 
economics (Perrow, 2011; Stechemesser et al., 2012). An understanding of the motivators 
to disclose is critical to gain positive action. 
The results of this study indicated positive disclosure results under both 
regulatory ETS and IFRS but did not analyze the profitability of the sample during the 
time frame. Data on revenue was collected but remained anecdotal for the analysis 
conducted. A further study of operating profit (EBIT) compared with disclosure 
frequencies may prove beneficial to encourage the airline industry and others to promote 
and action pollution reduction strategies.  
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Additional in depth studies should be conducted that consider the effects on net 
income of an increasing number of operational changes. Technology design, maintenance 
schedules, employee processes, and the costs and savings of other tactics should be 
quantified while flight traffic and flying miles increase. These may be juxtaposed against 
decreased fuel burn and lower operating costs. In addition to the IATA tactics workshops 
being given world-wide to the airline industry, scholarly research and statistical evidence 
is critical to legitimize the costs and benefits of the changes. 
Further mixed studies of the install and use frequencies of a variety of ERP 
systems for reporting would be important. They IS product along with what modules or 
enhancements that may have been employed by the airline industry may give insights 
into the limitations that some industry participants may face in future industry or 
regulatory reporting expectations. In this study ERP data was gathered that was available 
through the annual reports; however, an in-depth survey or detailed study of participant’s 
IT abilities may provide both quantitative and qualitative information. A detailed 
information systems study may provide the basic infrastructure attributes that would 
support extensive data gathering and reporting on a variety of metrics.  
Conclusion 
Environmental scientists have determined that GHG global warming, at the 
current escalation rates, will undermine the global economic GDP by 3% per year unless 
the atmospheric temperature is kept to within 2% of the 1990 rate (Tsai et al., 2012). 
ICAO under the UN environmental mandate has negotiated agreement through IATA 
with the airline industry for EU emissions penalties by 2020. At a forecasted airline 
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traffic growth rate of approximately 4% per year, extrapolation of 700 million tons of 
CO2 (2013) yearly airline emissions would result in approximately (1.048 x 700) 958 
million tons of CO2 annually by 2020 (Tsai et al., 2012). Those figures come from one 
industry that contributes just 2% of the current anthropogenic industrial and 
transportation atmospheric pollution.  
The results of this study indicated that government/regulatory intervention is 
necessary if we are to disclose carbon pollution on financial statements and thereby begin 
to include the real costs of business and to take responsibility for the destruction of our 
ecosystems. This study also showed that a consistent accounting framework (i.e., IFRS) 
is necessary for consistency and fairness in economic reporting. This study also showed 
that most airlines were willing to do their part based upon legitimate CSR behavior and 
regulatory leadership to treat the entire industry fairly. Investment into efficient 
technologies and processes appeared to be economically beneficial from this sample’s 
annual reports.  
A standardized, regulatory supported and legislated mandate, understanding, and 
calculation for GHG must be adopted in a global context. The accounting for these must 
be written specifically into IFRS so that both the calculation and the reporting become 
globally consistent. Both of these issues has been politically charged by ego posturing 
countries wanting the lead and the economics of dwindling and scarce economic 
resources to carve further expenses out of airline’s declining profit margins. 
It is a catch 22 for the earth and for the airlines. Economies are declining due to 
dwindling earth resources for an increasing global population. This declining profit 
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margin is cited as the economic argument against including further costs to mitigate, if 
not reverse, the earth’s declining carrying capacity. When governments embark 
courageously on a valuable scheme like the EU-ETS toward global sustainability, they 
cannot falter as their weakness sends a distrust message from which they may never 
recover. 
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Appendix A: Accounting for Carbon Costs Example (Management Accounting)  
Note. From Current dimension of environmental management accounting by E. Vasile and M. 
Man, 2012, Procedia-Social and Behavioral Sciences, 62, p. 568. Copyright 2012 by Elsevier. 
Reprinted with permission. Elsevier License 3540330314834. 
 
 
________________ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT ACCOUNTING - Types of employed measuring 
units_______  
Environmental management accounting in monetary units 
__________________________________________________________________________________ 
Environmental management 
accounting in physical units  
Past oriented Yearly costs 
and expenditures; Costs 
accounting.  
Future oriented Budget in 
monetary units for environment 
protection and investment plan. 
Costs’ estimation and project 
benefits. 
Past oriented Balance for 
energy, water, and materials. 
Environment performances 
evaluated by indicators. 
External report of environment 
activity.  
Future oriented Budget in 
physical units for 
environment protection and 
investments. Settling each 
action’s performances. 
Planning and implementing 
the environmental 
management systems, 
pollution prevention, and 
clean manufacturing.  
Accounting in monetary units / Accounting in physical units    
Conventional accounting  Accounting of monetary 
environmental management  
Accounting of physical 
environmental management  
Other instruments of 
evaluation  
Data at the level of the corporation    
Conventional accounting  Transition to environmental costs as 
part of conventionally registered 
costs.  
Balance of flows at the level 
of the corporation for 
materials, energy, and water.  
Systems of production 
planning; system of stocks 
accounting.  
Data regarding processes, the costs of manufacturing centers and of products; accounting level   
Costs accounting  Activities relying upon the flows of 
materials costs (cost accounting)  
Balance of material 
flows,processes, and products.  
o
f
  
Other evaluations at the 
level of the environment; 
measures and tools of 
evaluation.  
Applications: business interest     
Statistic indicators for 
internal use, calculation of 
savings; budget and 
investment plan drawing.  
Statistic indices of internal use; 
budget and investment plan after 
environment costs.  
Management accounting of 
environment systems; 
performances’ evaluation, etc. 
 Other internal uses for 
internal production; eco-
projects.  
External financial report.  External data regarding 
environment expenditures; 
investments, responsibilities.  
External report; durability report.  Other external reports 
towards statistics 
agencies, local 
authorities, etc.  
Applications at national 
level  
   
National income accounting 
at the level of statistics 
agency.  
Investments national accounting, 
yearly environment costs; 
externalities costs.  
Accounting of national resources; balance of materials flows 
according to countries, regions, and fields. 
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Appendix B: Estimated Marginal Means Between Groups 
Estimated Marginal Means Between Groups In 2012 and 2013 Airline Carbon Reporting 
Data 
Estimates 
Dependent 
Variable 
Group Mean Std. Error 95% Confidence Interval 
Lower Bound Upper Bound 
TtlYes12 
EU resident group 3.141a .215 2.713 3.570 
EU bound group .751a .152 .448 1.054 
non EU bound group .393a .154 .086 .700 
TtlYes13 
EU resident group 3.240a .159 2.922 3.559 
EU bound group .402a .113 .177 .627 
non EU bound group .354a .114 .125 .582 
a. Covariates appearing in the model are evaluated at the following values: TtlYes11 = 
.43. 
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Sheridan College        1999- present 
Seneca  College        2002- 2004 
Marketing -York University       1994, 1995   
Finance, Accounting, and Management- York University   2002 – present 
  
ADMS 2510 Accounting York U        2002 through 2005, 2011 
ADMS 3510 Management Accounting York U      2005 through 2008, 2012 
ADMS 4570 Advanced Management-Cases, York U    2004, 2005, 2013 
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Managerial Accounting Sheridan College 2000 – 2002; 2009 through 2014 
Mobile Applications for IT     Sheridan College 1999 
Financial Accounting    Sheridan College 2002, 2007 through 2013 
Organizational Behavior Sheridan College, 2003, 2004, 2006, 2010 to 2012 
Taxation   Sheridan College, 2008  
    CanMAPP seminars, 2006, 2008, 2011, 2012 
Leadership and Management Sheridan College, 2006, 2007, 2008, 2010, 2012, 2013 
Business Administration Sheridan College 2008, 2009, 2011 through 2014 
 
Investment Planning Seminars: Investors Group  1999, 2000, 2001 
 
Community Service: 
Committee Member; Parks, Recreation and Culture Committee  Oakville  2001 - 2004 
Chair, Tree Committee                                     Oakville  2003 - 2005 
Chair, Parks and Recreation Committee                       Oakville  2004 - 2005 
CanMAPP Inc.; Director (Accounting Practitioners Association) Toronto   2007 - 2012 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
